A

DISCOURSE

In VINDICATION of the

Doctrine of the Trinity:

WITH

An ANSWER

To the Late

Socinian Objections

Against it from

Scripture, Antiquity and *Reason.*

AND

A PREFACE concerning the different *Explications* of the *Trinity*, and the Tendency of the present SOCINIAN Controversie.

By the Right Reverend Father in God,

Edward, Lord Bishop of *Worcester.*

Stillingfleet

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THE PREFACE.

WHen I was desir'd, not long since, to reprint the Discourse lately published, concerning the Doctrine of Christ's Satisfaction, *I thought it necessary to look into the* Socinian Pamphlets, *(which have swarmed so much among us within a few years) to see how far an Answer had been given in them to any of the arguments contained in it; but I found the Writers of them thought it not for their purpose to take any notice at all of it; but rather endeavour'd to turn the Controversie quite another way, and to cover their true Sense under more plausible Expressions. Of which I have given a full account in the Preface to the late Edition of it. But among those Treatises (which for the general good of the Nation are gather'd into Volumes and dispers'd abroad, to make either* Proselytes *or* Infidels) *I found one, wherein there is pretended to be an Answer to my*

Sermon about the Myſteries of the Chriſtian Faith, *(reprinted with the former Diſcourſe) and therein I meet with a paſſage, which hath given occaſion to this* Vindication. *For there are theſe Words*, That I had utterly miſtaken, in thinking that they deny the Articles of the new Creed, or *Athanaſian* Religion, becauſe they are Myſteries, or becauſe, *ſay they*, we do not comprehend them; we deny them, becauſe we do comprehend them, we have a clear and diſtinct Perception, that they are not Myſteries, but Contradictions, Impoſſibilities and pure Nonſenſe. *Which words contain in them ſo ſpitefull, ſo unjuſt, and ſo unreaſonable a Charge upon the Chriſtian Church in general, and our own in particular, that I could not but think my ſelf concerned, eſpecially ſince they are addreſſed to me, to do what in me lay (as ſoon as my uncertain State of Health would permit) towards the clearing the fundamental* Myſtery of the Athanaſian Religion, *as they call it, viz.* The Doctrine of the Trinity, (*which is chiefly ſtruck at by them*) *without running into any* new Explications, *or laying aſide any* old terms, *for which I could not ſee any juſt occaſion.*

For however thoughtfull Men may think to eſcape ſome particular difficulties better, by

by going out of the common Roads; yet they may meet with others which they did not foreſee, which may make them as well as others judge it, at laſt, a wiſer and ſafer courſe to keep in the ſame way, which the Chriſtian Church hath uſed, ever ſince it hath agreed to expreſs her Senſe in ſuch Terms, *which were thought moſt proper for that purpoſe. For in ſuch caſes, the Original and Critical Signification of words is not ſo much to be attended, as the uſe they are applied to, and ſince no other can be found more ſignificant or proper for that end; it looks like yielding too great advantage to our Adverſaries, to give up the Boundaries of our Faith. For although there be a difference between the neceſſary Article of Faith it ſelf, and the manner of expreſſing it, ſo that thoſe may truly believe the Subſtance of it, who differ in the Explication; yet ſince the Senſe of the Article hath been generally received under thoſe terms, there ſeems to be no ſufficient reaſon to ſubſtitute new ones inſtead of the old, which can hardly be done without reflecting on the Honour of the Chriſtian Church, and giving occaſion for very unreaſonable Heats and Diſputes, among thoſe, who, if we may believe their own words, agree in the ſame fundamental Doctrine* viz. *a* Trinity

in Unity, *or* three Perſons *in the* ſame undivided divine Eſſence.

I am ſo little a Friend to any ſuch Heats and Differences among our ſelves, eſpecially when we are ſo violently attacked by our common Adverſaries, that were there no other reaſon, I ſhould for the ſake of that alone forbear making uſe of new Explications; *but there is another too obvious, which is, the mighty advantage they have taken from hence to repreſent our Doctrine as* uncertain, *as well as* unintelligible. *For as ſoon as our* Unitarians *began to appear with that Briskneſs and Boldneſs they have done now for ſeveral years, ſome of our Divines thought themſelves oblig'd to write in Defence of the Doctrine of the Trinity. Thence came ſeveral Anſwers to them, and in* ſeveral Methods, *as the Perſons thought moſt ſubſervient to the ſame end; but whatever their intentions were, our Adverſaries were too much pleaſed to conceal the Satisfaction which they took in it. For ſoon after, we had the* ſeveral Explications *ſet forth and compared with each other; and all managed ſo, as to make the Cauſe to ſuffer by the diſagreement of the Advocates for it. And from hence they have formed a* fivefold Trinity. 1. *The* Ciceronian Trinity; *becauſe* Tully *had uſed the*

the Word Perſonæ *for different Reſpects*; Suſtineo ego tres Perſonas; *and according to this Acceptation*, Three Perſons in the Godhead *are no more than* three Relations, Capacities or Reſpects of God to his Creatures, *which ſay they, is* downright Sabellianiſm, and is no manner of Myſtery, but the moſt intelligible and obvious thing in the World. 2. The *Carteſian* Trinity, which maketh three divine Perſons, and three infinite Minds, Spirits and Beings to be but one God. 3. The *Platonick* Trinity, of three divine Co-eternal Perſons, whereof the ſecond and third are ſubordinate or inferiour to the firſt in Dignity, Power and all other Qualities, except only Duration. 4. The *Ariſtotelian* Trinity, which ſaith the Divine Perſons are one God, becauſe they have one and the ſame numerical Subſtance. 5. The Trinity of the *Mobile*, or that which is held by the common People, or by ſuch lazy Divines, who only ſay in ſhort, that it is an unconceivable Myſtery; and that thoſe are as much in fault who go about to explain it, as thoſe who oppoſe it.

Conſiderat. on the Explications of the Doctrine of the Trinity, by Dr. W. &c. p. 10.

P. 9.

But that which hath made the moſt noiſe, and cauſed the greateſt Heat and Ferment among us, hath been a difference firſt

begun between two learned Divines of our Church, about the ſecond and fourth; and the account which our Unitarians *give of*
P. 13. *both is this,* That the one is a rational and intelligible Explication, but not true nor Orthodox; the other is true and Orthodox, but neither rational, intelligible nor poſſible. *I do not mention this, as though their words were to be taken as to either; but only to ſhew what advantage they take from both, to repreſent that which is ſet up for the Churches Doctrine, either not to be* truly ſo, *or to be neither* rational nor intelligible.

The deſign *of the following* Diſcourſe, *is to make it appear,* (1.) *That the Churches Doctrine, as to the Trinity, as it is expreſſed in the* Athanaſian Creed, *is not liable to their charges of* Contradiction, Impoſſibilities and pure Nonſenſe. (2.) *That we own no other Doctrine than what hath been received by the Chriſtian Church in the ſeveral Ages from the Apoſtles Times:* (3.) *And that there are no Objections in point of reaſon, which ought to hinder our Aſſent to this great point of the Chriſtian Faith.*

But the chief Deſign *of this* Preface, *is to remove this Prejudice which lies in our way from the different* manners *of* Explication,

tion, *and the warm Diſputes which have been occaſion'd by them.*

It cannot be denied, that our Adverſaries have taken all poſſible advantage againſt us from theſe unhappy differences; and in one of their lateſt Diſcourſes they glory in it, and think they have therein out-done the foreign Unitarians: For, *ſay they*, We have ſhewed, that their Faiths concerning this pretended Myſtery are ſo many and ſo contrary, that they are leſs one Party among themſelves, than the far more learned and greater number of them are one Party with us: *this is ſpoken of thoſe they call* Nominal Trinitarians; *and for the other whom they call* Real, *they prove them guilty of* manifeſt Hereſie; *the one they call* Sabellians, *which they ſay is the ſame with* Unitarians, *and the other* Polytheiſts or diſguiſed Pagans, *and they borrow arguments from one ſide to prove the charge upon the other; and they confidently affirm that all that ſpeak out in this matter, muſt be driven either to* Sabellianiſm, *or* Tritheiſm. *If they are* Nominal Trinitarians, *they fall into the former, if* Real *into the latter.*

Diſcourſe concerning the Real and Nominal Trinitarians, *A. D.* 1695, p. 3.

Letter to the Univerſities, p. 15.

This is the whole Deſign of this late Diſcourſe, which I ſhall here examine, that I may remove this ſtumbling Block, before I enter upon the main buſineſs.

1. *As*

1. *As to thoſe who are called* Nominal Trinitarians. *Who are they? And from whence comes ſuch a Denomination? They tell us*, That they are ſuch who believe three Perſons, who are Perſons in Name only; indeed and in truth they are but one ſubſiſting Perſon. *But where are theſe to be found?* Among all ſuch, *ſay they*, as agree that there is but one only and ſelf-ſame divine Eſſence and Subſtance. *But do theſe aſſert, that there is but* one ſubſiſting Perſon, *and* three only in Name? *Let any one be produced who hath written in defence of the Trinity; for thoſe who have been moſt charged, have utterly deny'd it. That learned Perſon, who is more particularly reflected upon in this Charge, is by them ſaid to affirm*, That God is one divine intellectual Subſtance, or really ſubſiſting Perſon, and diſtinguiſhed and diverſified by three relative Modes, or relative Subſiſtences. *And Mr.* Hooker *is produced to the ſame purpoſe*, That there is but one Subſtance in God, and three diſtinct relative Properties, which Subſtance being taken with its peculiar Property, makes the diſtinction of Perſons in the Godhead. *But ſay they*, Theſe Modes and Properties do not make any real ſubſiſting Perſons; but only

Diſcourſe of Nominal and Real Trinit p. 7.

P. 10.

P. 11.

only in a Grammatical and Critical Senſe, and at moſt this is no more than one Man may be ſaid to be three Perſons on the account of different Relations, as *Solomon* was Son of *David*, Father of *Rehoboam*, and proceeding from *David* and *Bathſheba*, and yet was but one ſubſiſting Perſon. *This is the force of what they ſay. But then in a triumphing manner they add*, That the Realiſts have ſo manifeſt an advantage againſt them, that they have no way to defend themſelves but by Recrimination, *i. e. by ſhewing the like Abſurdity in their Doctrine. And thus they hope either ſide will baffle the other, and in the mean time, the Cauſe be loſt between them.* P. 13.

But in ſo nice a matter as this, we muſt not rely too much on an Adverſary's Repreſentation; for the leaving out ſome expreſſions, may make an opinion look with another Appearance, than if all were taken together, it would have. We muſt therefore take notice of other paſſages which may help to give the true Senſe of the learned Author, who is chiefly aimed at.

1. *In the very ſame Page he aſſerts*, That each of the divine Perſons has an abſolute Nature diſtinctly belonging to him, though not a diſtinct abſolute Nature; and Tritheiſm *charged*, &c. p. 157.

and to the ſame purpoſe in another place.

Animadv. p. 245. 2. That the eternal Father is and ſubſiſts as a Father, by having a Son, and communicating his Eſſence to another.

Animadv. &c. p. 243. *And elſewhere, that* the Relation between Father and Son is founded on that eternal Act, by which the Father communicates his divine Nature to the Son.

Ib. p. 240. 3. *That the* foundation *of the* Doctrine of the Trinity *is this*, 1. That there can be but one God. 2. That there is nothing in God, but what is God. 3. That there can be no Compoſition in the Deity with any ſuch poſitive real Being, diſtinct from the Deity it ſelf. But the Church finding in Scripture mention of three, to whom diſtinctly the Godhead does belong, expreſſed theſe three by the Name of Perſons, and ſtated their Perſonalities upon three diſtinct Modes of Subſiſtence, allotted to one and the ſame Godhead, and theſe alſo diſtinguiſhed from one another by three diſtinct Relations.

What do theſe men mean, to charge one who goes upon theſe grounds with Sabellianiſm? *Doth he make the three Perſons to be mere Names, as S.* Baſil *in few words expreſſes the true nature of* Sabellianiſm, *that it was* ἓν πρᾶγμα πολυώνυμον, One thing

Baſil Ep. 64.

thing with different Denominations? *Can the* communicating the divine Eſſence by the Father to the Son, *be called a* Name, *or a* Mode, *or a* Reſpect *only? And theſe Men of wonderfull Subtilty, have not learnt to diſtinguiſh between* Perſons *and* Perſonalities.

Where is the leaſt Intimation given, that he look'd on the divine Perſons as Modes *and* Reſpects *only? That is impoſſible, ſince he owns a* Communication of the divine Eſſence, and that each of the divine Perſons hath the divine Nature belonging to him; *could it ever enter into any Man's head to think, that he that owns this ſhould own the other alſo? But the* Perſonality *is a thing of another conſideration. For it is the reaſon of the diſtinction of Perſons in the ſame undivided Nature. That there is a diſtinction, the Scripture aſſures us; and withall, that there is but one divine Eſſence. How can this diſtinction be? Not by eſſential Attributes, for thoſe muſt be in the divine Eſſence, and in every Perſon alike, otherwiſe he hath not the entire divine Nature; not by accidents, as Men are diſtinguiſhed from each other, for the divine Nature is not capable of theſe; not by ſeparate or divided Subſtances, for that would be inconſiſtent with the perfect Unity of the*

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Godhead; ſince therefore there can be no other way of diſtinction, we muſt conſider how the Scripture directs us in this caſe; and that acquaints us with the Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt, *as having* mutual Relation *to each other; and there is no Repugnancy therein to the* Divine Nature, *and therefore the diſtinction of the Perſons hath been fixed on that, as the moſt proper foundation for it. And theſe are called different* Modes *of* Subſiſtence, *on which the diſtinct* Perſonalities *are founded, which can be no other than* relative. *But a* Perſon *is that which reſults from the divine Nature and Subſiſtence together; and although a Perſon cannot be ſaid to be a* relative, *conſider'd as ſuch, yet being joyned with the manner of Subſiſtence, it doth imply a* Relation, *and ſo a Perſon may be ſaid to be a* relative Being.

Conſiderat. on the Explication, p. 23. *But ſay they,* If the three Perſons have all the ſame individual Subſtance, then they are truly and properly only three Modes; and therefore although among Men, Perſonalities are diſtinct from the Perſons, becauſe the Perſons are diſtinct intelligent Subſtances, yet this cannot hold where there is but one individual Subſtance.

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The queſtion is, Whether thoſe they call Nominal Trinitarians, *are liable to the charge of* Sabellianiſm; *the anſwer is, That they cannot, becauſe they aſſert far more than* three Names, *viz.* That each Perſon hath the divine Nature diſtinctly belonging to him. *But ſay they,* Theſe Perſons are but mere Modes. No, *ſay the other*; We do not ſay that the Perſon is only a *Modus*, but that it is the divine Nature, or Godhead ſubſiſting under ſuch a *Modus*, ſo that the Godhead is ſtill included in it, joyned to it, and diſtinguiſhed by it. Grant all this, *the Unitarians reply*, yet where there is the ſame individual Subſtance, the Perſon can be only a *Modus*. *To which it is anſwer'd*, That this individual Subſtance hath three diſtinct ways of ſubſiſting, according to which it ſubſiſts diſtinctly and differently in each of the three divine Perſons. *So that here lies the main point, whether it be* Sabellianiſm, *to aſſert the ſame individual Subſtance under three ſuch different Modes of Subſiſtence. If it be, the moſt learned and judicious of the Fathers did not know what* Sabellianiſm *meant* (*as I have ſhewed at large in the following Diſcourſe*) *for they utterly diſowned* Sabellianiſm, *and yet aſſerted*, That the ſeveral Hypoſtaſes

Animad. p. 291.

Tritheiſm *charged*, p. 306.

Chap. VII.

Hypoſtaſes conſiſted of peculiar Properties in one and the ſame divine Subſtance. *But it is not the authority of Fathers which they regard, for they ſerve them only as Stones in the Boys way when they quarrel,* viz. *to throw them at our Heads.*

Let us then examine this matter by reaſon without them Perſons among Men, *ſay they,* are diſtinguiſhed from Perſonalities, becauſe they have diſtinct Subſtances, therefore where there is but one Subſtance, the Perſon can be only a Mode, and therefore the ſame with the Perſonality.

I anſwer, that the true original Notion of Perſonality *is no more than a different Mode of ſubſiſtence in the ſame common Nature. For every ſuch Nature is in it ſelf one and indiviſible; and the more perfect it is, the greater muſt its Unity be. For the* firſt Being *is the moſt* One; *and all* Diviſion *comes from* Diſtance, *and* Imperfection. *The firſt foundation of* Diſtinction *is Diverſity; for if there were no Diverſity, there would be nothing but entire and perfect Unity. All Diverſity comes from two things,* Diſſimilitude *and* Dependence. *Thoſe Philoſophers (called* Megarici*) did not think much amiſs, who ſaid,* That if all things were alike, there would be

be but one Subſtance or Being in the World; *and what we now call* different Subſtances, *would be only different Modes of Subſiſtence in the ſame individual Nature. The difference of Subſtances in created Beings, ariſes from thoſe two things.* 1. *A Diſſimilitude of Accidents, both internal and external.* 2. *The Will and Power of God, whereby he gives them diſtinct and ſeparate Beings in the ſame common Nature. As for inſtance, the Nature or Eſſence of a Man conſider'd in it ſelf, is but one and indiviſible; but God gives a ſeparate Exiſtence to every Individual, whereby that common Nature ſubſiſts in ſo many diſtinct Subſtances, as there are Individuals of that kind; and every one of theſe Subſtances is diſtinguiſhed from all others, not only by a ſeparate internal vital Principle and peculiar Properties, but by ſuch external Accidents, as do very eaſily diſcriminate them from each other. And the ſubject of all theſe Accidents is that* peculiar Subſtance, *which God hath given to every Individual, which in rational Beings is called a* Perſon; *and ſo we grant that in all ſuch created Beings the* Perſonality *doth ſuppoſe a diſtinct Subſtance; not from the Nature of Perſonality, but from the condition of the ſubject wherein it is. The* Perſonality *in it ſelf is but a diffe-*

rent Mode of Subſiſtence in the ſame common Nature, which is but One; *but this Perſonality being in ſuch a ſubject as Man is, it from thence follows, that each Perſon hath a peculiar Subſtance of his own; and not from the* Nature *of* Perſonality. *But when we come to conſider a divine Eſſence, which is moſt perfectly one, and is wholly uncapable of any ſeparate Exiſtence or Accidents, there can be no other way of diſtinction conceived in it, but by different* Modes *of* Subſiſtence, *or* relative Properties *in the ſame divine Eſſence. And herein we proceed, as we do in our other Conceptions of the divine Nature,* i. e. *we take away all Imperfection from God, and attribute only that to him, which is agreeable to his divine Perfections, although the manner of it may be above our comprehenſion. And if this be owning the* Trinity of the Mob, *I am not aſhamed to own my ſelf to be one of them; but it is not out of* Lazyneſs *or* affected Ignorance, *but upon the greateſt and moſt ſerious conſideration.*

Letter to the Univerſity, p. 15.

They may call this a Trinity of Cyphers, *if they pleaſe, but I think more modeſt and decent Language about theſe matters would become them as well as the things themſelves much better. And they muſt prove a little better than they have done, that different Modes*

Modes of Subſiſtence in the divine Nature, or the relations of Father and Son are mere Cyphers, *which is ſo often mentioned in Scripture, as a matter of very great conſequence; and that when we are baptized in the* Name of the Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt, *we are baptized into a* Trinity of Cyphers.

But our Unitarians *proceed, and ſay, that the ſame Author* affirms not only the Perſonalities, but the Perſons to be merely Relative. *For he ſaith,* That every Perſon, as well as every Perſonality in the Trinity, is wholly Relative. *But it is plain he ſpeaks there, not of the* Perſon in himſelf, *but with reſpect to the* manner of Subſiſtence, *or the relative Properties belonging to them But if the Notion of a Perſon doth beſides the relative Property, neceſſarily ſuppoſe the divine Nature together with it; how can a Perſon then be imagined to be wholly Relative? But they urge,* That which makes the firſt Perſon in the Trinity to be a Perſon, makes him to be a Father, and what makes him to be a Father, makes him to be a Perſon. *And what follows from hence, but that the relative Property is the Foundation of the Perſonality? But by no means, that the Perſon of the Father is nothing but the rela-*

Diſcourſe of Nominal and real Trinitarians, p. 10. Tritheiſm charged, &c. p. 157.

tive Property? The inſtance of Solomon *is not at all to the purpoſe, unleſs we aſſerted three Perſons founded upon thoſe different Relations in his individual Nature. Who denies, that one Perſon may have different Reſpects, and yet be but one Perſon ſubſiſting? Where doth the Scripture ſay,* That the Son of *David*, the Father of *Rehoboam*, and he that proceeded from *David* and *Bathſheba were* three Perſons *diſtinguiſhed by thoſe* relative Properties? *But here lies the foundation of what we believe as to the Trinity; we are aſſured from Scripture, that there are three to whom the divine Nature and Attributes are given, and we are aſſured both from Scripture and Reaſon, that there can be but one divine Eſſence; and therefore every one of theſe muſt have the divine Nature, and yet that can be but One. But it is a moſt unreaſonable thing to charge thoſe with* Sabellianiſm, *who aſſert,* That every Perſon hath the divine Nature diſtinctly belonging to him, *and that* the divine Eſſence is communicated from the Father to the Son. *Did ever* Noetus *or* Sabellius, *or any of their Followers ſpeak after this manner? Is the divine Eſſence but a* mere Name, *or a* different reſpect *only to Mankind? For the aſſerting ſuch relative Perſons as have no Eſſence*

Eſſence at all, was the true Sabellian Do-ctrine, *as will be made appear in the follow-ing Diſcourſe. And ſo much is confeſs'd by our* Unitarians *themſelves, for they ſay,* That the *Sabellians* held, that Father, Son and Spirit are but only three Names of God given to him in Scripture, by oc-caſion of ſo many ſeveral Diſpenſations to-wards the Creature, and ſo he is but one ſubſiſting Perſon and three relative Per-ſons; as he ſuſtains the three Names of Father, Son and Spirit, which being the Relations of God towards things without him, he is ſo many relative Perſons, or Perſons in a Claſſical Critical Senſe, *i. e. Perſons without any Eſſence belonging to them as ſuch. But thoſe who aſſert a* Com-munication of the divine Eſſence *to each Perſon can never be guilty of* Sabellianiſm, *if this be it, which themſelves affirm. And ſo thoſe called* Nominal Trinitarians, *are very unjuſtly ſo called, becauſe they do re-ally hold a* Trinity *of* Perſons *in the* Uni-ty of the Godhead. *Diſcourſe of Nominal and Real* Unit. *p.* 18.

2. *Let us now ſee what charge they lay upon thoſe whom they call* Real Trinitari-ans; *and they tell us,* That the Nominals will ſeem to be profound Philoſophers, deep Sages in compariſon with them. *Theſe are very obliging expreſſions to them* *Diſcourſe of Nom.* &c. *p.* 19.

in the beginning. But how do they make out this groſs Stupidity of theirs? In ſhort it is, That they ſtand condemned and anathematized as Hereticks by a general Council, and by all the Moderns, and are every day challenged and impeached of Tritheiſm, and cannot agree among themſelves, but charge one another with great Abſurdities; *and in plain terms they*
P. 32. *charge them* with Nonſenſe in the thing, whereas the other lay only in words. Becauſe theſe aſſert three divine ſubſiſting Perſons, three infinite Spirits, Minds or Subſtances, as diſtinct as ſo many Angels or Men, each of them perfectly God, and yet all of them are but one God. *To underſtand this matter rightly, we muſt conſider that when the* Socinian Pamphlets *firſt came abroad, ſome years ſince, a learned and worthy Perſon of our Church, who had appear'd with great vigour and reaſon againſt our Adverſaries of the Church of* Rome *in the late Reign (which ought not to be forgotten) undertook to defend the* Doctrine *of the* Trinity *againſt the* Hiſtory of the Unitarians, *and the* Notes on the Athanaſian Creed; *but in the warmth of diſputing, and out of a deſire to make this matter more intelligible, he ſuffer'd himſelf to be carried beyond the ancient Methods*

which

which the Church hath uſed to expreſs her Senſe by, ſtill retaining the ſame fundamental Article of three Perſons in one undivided Eſſence, *but explaining it in ſuch a manner, as to make each Perſon to have a* peculiar and proper Subſtance of his own.

This gave ſo great an advantage to the Author of thoſe Treatiſes, that in a little time, he ſet forth his Notes with an Appendix in anſwer to this new Explication. *Wherein he charges him with* Hereſie, Tritheiſm *and* Contradiction. *The very ſame charges which have been ſince improved and carried on by others; I wiſh I could ſay, without any unbecoming Heat or Reflections.* Conſiderat. on the Explication of the Trinity, p. 12.

But I ſhall now examine how far theſe charges have any ground, ſo as to affect the Doctrine of the Trinity, which is the chief end our Adverſaries aimed at, in heaping theſe Reproaches upon one who appeared ſo early, and with ſo much zeal to defend it. We are therefore to conſider theſe things:

1. *That a Man may be very right in the Belief of the Article it ſelf; and yet may be miſtaken in his* Explication *of it. And this one of his keeneſt Adverſaries freely acknowledges. For he plainly diſtinguiſhes between* the fundamental Article *and the* manner *of* explaining *it, and affirms,* That

Tritheiſm *charged*, &c. p. 309.

a Man may quit his Explication without parting with the Article it ſelf. *And ſo he may retain the Article with his Explication.*

But ſuppoſe a Man to aſſent to the fundamental Article it ſelf, and be miſtaken in his Explication of it, can he be charged with Hereſie *about this Article? For* Hereſie *muſt relate to the fundamental Article to which he declares his hearty and unfeigned Aſſent; but here we ſuppoſe the miſtake to lie only in the* Explication. *As for inſtance,* Sabellianiſm *is a condemned and exploded Hereſie, for it is contrary to the very Doctrine of the Trinity; but ſuppoſe one who aſſerts the Doctrine of* three Perſons, *ſhould make them to be* three Modes, *muſt ſuch a one preſently be charged with* Hereſie, *before we ſee whether his Explication be conſiſtent with the fundamental Article or not? For this is liable to very obvious Objections, that the Father begets a Mode inſtead of a Son, that we pray to three Modes inſtead of three real Perſons, that Modes are mutable things in their own Nature,* &c. *but muſt we from hence conclude ſuch a one guilty of Hereſie, when he declares, that he withall ſuppoſed them not to be mere Modes, but that the divine Eſſence is to be taken together with the Mode to make a Perſon?*

ſon? Yea, ſuppoſe ſome ſpiteſull Adverſary ſhould ſay, That it is a Contradiction to ſay, That the ſame common Nature can make a Perſon with a Mode ſuperadded to it, unleſs that be individuated, for a Perſon doth imply an individual Nature, and not a mere relative Mode. Is this ſufficient to charge ſuch a Perſon with the Sabellian Hereſie, *which he utterly diſowns? Is not the like Equity to be ſhew'd in another though different Explication? Suppoſe then a Perſon ſolemnly profeſſes to own the fundamental Doctrine of the Trinity as much as any others; but he thinks, that three Perſons muſt have diſtinct Subſtances to make them Perſons, but ſo as to make no Diviſion or Separation in the Godhead, and that he cannot conceive a Communication of the divine Eſſence without this; muſt this preſently be run down as* Hereſie, *when he aſſerts at the ſame time three Perſons in the ſame undivided Eſſence? But this is ſaid to be a* Contradiction; *ſo it was in the other caſe and not allow'd then, and why ſhould it be otherwiſe in this? I ſpeak not this to juſtifie ſuch Explications, but to ſhew that there is a difference between the* Hereſie *of denying an Article, and a miſtake in the Explication of it. Even the greateſt Hereſie-makers in the world, diſtinguiſh between Hereſies*

and

and erroneous Explications of Articles of Faith, as any one may find that looks into them. And even the Inquiſitors of Hereſie *themſelves allow the diſtinction between* Hereſie *and an erroneous Propoſition in Faith, which amounts to the ſame with a miſtaken* Explication *of it; and they all grant that there may be Propoſitions that tend to Hereſie or ſavour of it, which cannot be condemned for Heretical. And even* Pegna *condemns* Melchior Canus *for being too cruel in aſſerting it to be Hereſie to contradict the general Senſe of Divines, becauſe the* Schools *cannot make* Hereſies.

Direct. Inquiſit. *part II. quæſt.* 2. p. 226.

2. *It is frequently and ſolemnly affirmed by him,* That the Unity of the Godhead is the moſt real, eſſential, indiviſible, inſeparable Unity; that there is but one divine Nature, which is originally in the Father, and is ſubſtantially communicated by the Father to the Son, as a diſtinct ſubſiſting Perſon, by an eternal ineffable Generation, and to the Holy Ghoſt by an eternal and ſubſtantial Proceſſion from Father and Son. *Do the others who maintain a Trinity deny this? By no means. For we have already ſeen that they aſſert the ſame thing. So that they are fully agreed as to the main fundamental Article. And even the* Unitarians *yield, that from the beginning*

Modeſt examin. p. 19.

P. 27, 28.

beginning he aſſerted, That the three divine Perſons are in one undivided Subſtance. *Wherein then lies the foundation of this mighty Quarrel, and thoſe unreaſonable Heats that Men have fallen into about it; to the great ſcandal of our Church and Religion? In ſhort it is this; that the ſame Author aſſerts*, (1.) That it is groſs Sabellianiſm to ſay, That there are not three perſonal Minds, or Spirits, or Subſtances. (2.) That a diſtinct ſubſtantial Perſon muſt have a diſtinct Subſtance of his own proper and peculiar to his own Perſon. *But he owns, that* although there are three diſtinct Perſons, or Minds, each of whom is diſtinctly and by himſelf God, yet there are not three Gods, but one God, or one Divinity; *which he ſaith*, is intirely, and indiviſibly, and inſeparably in three diſtinct Perſons or Minds. *That the ſame one* divine Nature is wholly and intirely communicated by the eternal Father to the eternal Son and by the Father and Son to the eternal Spirit without any Diviſion or Separation; and ſo it remains one ſtill.

Notes on Athanaſius his Creed, Edit. 2. p. 19.

Modeſt examin. p. 15.

P. 17.

P. 29.

P. 30.

This is the ſubſtance of this new Explication, *which hath raiſed ſuch Flames, that* Injunctions *from authority were thought neceſſary to ſuppreſs them. But thoſe can reach*

reach no farther than the reſtraint of Mens Tongues and Pens about theſe matters, and unleſs ſomething be found out to ſatisfie their Minds, and to remove Miſapprehenſions, the preſent Heat may be only cover'd over and kept in; which when there is a vent given, may break out into a more dangerous Flame.

Therefore I ſhall endeavour to ſtate and clear this matter ſo as to prevent any future Eruption thereof, which will be done by conſidering how far they are agreed, and how far the remaining difference ought to be purſued.

1. *They are agreed*, That there are three diſtinct Perſons and but one Godhead.

2. That there are no ſeparate and divided Subſtances in the Trinity; but the divine Nature is wholly and entirely one and undivided.

3. That the divine Eſſence is communicated from the Father to the Son, and from both to the holy Spirit. *So that the charge of* Sabellianiſm *on thoſe who reject this new Explication is without ground. For no* Sabellian *did or could aſſert a* Communication of the divine Eſſence.

Which being agreed on both ſides, the Diſpute turns upon this ſingle point, whether

ther a communicated Eſſence, *doth imply a* diſtinct Subſtance *or not. On the one ſide it is ſaid*, That there being but one God, there can be but one divine Eſſence, and if more Eſſences more Gods. *Remarks upon the examinat.* p. 33.

On the other ſide, that ſince they own a communicated Eſſence neceſſary to make a diſtinction of Perſons in the Son and Holy Ghoſt, if the Eſſence be not diſtinct, the foundation of diſtinct Perſonalities is taken away. *But how is this clear'd by the other Party? They ſay*, That it is one peculiar Prerogative of the divine Nature and Subſtance, founded in its infinite and therefore tranſcendent Perfection, whereby it is capable of reſiding in more Perſons than one, and is accordingly communicated from the Father to the Son and Holy Ghoſt. *Remarks* p. 34.

So that the Communication of the divine Nature is owned to the Perſons of the Son and Holy Ghoſt. *But how then comes it not to make a diſtinct Eſſence, as it makes diſtinct Perſons, by being communicated?*

The anſwer we ſee is, That it is a peculiar Prerogative founded on the infinite and therefore tranſcendent Perfection of the divine Nature. *But they further add*, That when the Son and Holy Ghoſt are ſaid p. 36.

ſaid to have the ſame divine Nature from the Father, as the Origin and Fountain of the Divinity; not by the Production of a new divine Nature but by a Communication of his own; which is one and the ſame in all three without Separation, Difference, or Diſtinction; that this is indeed a great Myſtery, which hath been always look'd upon by the greateſt and wiſeſt Men in the Church, to be above all Expreſſions and Deſcription.

Ibid. *So that the greateſt difficulty is at laſt reſolved into the incomprehenſible Perfection of the divine Nature*; and that neither Man nor Angels can give a ſatisfactory anſwer to Enquiries about the manner of them. *And the Author of the* Animadverſions *ſaith*, That in the divine Perſons of the Trinity, the divine Nature and the perſonal Subſiſtence coaleſce into one, by an incomprehenſible, ineffable kind of Union and Conjunction.

Animadv. p. 36.

But do thoſe on the other ſide think, that the aſſerting three diſtinct Subſtances in one and the ſame individual Subſtance tends to clear and explain the Notion of the Trinity and make it more eaſie and intelligible? The Divinity, *they ſay*, is whole, intire, indiviſible, and inſeparable in all three.

Modeſt examin p. 30.

But

But can one whole intire indiviſible Subſtance be actually divided into three Subſtances? For if every Perſon muſt have a peculiar Subſtance of his own; and there be three Perſons, there muſt be three peculiar Subſtances, and how can there be three peculiar Subſtances, and yet but one entire and indiviſible Subſtance? I do not ſay, there muſt be three divided Subſtances in place, or ſeparate Subſtances, but they muſt be divided as three Individuals of the ſame kind, which muſt introduce a Specifick Divine Nature, *which I think very inconſiſtent with the divine Perfections; but of this at large in the following Diſcourſe.*

I do not lay any force upon this argument, Tritheiſm *charged*, P. 262. *that* there can be no ground of the Diſtinction between the three Subſtances, if there be but one Subſtance in the Godhead, (*as ſome have done*) becauſe the ſame Subſtance cannot both unite and diſtinguiſh them; *for the ground of the diſtinction is not the* Subſtance *but the* Communication *of it, and where that is* P. 264. *ſo freely aſſerted, there is a reaſon diſtinct from the* Subſtance *it ſelf, which makes the* Diſtinction *of Perſons.*

But the difficulty ſtill remains, how each Perſon ſhould have a Subſtance of his own; and yet there be but one entire and indiviſible

ſible Subſtance, for every Perſon *muſt have a proper Subſtance of his own; or elſe according to this* Hypotheſis, *he can be no Perſon; and this peculiar Subſtance muſt be really diſtinct from that Subſtance which is in the other two: ſo that here muſt be three diſtinct Subſtances in the three Perſons. But how then can there be but one individual Eſſence in all three? We may conceive one common Eſſence to be individuated in three Perſons, as it is in Men; but it is impoſſible to conceive the ſame individual Eſſence to be in three Perſons, which have peculiar Subſtances of their own. For the Subſtances belonging to the Perſons, are the ſame Eſſence individuated in thoſe Perſons: and ſo there is no avoiding making three individual Eſſences and one ſpecifick or common divine Nature. And* Maimonides *his argument is conſiderable againſt more Gods than one;* If, *ſaith he,* there be two Gods, there muſt be ſomething wherein they agree, and ſomething wherein they differ; that wherein they agree muſt be that which makes each of them God; and that wherein they differ muſt make them two Gods. *Now wherein doth this differ from the preſent* Hypotheſis? *There is ſomething wherein they differ, and that is their proper Subſtance; but* Maimonides *thought*

More Nevoch. par. II. c. 1.

thought that wherein they differ'd *ſufficient* to make them two Gods. *So that I fear it will be impoſſible to clear this* Hypotheſis *as to the reconciling* three individual Eſſences *with* one individual divine Eſſence, *which looks too like aſſerting that there are three Gods and yet but one. And the Author of this Explication doth at laſt confeſs, that* three diſtinct whole inſeparable Sames, are hard to conceive as to the manner of it. *Now to what purpoſe are* new Explications *ſtarted and Diſputes raiſed and carried on ſo warmly about them, if after all, the main difficulty he confeſs'd to be above our Comprehenſion? We had much better ſatisfie our ſelves with that Language which the Church hath receiv'd and is expreſs'd in the Creeds, than go about by new Terms, to raiſe new Ferments, eſpecially at a time, when our united Forces are moſt neceſſary againſt our common Adverſaries. No wiſe and good Men can be fond of any new Inventions, when the Peace of the Church is hazarded by them. And on the other ſide, it is as dangerous to make* new Hereſies *as* new Explications. *If any one denies the Doctrine contained in the* Nicene Creed, *that is no* new Hereſie; *but how can ſuch deny the Son to be conſubſtantial to the Father, who aſſert one and*

Modeſt examin. p. 30.

the ſame indiviſible Subſtance in the Father, and the Son? But they may contradict themſelves. *That is not impoſſible on either ſide. But doth it follow that they are guilty of Hereſie?* Are not three Subſtances and but one a Contradiction? *No more, ſay they, than that a* communicated Subſtance *is not diſtinct from that which did communicate. But this whole diſpute we find is at laſt reſolved into the infinite and unconceivable Perfections of the Godhead, where it is moſt ſafely lodged; and that there is no real* Contradiction *in the* Doctrine *it ſelf, is part of the deſign of the Diſcourſe afterwards.*

But here it will be neceſſary to take notice of what the Unitarians *have objected againſt this* new Explication, *viz.* That it was condemned by the ancients in the Perſon of *Philoponus*; in the middle Ages, in the Perſon and Writings of *Abbot Joachim*; but more ſeverely ſince the Reformation, in the Perſon of *Valentinus Gentilis*, who was condemned at *Geneva*, and beheaded at *Bern* for this very Doctrine.

Conſiderat. on the Explication of the Trinity, &c. p. 12.

To theſe I ſhall give a diſtinct anſwer:

1. *As to* Joh. Philoponus, *I do freely own, that in the* Greek Church, *when in the ſixth Century he broached his opinion,* That

That every Hypoſtaſis muſt have the common Nature individuated in it, *this was look'd upon as a Doctrine of dangerous conſequence, both with reſpect to the Trinity and Incarnation. The latter was the firſt occaſion of it*; *for as* Leontius *obſerves, the diſpute did not begin about the Trinity, but about the Incarnation*; *and* Philoponus *took part with thoſe who aſſerted but one Nature in Chriſt after the Union, and he went upon this ground, That if there were two* Natures *there muſt be two* Hypoſtaſes, *becauſe* Nature *and* Hypoſtaſis *were the ſame. Then thoſe on the Churches ſide, ſaith* Leontius, *objected, That if they were the ſame, there muſt be three diſtinct Natures in the Trinity, as there were three* Hypoſtaſes; *which* Philoponus *yielded, and grounded himſelf on* Ariſtotle's *Doctrine, that there was but one common Subſtance and ſeveral individual Subſtances, and ſo held it was in the Trinity, whence he was called the leader of the* Hereſie of the Tritheiſts. *This is the account given by* Leontius *who lived very near his time, A. D. 620. The ſame is affirmed of him by* Nicephorus, *and that he wrote a Book on purpoſe about the Union of two Natures in Chriſt, out of which he produces his own words concerning a common and individual* Nature,

Leont. de Sectis Act. 5.

Niceph. Calliſt. l. 18. c. 46, 47.

Nature, (*which he calls* μερικωτάτην ὕπαρξιν) *which can agree to none elſe. And the main argument he went upon was this, that unleſs we aſſert a ſingular Nature in the* Hypoſtaſes, *we muſt ſay, that the whole Trinity was incarnate; as unleſs there be a ſingular humane Nature diſtinct from the common, Chriſt muſt aſſume the whole Nature of Mankind. And this argument from the* Incarnation, *was that which made* Roſcelin, *in the beginning of the diſputing Age,* A. D. 1093, *to aſſert,* That the three Perſons were three things diſtinct from each other, as three Angels or three Men, becauſe otherwiſe the Incarnation of the ſecond Perſon could not be underſtood, *as appears by* Anſelm's *Epiſtles, and his* Book of the Incarnation *written upon that occaſion. But as* Anſelm *ſhews at large, if this argument hold, it muſt prove the three Perſons not only to be* diſtinct, *but* ſeparate *and divided* Subſtances, (*which is directly contrary to this* new Explication) *and then there is no avoiding* Tritheiſm. *But to return to* Joh. Philoponus, *who, ſaith* Nicephorus, *divided the* indiviſible Nature of God into three Individuals as among Men: Which, *ſaith he,* is repugnant to the Senſe of the Chriſtian Church; *and he produces the Teſtimony*

Anſelm. epiſt. l. 2. ep. 41. De fide Trinit. &c. c. 3.

C. 48.

mony of Gregory Nazianzen *againſt it, and adds, that* Leontius *and* Georgius Piſides *confuted* Philoponus.

But in that divided time, there were ſome called Theodoſiani, *who made but* one Nature and one Hypoſtaſis; *and ſo fell in with the* Sabellians; *but others held,* That there was one immutable divine Eſſence, but each Perſon had a diſtinct individual Nature; *which the reſt charged with* Tritheiſm. *Which conſequence they utterly rejected, becauſe although they held* three diſtinct Natures, *yet they ſaid,* They were but one God, becauſe there was but one invariable Divinity in them. Nicephorus *ſaith, that* Conon's Followers *rejected* Philoponus; *but* Photius *mentions a conference between* Conon *and others, about* Philoponus, *wherein he defends him againſt other* Severians. Photius *grants, that* Conon *and his Followers* held a conſubſtantial Trinity and the Unity of the Godhead, and ſo far they were Orthodox: *but ſaith,* They were far from it, when they aſſerted proper and peculiar Subſtances to each Perſon. *The difference between* Conon *and* Philoponus *about this point, (for* Conon *wrote againſt* Philoponus *about the Reſurrection) ſeems to have been partly in the Doctrine, but chiefly in*

C. 49.

Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 24.

Phot. Cod 23.

the conſequence of it: for theſe rejected all kind of Tritheiſm, *which* Philoponus *ſaw well enough muſt follow from his Doctrine, but he denied any real Diviſion or Separation in thoſe Subſtances as to the Deity.*

Iſid Orig. l. 7. de hæreſ. de Trinit. Iſidore *ſaith*, That the Tritheiſts owned three Gods, as well as three Perſons; and that if God be ſaid to be Triple, there muſt follow a Plurality of Gods. *But there were others called* Triformiani, *of whom S.* Auguſtin *ſpeaks*, Who held the three Perſons to be three diſtinct parts, which being united made one God; which, *ſaith he*, is repugnant to the divine Perfection.

Aug. de hæreſ. c. 74.

But among theſe Severians, *there were three ſeveral opinions:*

1. *Of* Philoponus, *who held one common Nature and three Individual.*

2. *Of thoſe who ſaid there was but one Nature and one* Hypoſtaſis.

3. *Of thoſe who affirm'd there were three diſtinct Natures, but withal, that there was but* one indiviſible Godhead; *and theſe differ'd from* Philoponus *in the main ground of* Tritheiſm, *which was, that he held the* common Nature *in the* Trinity, *to be only a* ſpecifick Nature, *and ſuch as it is among Men. For* Philoponus *himſelf in the words which* Nicephorus *produces, doth*

doth assert plainly, that the common Nature is separated from the Individuals, τῇ ψιλῇ ἐπινοίᾳ, *by a meer act of the Mind; so that he allow'd no individual Unity in the divine Nature, but what was in the several Persons; as the common Nature of Man is a Notion of the Mind, as it is abstracted from the several Individuals, wherein alone it really subsists; so that here is an apparent difference between the Doctrine of* Joh. Philoponus *and the* new Explication, *for herein the most real, essential and* indivisible Unity of the divine Nature *is asserted; and it is said to be* no Species, *because* it is but one, *and so it could not be condemned in* Joh. Philoponus. *Modest examin. p. 19.*

2. *We now come to* Abbat Joachim, *whose Doctrine seems to be as much mistaken, as it is represented in the* Decretal, *where the Condemnation of it by the* Lateran Council *is extant. But here I cannot but observe what great Authority these* Unitarians *give to this* Lateran Council, *as if they had a Mind to set up* Transubstantiation *by it, which they so often parallel with the Trinity. Thence in their late Discourse they speak of it as* the most general Council that was ever called, and that what was there defined, it was made Heresie to oppose it. *But by their favour, we neither* *Discourse of Real and Nominal Trinit. p. 4.*

own this to have been a general Council, *nor that it had* Authority *to* make that Hereſie *which was not ſo before. But that Council might aſſert the Doctrine of the Trinity truly, as it had been receiv'd, and condemn the opinion of* Joachim *juſtly. But what it was, they do not or would not ſeem to underſtand.* Joachim *was a great* Enthuſiaſt, *but no deep Divine (as Men of that Heat ſeldom are) and he had many Diſputes with* Peter Lombard *in his Life, as the Vindicator of* Joachim *confeſſes. After his Death, a Book of his was found, taxing* Peter Lombard *with ſome ſtrange Doctrine about the Trinity, wherein he called him* Heretick *and* Madman; *this Book was complained of in the* Lateran Council, *and upon Examination it was found, that inſtead of charging* Peter Lombard *juſtly, he was fallen into Hereſie himſelf, which was denying the eſſential Unity of the three Perſons, and making it to be Unity of Conſent. He granted that they were* one Eſſence, one Nature, one Subſtance: *but how? Not by any* true proper Unity, *but* Similitudinary and Collective, *as they called it, as many Men are one People, and many Believers make one Church. Whence* Thomas Aquinas *ſaith, that* Joachim fell into the Arian Hereſie. *It is ſufficient to*

Greg. de Laur. Apol. Joachim Abbat, c. 66.

Decret. Greg. l. 1. c. 2.

Comment. in decret. opuſc. 24.

my

my purpoſe, that he denied the individual Unity of the divine Eſſence, which cannot be charged on the Author of the New Explication, *and ſo this comes not home to the purpoſe.*

3. *But the laſt charge is the moſt terrible, for it not only ſets down the* Hereſie, *but the capital puniſhment which follow'd it. Yet I ſhall make it appear, (notwithſtanding the very warm Proſecution of it by another hand) that there is a great difference between the Doctrine of* Valentinus Gentilis, *and that which is aſſerted in this Explication.*

1. *In the Sentence of his Condemnation it is expreſſed,* That he had been guilty of the vileſt Scurrility and moſt horrid Blaſphemies againſt the Son of God and the glorious Myſtery of the Trinity. *But can any thing of this Nature be charged upon one, who hath not only written in Defence of it, but ſpeaks of it with the higheſt Veneration?* *Brief Account of Valentin. Gentilis, p. 132.*

2. *In the ſame Sentence it is ſaid,* That he acknowledged the Father only to be that infinite God which we ought to worſhip, which is plain Blaſphemy againſt the Son. *But can any Men ever think to make this the ſame caſe with one, who makes uſe of that as one of his chief arguments,* Ibid.

That

Modeſt examin. p. 20. That the three Perſons are to be worſhipped with a diſtinct divine Worſhip.

3. *It is charged upon him,* That he called the Trinity a meer human Invention, not ſo much as known to any Catholick Creed, and directly contrary to the Word of God. *But the Author here charged,* Brief Account, &c. p. 40. *hath made it his buſineſs to prove the Doctrine of the Trinity to be grounded on Scripture, and to vindicate it from the Objections drawn from thence againſt it.*

4. *One of the main Articles of his charge* Brief Account, &c. p. 41, 42, 43, 45. *was,* That he made three Spirits of different Order and Degree, that the Father is the one only God, by which the Son and Holy Ghoſt are excluded manifeſtly from the Unity of the Godhead; *But the* Modeſt examin. p. 29. *Perſon charged with his Hereſie ſaith,* The Reaſon why we muſt not ſay three Gods, is, becauſe there is but one and the ſame Divinity in them all; and that entirely, indiviſibly, inſeparably.

But it is ſaid, that although there may be ſome differences, yet they agree in aſſerting, That there are three diſtinct eternal Spirits or Minds in the Trinity; *and* Genebrard *is brought into the ſame Hereſie with them. But* Genebrard *with great in-* Genebrard de Trinit. l. 2. p. 91. *dignation rejects the Doctrine of* Valentinus Gentilis, *becauſe he held an Inequality*

in

in the Perſons, and denied the individual Unity of the Godhead in them; but he ſaith, he follow'd Damaſcen *in aſſerting* three real Hypoſtaſes; *and he utterly denies* Tritheiſm, *and he brings a multitude of reaſons, why the charge of* Tritheiſm *doth not lie againſt his opinion, although he owns the* Hypoſtaſes *to be* three diſtinct individuals, *but then he adds,* That there is an indiviſible and inſeparable Union of the divine Nature in all three Perſons. L. 2. p. 159. P. 153.

Now to deal as impartially in this matter as may be, I do not think our underſtandings one jot helped in the Notion of the Trinity by this Hypotheſis; but that it is liable to as great difficulties as any other, and therefore none ought to be fond of it, or to ſet it againſt the general Senſe of others, and the current Expreſſions of Divines about theſe Myſteries; nor to call the different opinions of others Hereſie *or* Nonſenſe, *which are provoking Words, and tend very much to inflame Mens Paſſions, becauſe their Faith and Underſtanding are both call'd in queſtion, which are very tender things.*

But on the other ſide, a difference ought to be made between the Hereſie and Blaſphemy of Valentinus Gentilis, *and the opinion of ſuch who maintain the* individual

and

and indivisible Unity *of the Godhead; but withal, believe that every Person hath an individual Substance as a Person, and that* Sabellianism *cannot be avoided otherwise. Wherein I think they are mistaken, and that the Fathers were of another opinion; and that our Church owns but* one Substance in the Godhead, *as the Western Church always did, (which made such difficulty about receiving* three Hypostases, *because they took* Hypostasis *for a* Substance) *but yet I see no reason why those who assert three* Hypostases, *and mean three individual Substances should be charged with the Heresie of* Valentinus Gentilis, *or so much as with that of* Abbat Joachim *or* Philoponus, *because they all rejected the* individual Unity of the divine Nature, *which is constantly maintained by the Defenders of the other* Hypothesis.

But it is said and urged with vehemency, that these two things are inconsistent with each other; that it is going forward and backward, being Orthodox in one Breath and otherwise in the next; that all this looks like shuffling and concealing the true meaning, and acting the old Artifices under a different Form. For the Samosatenians *and* Arians, *when they were pinched, seem'd very Orthodox in their Expressions,*

but

but retained their Hereſies ſtill in their Minds; and there is reaſon to ſuſpect the ſame Game is playing over again, and we cannot be too cautious in a matter of ſuch Conſequence.

I grant very great caution is needful, but the mixture of ſome Charity with it will do no hurt. Why ſhould we ſuſpect thoſe to be inwardly falſe, and to think otherwiſe than they ſpeak, who have ſhew'd no want of Courage and Zeal, at a time when ſome thought it Prudence to ſay nothing, and never call'd upon their Superiours *then to own* the cauſe of God, *and to do their Duties as they have now done, and that in no very obliging manner? And if the ſame Men can be cool and unconcerned at ſome times, (when there was ſo great reaſon to be otherwiſe) and of a ſudden grow very warm, and even to boil over with Zeal; the World is ſo ill natur'd, as to be too apt to conclude there is ſome other cauſe of ſuch an alteration than what openly appears. But there is a kind of* bitter Zeal, *which is ſo fierce and violent, that it rather inflames than heals any Wounds that are made; and is of ſo malignant a Nature, that it ſpreads and* eats like a Cancer, *and if a ſtop were not given to it, it might endanger the whole Body. I am very ſenſible how*

how little a Man consults his own ease, who offers to interpose in a dispute between Men of Heat and Animosity; but this moves me very little, when the interest of our Church and Religion is concerned, which ought to prevail more than the fear of displeasing one or other Party, or it may be both. I do heartily wish, that all who are equally concerned in the common Cause, would lay aside Heats, and Prejudices, and hard Words, and consider this matter impartially; and I do not question, but they will see cause to judge, as I do, that the difference is not so great as our Adversaries for their own advantage make it to be. And since both sides yield, that the matter they dispute about is above their reach, the wisest course they can take is to assert and defend what is revealed, and not to be too peremptory and quarrelsome about that which is acknowledged to be above our comprehension, I mean as to the manner *how the three Persons partake of the divine Nature.*

Oderat rixas & jurgia, præsertimque inter eruditos; ac turpe esse dicebat viros indubitatè doctos canina rabie famam vicissim suam rodere ac lacerare scriptis trucibus, tanquam vilissimos de plebe cerdones in Angiportis sese luto ac stercore conspurcantes. *Nic. Rigalt. vit. P. Puteani*, p. 48.

It would be of the most fatal consequence to us, if those Weapons, which might be so usefully imploy'd against our common Adversaries, should still be turned upon one another,

another. I know no manner of advantage they have againſt us, but from thence, and this is it which makes them write with ſuch Inſolence and Scorn towards thoſe who are far their Superiours in Learning and Wit, as well as in the Goodneſs of their cauſe. And is it poſſible that ſome of our moſt skilful Fencers ſhould play Prizes before them, who plainly animate them againſt each other for their own Diverſion and Intereſt? Sometimes one hath the better, ſometimes the other, and one is cried up in Oppoſition to the other, but taken alone is uſed with the greateſt Contempt. One Man's work is ſaid to be learned and accurate, *and the more, becauſe it follows,* that he concerns not himſelf with the Socinians. *The wiſer Man no doubt, for that Reaſon. At another time it is called the* Birth of the Mountains, *and the Author parallel'd with no leſs a Man than* Don Quixot, *and his elaborate Writings with his Adventures, and they ridicule his Notion of* Modes *as if they were only ſo many* Gambols and Poſtures. *And then for his Adverſary, they hearten and incourage him all they can; they tell him,* He muſt not allow to the other the leaſt Title of all he contends for, *leaſt their ſport ſhould be ſpoiled; and to comfort him, they tell him, that his Adverſary*

Conſiderat. on the Explication by Dr. W. &c. p. 12.

P. 13.

P. 22.

P. 23.

P. 25. *ſary is a* Socinian *at bottom, and doth not know it; that all his* Thingums, Modes, Properties *are* only an Addition of Words and Names, and not of Perſons properly ſo called, *and that his whole* Scheme *is nothing but* Socinianiſm dreſt up in the abſurd Cant of the Schools. *That* his
P. 19. Book hath much more Scurrility than Argument, that his uſage of him was barbarous, and a greater Solœciſm in manners, than any he accuſes him of in Grammar or Speech; *and in ſhort,* That his Ex-
P. 13. plication of the Trinity is a great Piece of Nonſenſe, (*though it comes ſo near to* Socinianiſm.) *But how doth the other* Antagoniſt *eſcape? What, nothing but good Words to him? In this place they had a mind to keep him in heart, and only charge him with a* Hereſie *which they laugh at; but in another place, they ſet him out with ſuch colours, as ſhew they intended only to play one upon the other. They charge him not only with* Hereſie *but* Polytheiſm, Which, *they ſay,* is next to Atheiſm; *that his Vindication is a* ſupercilious, diſdainful and peeviſh Anſwer: that he had neither Humanity nor good Manners left; that there is nothing conſiderable in his Books but what he borrow'd from Them. *Theſe are ſome of the Flowers which they beſtow*

Defence of the Notes on Athanaſius *his Creed,* p. 24. P. 31.

beſtow on theſe Perſons of Reputation in Polemick Squabble *as they call it, which plainly ſhew, that their aim is, as much as may be, to divide and then to expoſe us. And ſhall we ſtill go on to gratifie this inſulting Humour of theirs, by contending with one another, and afford them ſtill new matter for Books againſt both? As we may ſee in their late Diſcourſe about* Nominal *and* Real Trinitarians, *which was intended for a* rare ſhew, *wherein the two Parties are repreſented as combating with one another, and they ſtand by and triumph over theſe* Cadmean Brethren, *as they call them.*

Neither are they the Socinians *only, but thoſe who deſpiſe all Religion (who I doubt are the far greater number) are very much entertained with ſuch encounters between Men of Wit and Parts, becauſe they think, and they do not think amiſs, that Religion it ſelf will be the greateſt ſufferer by them at laſt: And this is the moſt dangerous, but I hope not the moſt prevailing Party of Men among us. The* Socinians *profeſs themſelves Chriſtians, and I hope are ſo, (eſpecially if but One Article of Faith be required to make men ſo) but I cannot but obſerve that in the late* Socinian *Pamphlets, there is too ſtrong a biaſs towards* Deiſm, *(which conſideration alone ſhould make us*

unite and look more narrowly to their ſteps.) I do not charge their Writers with a profeſſed deſign to advance Deiſm *among us; but their way of managing their Diſputes, is as if they had a mind to ſerve them. And ſuch men who are Enemies to all revealed Religion, could not find out better Tools for their purpoſe than they are. For they know very well, that in ſuch a Nation as ours, which is really concerned for the Profeſſion of Religion one way or other, there is no opening profeſſed Schools of* Atheiſm; *but the deſign muſt be carried on under ſome ſhew of Religion. And nothing ſerves their turn ſo well, as ſetting up natural Religion in oppoſition to Revealed. For this is the way by degrees to looſen and unhinge the Faith of moſt Men, which with great reaſon is built on the Scripture as the ſureſt foundation.*

But here it is fit to obſerve the ſeveral ſteps they take in order to this advancing Deiſm, *and how our* Unitarians *have complied with all of them.*

I. *The firſt point they are to gain is,* The leſſening the Authority *of Scripture, and if this be once done, they know Mens Minds will be left ſo roving and uncertain, that they will ſoon fall into* Scepticiſm *and* Infidelity.

II. *The*

II. *The next is, to repreſent* Church-men *as* Perſons of Intereſt and Deſign, *who maintain Religion only becauſe it ſupports them; and this they call* Prieſt Craft, *and if they can by this means take away their Authority too, the way lies ſtill more open for them; for it is more eaſie to make a Prey of the Flock, when the Shepherds are ſuſpected only to look after their Fleeces. Since ſuch a ſuſpicion takes away all Truſt and Confidence in their Guides; and they know very well, how little others will be able to defend themſelves.*

III. *Another ſtep is, to magnifie the* Deiſts *as Men of* Probity and good Senſe; *that aſſert the juſt Liberties of Mankind, againſt that terrible thing called* Prieſt-Craft; *and that would reſcue Religion from falſe Gloſſes and abſurd Notions taken up from the* Schools *and taught in the* Univerſities, *on purpoſe to keep under thoſe Principles of univerſal Liberty as to Opinions, which thoſe of freer Minds endeavour to promote. But eſpecially they are great Enemies to all* Myſteries of Faith, *as unreaſonable Impoſitions on thoſe of more refined Underſtandings, and of* clear and diſtinct Perceptions, *as they have learnt to expreſs themſelves. Theſe they account intolerable Uſurpations on Men of ſuch* Elevations *as*

themſelves ; *for* Myſteries *are only for the* Mob, *and not for Perſons of ſuch* noble *Capacities.*

IV. *The laſt thing is, to repreſent all Religions as indifferent, ſince they agree in the common Principles of natural Religion, eſpecially the Unity of God, and all the reſt is but according to the different Inventions of Men, the skill of the Contrivers, and the ſeveral Humors and Inclinations of Mankind.*

Theſe are the chief Myſteries *of* Deiſm *in our Age* ; *for even* Deiſm *hath its* Myſteries, *and it is it ſelf a* Myſtery of Iniquity, *which I am afraid is too much* working already *among us, and will be more if no effectual ſtop be put to it.*

I call it Deiſm, *becauſe that Name obtains now, as more plauſible and modiſh* ; *for* Atheiſm *is a rude unmannerly Word, and expoſes Men to the Rabble, and makes Perſons ſhun the company and avoid the Converſation and Dealing with ſuch who are noted for it. And this would be a mighty Prejudice to them, as to their Intereſts in this World, which they have reaſon to value.*

But to be a Deiſt, *ſeems to be only a ſetting up for having more Wit, than to be cheated by the* Prieſts, *and impoſed upon by the common Forms of Religion, which ſerve well*

well enough for ordinary People that want Senſe, and are not skill'd in Demonſtrations; but the Deiſts are ſo wiſe as to ſee through all theſe things. And therefore this name gains a Reputation among all ſuch as hate Religion, but know not how otherwiſe to diſtinguiſh themſelves from profeſſed Atheiſts, which they would by no means be taken for; although if they be preſſed home, very few among them will ſincerely own any more than a Series of Cauſes, without any intellectual Perfections, which they call God. *A ſtrange God without Wiſdom, Goodneſs, Juſtice or Providence!*

But I am now to ſhew, how in all theſe points the preſent Unitarians *have been very ſerviceable to them, in the Books which they have lately publiſhed and diſperſed both in City and Country.*

1. *As to the Authority of Scripture: They have been already juſtly expoſed for undermining the Authority of S.* John's Goſpel, *by muſtering up all the Arguments of the old Hereticks againſt it, and giving no anſwers to them. And what defence have they ſince made for themſelves? No other but this very trifling one, that they* repeat their Reaſons but do not affirm them. *What is the meaning of this? If they are true, why do they not affirm them? If they are falſe, why*

Vindication of the Archbiſhop's Sermons. p. 5.

Anſwer to Dr. Bull, p. 47.

do they not anſwer them? Is this done like thoſe who believe the Goſpel of *S.* John *to be* divine, *to produce all the arguments they could meet with againſt it; and never offer to ſhew the Weakneſs and Unreaſonableneſs of them? Doth not this look like a deſign to furniſh the* Deiſts *with ſuch arguments as they could meet with againſt it? Eſpecially, when they ſay,* That *S. John* doth not oppoſe them. *Why then are theſe Arguments produced againſt his Goſpel? Men do not uſe to diſpute againſt their Friends, nor to tell the World what all People have ſaid againſt them, and give not a word of anſwer in vindication of them. But they ſay,* The modern *Unitarians* allow of the Goſpel and other Pieces of *S. John. A very great favour indeed,* to allow of them. *But how far? As of divine Authority? Not a word of that. But as ancient Books which they think it not fit for them to diſpute againſt. But if* the ancient *Ebionites* were their Predeceſſors, *as they affirm, they can allow none but* the Goſpel according to the *Hebrews; and muſt reject the reſt and all S.* Paul's Epiſtles; *and in truth, they make him argue ſo little to the purpoſe, that they muſt have a very mean opinion of his Writings. But of theſe things in the Diſcourſe it ſelf.*

Hiſtory of the Unitarians, p. 10.

As

As to Church-men, *no profeſſed* Deiſts *could expreſs themſelves more ſpitefully than they have done, and that againſt thoſe to whom they profeſs the greateſt reſpect. What then would they ſay of the reſt? They ſay in general,* That it is natural to Worldlings, to mercenary Spirits, to the timorous and ambitious; in a word, to all ſuch as prefer not God before all other, whether Perſons or Conſiderations to believe as they would have it. *Conſiderat. on the Explication by the Archbiſhop, &c. p. 13.*

But although the words be general, yet any one that looks into them may ſoon find that they were intended for ſuch Churchmen who had written againſt their opinions. And the Inſinuation is, that if it were not for worldly Intereſts, they would own them to be in the right. Whereas I am fully perſwaded, that they have no way to defend their Opinions, but to reject the Scriptures and declare themſelves Deiſts; *and as long as we retain a juſt Veneration for the Scripture, we can be of no other Opinion, becauſe we look on their Interpretations as unreaſonable, new, forced, and inconſiſtent with the circumſtances of Places and the main Scope and Tenor of the New Teſtament. But their Introduction to the Anſwer to the late* Archbiſhop's *Sermons about the* Trinity *and* Incarnation, *ſhew their Temper*

ſufficiently as to all Church men. He was the Perſon they profeſſed to eſteem and reverence above all others, and confeſs that he inſtructs them in the Air and Language of a Father, (*which at leaſt deſerved a little more dutiful Language from them.*) *But ſome Mens fondneſs for their Opinions breaks all bounds of Civility and Decency*; *for preſently after, mentioning the* Archbiſhop *and other* Biſhops *who had written againſt them, they ſay it ſignifies nothing to the caſe,* That they are great Penſioners of the World. For it is certain we have a mighty Propenſity to believe as is for our Turn and Intereſt. *And ſoon after, that their Oppoſers* are under the power of ſuch fatal Biaſſes, that their Doctrine is the more to be ſuſpected becauſe it is theirs. For the reaſon why they maintain the Doctrine of the Trinity is, becauſe they muſt. *The plain meaning of all this is, that the late Archbiſhop* (*as well as the reſt*) *was a* mere ſelf-intereſted Man, (*which none who knew either the* outſide *or* inſide *of* Lambeth *could ever imagine*) *that* if he were really againſt them (*as none could think otherwiſe, who knew him ſo well and ſo long as I did*) *it only ſhew'd* what a ſtrange Power, Intereſt hath in the Minds of all Church-Men.

Anſwer to the Archbiſh. Serm. P. 43.

P. 44.

But

But what Biaſs *was it, which made him write with that ſtrength and judgment againſt their Opinions? Let us ſet aſide* all Titles of Reſpect and Honour *as they deſire, let Reaſon be compared with Reaſon; and his Arguments with their Anſwers; and it will be ſoon found that the advantage which he had, was not from any other* Dignity *than that of a clearer Judgment, and a much ſtronger way of Reaſoning. Whereas their Anſwers are ſuch, as may well be ſuppoſed to come from thoſe, who had ſome ſuch* Biaſs, *that they muſt at leaſt ſeem to anſwer what in truth they could not. As hath been fully made appear in the* Vindication *of him, to which no reply hath been given, although other Treatiſes of theirs have come out ſince. In the* Concluſion *of that* Anſwer *they ſay,* That they did not expect that their Anſwer ſhould ſatisfie us, *and in truth they had a great deal of reaſon to think ſo. But what reaſon do they give for it? A very kind one no doubt;* becauſe Prepoſſeſſion and Intereſt have taken hold of us. *As though we were Men of ſuch mean and mercenary Spirits, as to believe according to* Prepoſſeſſion *without Reaſon, and to act only as ſerves our preſent* Intereſt. *But we never made mean* Addreſſes *to* Infidels *to ſhew how near our Principles came to theirs, nor made Parallels*

Anſwer to the Archbiſhop. p. 65.

lels between the Trinity *and* Tranſubſtantiation, *as ſome did, and defended them, as well as they could, when Popery was uppermoſt. But enough of this.*

3. *We have ſeen how much they have gratified the* Deiſts *by repreſenting Church-men in ſuch a manner, let us now ſee in what manner they treat the* Deiſts. *It is with another ſort of Language; and which argues a more than ordinary kindneſs to them. In one place they ſay,* That the Deiſts are moſtly well-natured Men, and Men of Probity and Underſtanding; in effect that they are ſincere honeſt-hearted Men, who do good by the impulſe of their natural Religion, Honeſty and good Conſcience, which have great Influence upon them. *What another ſort of character is this from that of the greateſt, and in their opinion the beſt of our Clergy? This muſt proceed from ſome Intimacy and Familiarity with them; and it is eaſie to imagine from hence, that they are upon very good Terms with one another, becauſe they muſt be* Unitarians, *if they believe a God at all.*

Some thoughts upon Dr. Sh. *Vindication. p.* 21.

But where elſe are theſe honeſt conſcientious Deiſts *to be found?*

It is rare indeed for others to find any one that rejects Chriſtianity out of pure Conſcience, and that acts by principles of ſincere Virtue. I never yet could meet with ſuch, nor

hear

hear of thoſe that have. And I would fain know the reaſons on which ſuch conſcientious Men proceeded; for truly the Principles of natural Religion are thoſe which recommend Chriſtianity to me; for without them the Myſteries of Faith *would be far more unaccountable than now they are; and ſuppoſing them, I ſee no incongruity in them,* i.e. *That there is a juſt and holy God, and a wiſe Providence, and a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments; and that God deſigns to bring Mankind to happineſs out of a State of Miſery; let theſe be ſuppoſed, and the Scheme of Chriſtianity will appear very reaſonable and fitted to the Condition and Capacity of Mankind. And the ſublimeſt Myſteries of it are not intended to* puzzle *or* amuſe Mankind, *as weak Men imagine; but they are diſcover'd for the greateſt and beſt purpoſes in the World, to bring Men to the hatred of Sin and Love of God, and a* patient continuance in well-doing, *in order to* a bleſſed Immortality. *So that this is truly a* Myſtery of Godlineſs, *being intended for the advancement of real Piety and Goodneſs among Mankind in order to make them happy. But as to theſe* Unitarians, *who have ſuch happy Acquaintance with theſe* conſcientious Deiſts; *I would fain learn from them, if they think them miſtaken, why they take no more pains*

to

to ſatisfie and convince them; for I find they decline ſaying a word againſt them. In one place they compare the Atheiſt *and* Deiſt *together; and very* honeſtly *and like any* conſcientious Deiſts, *they impute* all the Deiſm and moſt part of the Atheiſm of our Age to the Doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation.

Letter of Reſol. concerning the Trinity and Incar. p. 18.

Is it poſſible for Men that live in our Age to give ſuch an account as this of the Growth of Deiſm *and* Atheiſm *among us? What number of* Atheiſts *is there, upon any other account than from a looſeneſs of Thinking and Living? Where are thoſe who believe God to be an incomprehenſible Being, and yet reject the* Myſteries *which relate to his Being, becauſe they are incomprehenſible? Suppoſe any reject* ſpiritual Subſtance as Nonſenſe and a Contradiction, *as they do the* Trinity *on the ſame Pretences. Is this a ſufficient reaſon or not? They may tell them, as they do us that they can have no* Ideas, *no* clear and diſtinct Perceptions *of* immaterial Subſtances? *What anſwer do they give in this caſe? Not a Syllable; although they take notice of it. But I hope they give ſome better ſatisfaction to the* Deiſt; *No, for they ſay,* This is not a place to argue againſt either Atheiſt or Deiſt. *By no means: ſome would ſay, They were not ſuch Fools to fall out with*

Letter of Reſol. p. 5.

with their Friends. And it cannot be denied, that they have been the greateſt Incouragers of ſuch kind of Writings, which ſerve their turn ſo well; and in pure Gratitude they forbear to argue againſt them.

IV. *To ſhew how near they come to an Indifferency in Religion, they ſpeak favourably of* Mahometans, *and* Jews, *and even* Tartars, *becauſe they agree with them in the Unity of the Godhead. What an* honeſt-hearted Deiſt *do they make that Impoſtor* Mahomet? *One would hardly think ſuch a character could have come out of the Mouth of Chriſtians. But theſe are their Words,* Mahomet is affirmed by divers Hiſtorians to have had no other deſign in pretending himſelf to be a Prophet, but to reſtore the Belief of the Unity of God, which at that time was extirpated among the Eaſtern Chriſtians by the Doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation. *Who are thoſe Hiſtorians who give this character of him? Why are they not named, that their authority might be examin'd? Was the* Morocco Ambaſſador *one of them? Or* Paulus Alciatus, *who from a* Unitarian *turned* Mahometan? *But by the beſt accounts we can meet with, we find that he was a very cunning Impoſtor, and took in from the* Jews *and* Iſhmaelites *his Countrymen, Circumciſion; from the Chriſtians, an honourable mention*

Letter of Reſol. concerning the Trinity and Incar. p. 18.

Elmacin hiſt. Sarac. p. 4. Levin. Warner. de Alcoran.

mention of Chriſt, as a Prophet, and as the Word and Spirit of God, and owned his Miracles; *from the ancient Hereticks he denied his Suffering, but owned his being taken up into Heaven. Yea, he owned,* That he had his Goſpel from Heaven; but that his Diſciples changed it after his Death, and attributed more to Chriſt than he aſſumed to himſelf. *Which ſhews that he had ſo much Sence, as to diſcern, that if the Books of the New Teſtament were genuine, more muſt be given to Chriſt, than either* Mahomet *or the* Unitarians *do allow. Let any indifferent Reader compare their character of* Mahomet *with that of* Athanaſius, *which theſe Men give, and they will eaſily find that they take as much care to blacken one, as they do to vindicate the other. What Chriſtian Ingenuity is here? But* Mahomet *was a* Deiſt, *and* Athanaſius *a* Trinitarian. *But they go on.*

Acts of Athanaſius, p. 5.

Whatſoever the deſign of *Mahomet* was, its certain, that *Mahometiſm* hath prevailed over greater Numbers and more Nations, than at this day profeſs Chriſtianity. *But how? Was it not by force of Arms and the Prevalency of the* Saracen *and* Turkiſh *Empire?* No, *ſay theſe learned* Hiſtorians, It was not by the Force of the Sword, but by that one Truth in the Alcoran the Unity of God. *It were endleſs to quote the*

Hiſto-

Hiſtorians, *who ſay, That it was* Mahomet's *Principle,* to ſubdue all by Force of Arms who oppoſed his Religion; *but the authority of* Elmacinus *alone is ſufficient; for in the beginning of his* Hiſtory *he owns that it was his Principle,* To make War upon thoſe that would not ſubmit to his Law. *And others ſay, that in remembrance of this,* Their Law is expounded by their Doctors, with a Sword drawn by them, and that it is the Law of the Alcoran to kill and ſlay thoſe that oppoſe it. *What liberty the Turkiſh Empire allows to Chriſtians* in the conquer'd Provinces *is not to this purpoſe, but by what means* Mahometiſm *prevailed in the World.*

Ricard. confut. legis Saracen. c. 10.

But ſay they, The Jews as well as Mahometans are alienated from us, becauſe they ſuppoſe the Trinity to be the Doctrine of all Chriſtians. *And what then? Muſt we renounce the Chriſtian Doctrine to pleaſe the* Jews *and* Mahometans? *muſt we quit* Chriſt's *being the* Meſſias, *becauſe the* Jews *deny it? Or the ſuffering of Chriſt, becauſe the* Mahometans *think it inconſiſtent with his Honour?*

But if this be the truth of the caſe, as to Jews *and* Mahometans; *no Perſons are ſo well qualified to endeavour their Converſion, as our* Unitarians; *which would be a much better imployment for them, than to*

expoſe

expoſe the Chriſtian Doctrine by ſuch Writings among us. I am aſhamed to mention what they ſay of the Tartars, *when they call them,* The Shield and Sword of that way of acknowledging and worſhipping God. *So that* Mahometans, Jews *and* Tartars *are fairly repreſented becauſe they agree in the grand Fundamental of the Unity of the Godhead; but the Chriſtian Church is charged with believing* Impoſſibilities, Contradictions, and pure Nonſenſe.

Letter of Reſol. p. 19.

And thus we find our Unitarians *ſerving the* Deiſts *in all their methods of overthrowing Revealed Religion and advancing* Deiſm *among us. And if this will not awaken us to look more after them, and unite us in the defence of our Common Cauſe againſt them, I do not think that other Methods will do it. For it is become a Reſtleſs and Active, although as yet, but a ſmall Body of Men, and they tell the World plainly enough that they are* free from the Biaſſes of hopes and Fears; and ſit looſe from the Awes and Bribes of the World. *So that there is no way of dealing with them, but by ſhewing the falſneſs & weakneſs of the grounds they go upon; and that they have no advantage of us as to* Scripture, Antiquity *or* Reaſon: *which is the Deſign of this Undertaking.*

Anſwer to the Archbiſhop. p. 44.

P. 66.

Worceſter, Sept. 30. 1696.

E. W.

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A DISCOURSE In VINDICATION of the *Doctrine of the Trinity:* WITH An ANSWER TO THE Late SOCINIAN Objections.

CHAP. I.

The Occaſion and Deſign of this Diſcourſe.

IT is now above twenty years ſince I firſt publiſhed *a Diſcourſe about the reaſons of the Sufferings of Chriſt*, (lately reprinted) in anſwer to ſome *Socinian* Objections at that time. But I know not how it came to paſs, that the *Socinian* Controverſie ſeemed to be laid aſleep among us for many years after;

and ſo it had continued to this day, if ſome mens buſie and indiſcreet zeal for their own particular Opinions (or other *Hereſies*) had not been more prevalent over them, than their care and concernment for the common intereſt of Chriſtianity among us. For it is that which really ſuffers by theſe unhappy and very unſeaſonable Diſputes about the *Myſteries of the Chriſtian Faith*, which could never have been ſtarted and carried on with more fatal conſequence to all revealed Religion, than in an age too much inclined to Scepticiſm and Infidelity. For all who are but well-wiſhers to that, do greedily catch at any thing which tends to unſettle mens minds as to matters of Faith, and to expoſe them to the ſcorn and contempt of Infidels. And this is all the advantage which they have above others in their writings. For upon my carefull Peruſal of them (which was occaſion'd by reprinting that Diſcourſe) I found nothing extraordinary, as to depth of Judgment, or cloſeneſs of Reaſoning, or ſtrength of Argument, or skill in Scripture or Antiquity, but the old ſtuff ſet out with a *new dreſs*, and too much ſuited to the *Genius* of the age we live in, *viz.* brisk and airy, but withal too light and ſuper-

ſuperficial. But although ſuch a ſort of Raillery be very much unbecoming the weight and dignity of the ſubject, yet that is not the worſt part of the character of them; for they ſeem to be written not with a deſign to convince others, or to juſtifie themſelves, but to *ridicule* the great *Myſteries of our Faith*, calling them *Jargon*, *Cant*, *Nonſenſe*, *Impoſſibilities*, *Contradictions*, *Samaritaniſm*, and what not? any thing but *Mahometiſm* and *Deiſm*. And at the ſame time they know, that we have not framed theſe Doctrines our ſelves; but have received them by as univerſal a Tradition and Conſent of the Chriſtian Church, as that whereby we receive the Books of the New Teſtament, and as founded upon their authority. So that, as far as I can ſee, the truth of theſe Doctrines and authority of thoſe Books muſt ſtand and fall together: For from the time of the writing and publiſhing of them all perſons who were admitted into the Chriſtian Church by the *Form of Baptiſm*, preſcribed by our Saviour, were underſtood to be received Members upon profeſſion of *the Faith of the Holy Trinity*; the *Hymns* and *Doxologies* of the Primitive Church were to *Father*, *Son and Holy Ghoſt*; and thoſe who openly oppo-

Conſiderat. on the explications of the Trinity, by Dr. W. &c. p. 22, 32. Defence of the Hiſtory of the Unit. p. 5. Anſwer to the Archbiſhop's Sermon, p. 4.

ſed *that Doctrine* were caſt out of the Communion of it: which to me ſeem plain and demonſtrative arguments, that this was the *Doctrine* of the *Chriſtian* Church from the beginning, as will appear in the progreſs of this Diſcourſe. The chief deſign whereof is to vindicate the *Doctrine of the Trinity*, as it hath been *generally received in the Chriſtian Church*, and is expreſſed in the *Athanaſian Creed*, from thoſe horrible Imputations of *Nonſenſe*, *Contradiction* and *Impoſſibility*; with which it is charged by our *Unitarians* (as they call themſelves;) and that in the anſwer to the Sermon lately reprinted, about *the Myſteries of the Chriſtian Faith*: which I firſt preached and publiſhed ſome years ſince, upon the breaking out of this controverſie among us, by the *Notes on Athanaſius his Creed*, and other miſchievous Pamphlets one upon another. I was in hopes to have given ſome check to their inſolent way of writing about matters ſo much above our reach, by ſhewing how reaſonable it was for us to ſubmit to divine Revelation in ſuch things, ſince we muſt acknowledge our ſelves ſo much to ſeek, as to the *nature* of *Subſtances*, which are continually before our Eyes; and therefore, if there were ſuch difficulties

about

about a Myſtery which depended upon Revelation, we had no cauſe to wonder at it; but our buſineſs was chiefly to be ſatisfied, whether this Doctrine were any part of that Revelation. As to which I propoſed ſeveral things, which I thought very reaſonable, to the finding out the true ſenſe of the Scripture about theſe matters. After a conſiderable time, they thought fit to publiſh ſomething, which was to paſs for an anſwer to it; but in it, they wholly paſs over that part which relates to the ſenſe of Scripture, and run into their common place about *Myſteries of Faith*; in which they were ſure to have as many *Friends*, as our Faith had *Enemies*: and yet they managed it in ſo trifling a manner, that I did not then think it deſerved an Anſwer. But a worthy and judicious Friend was willing to take that task upon himſelf, which he hath very well diſcharged: ſo that I am not concerned to meddle with all thoſe particulars, which are fully anſwer'd already, but the *general charge* as to the *Chriſtian Church* about the Doctrine of the Trinity, I think my ſelf oblig'd to give an anſwer to upon this occaſion. But before I come to that, ſince they ſo confidently charge the Chriſtian Church for ſo many

ages, with embracing *Errors* and *Nonſenſe*, and *Contradictions* for *Myſteries of Faith.* I deſire to know (ſuppoſing it poſſible for the Chriſtian Church to be ſo early, ſo generally, and ſo miſerably deceived in a matter of ſuch moment) by *what light* they have diſcovered this *great Error.* Have they any *new Books* of *Scripture* to judge by? Truly they had need, for they ſeem to be very weary of the old ones; becauſe they find they will not ſerve their turn; therefore they muſter up *the old Objections againſt them*, and give no anſwer to them; they find fault with *Copies*, and ſay, they are *corrupted and falſified to ſpeak the Language of the Church*: they let fall ſuſpicious words, *as to the Form of Baptiſm*, as though *it were inſerted from the Churches Practice*; they charge us with following *corrupt Copies*, and making *falſe Tranſlations* without any manner of ground for it.

Anſwer to the Archb. Serm. p. 50. *Explicat. of the Trinity*, p. 29. *Anſwer to* Milbourn, p. 15. 23. *Hiſtory of the* Unit. p. 43. *Anſwer to the Archb.* p. 29, 30.

And doth not all this diſcover no good will to the Scriptures, at leaſt, as they are received among us? And I deſpair of meeting with better Copies, or ſeeing a more faithfull Tranſlation than ours is. So that it is plain, that they have no mind to be tried by the *Scriptures*. For theſe exceptions are ſuch, as a Malefactor would

would make to a Jury he is afraid to be condemned by.

But what then is the peculiar light which theſe happy men have found in a corner, the want whereof hath made the Chriſtian Church to fall into ſuch *monſtrous Errors and Contradictions*? *Nothing* (*they pretend*) *but the mere light of common ſenſe and reaſon*; which they call after a more refined way of ſpeaking, *clear Ideas and diſtinct Perceptions of things.*

But leaſt I ſhould be thought to miſrepreſent them; I will produce ſome of their own Expreſſions. In one place they ſay, *We deny the Articles of the new Chriſtianity, or the* Athanaſian *religion, not becauſe they are Myſteries, or becauſe we do not comprehend them; we deny them becauſe we do comprehend them; we have a clear and diſtinct Perception, that they are not Myſteries, but Contradictions, Impoſſibilities, and pure Nonſenſe. We have our reaſon in vain, and all ſcience and certainty would be deſtroy'd if we could not diſtinguiſh between Myſteries and Contradictions.* And ſoon after, *We are not to give the venerable name of Myſteries to Doctrines that are contrary to nature's and reaſon's Light, or which deſtroy or contradict our natural Ideas.* Theſe things I have particular

Anſwer to my Sermon, p. 4.

reaſon to take notice of here, becauſe they are publiſhed as an *Anſwer* to the foregoing *Sermon* about the *Myſteries of the Chriſtian Faith*: and this ſhews the *general grounds* they go upon, and therefore more fit to be conſider'd here. To which I ſhall add one paſſage more, wherein they inſinuate, that the *Doctrine* of the *Trinity* hath been ſupported only by intereſt and force. Their words are (after they have called the *Doctrine of the Trinity*, *a monſtrous Parodox and Contradiction*) *This is that*, ſay they, *which becauſe all other arguments failed them in their diſputations with the* Photinians *and* Arians, *they at laſt effectually provcd, by the Imperial Edicts, by Confiſcations and Baniſhments, by Seizing and Burning all Books written againſt it or them, by capital Puniſhments, and when the Papacy (of which this is the chief Article) prevailed by Fire and Faggot.* This is a new diſcovery indeed, that the Doctrine of the Trinity, as it is generally receiv'd in the Chriſtian Church, is *the chief Article of Popery*; although it were embraced and defended long before *Popery* was known; and I hope would be ſo, if there were no ſuch thing as *Popery* left in the world. But if every thing which diſpleaſes ſome men muſt paſs for *Popery*,

Anſ to Dr. Wallis's four Letters, p. 4.

Popery, I am afraid *Chriſtianity* it ſelf will not eſcape at laſt: for there are ſome who are building apace on ſuch foundations as theſe; and are endeavouring what they can, to remove out of their way all revealed Religion, by the help of thoſe two powerfull *Machines*, viz. *Prieſt-craft* and *Myſteries*.

But becauſe I intend a clear and diſtinct Diſcourſe concerning the *Doctrine* of the *Trinity*, as is hath been generally received among us; I ſhall proceed in theſe four Enquiries.

(1.) Whether it was accounted a *monſtrous Paradox and Contradiction*, where Perſons were not ſway'd by *Force and Intereſt*?

(2.) Whether there be any *ground* of *common reaſon*, on which it can be juſtly charged with *Nonſenſe*, *Impoſſibilities* and *Contradiction*?

(3.) Whether their Doctrine about the *Trinity* or ours, be more agreeable to the *ſenſe* of *Scripture* and *Antiquity*?

(4.) Whether our Doctrine being admitted, it doth overthrow all *certainty of reaſon*, and makes way for believing the greateſt Abſurdities under the pretence of being *Myſteries of Faith*?

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

The Doctrine of the Trinity not received in the Chriſtian Church by Force or Intereſt.

AS to the firſt, it will lead me into an enquiry into the ſenſe of the *Chriſtian Church*, as to this Doctrine, long before *Popery* was hatched, and at a time when the main force of *Imperial Edicts* was againſt *Chriſtianity* it ſelf; at which time this Doctrine was owned by the Chriſtian Church, but diſowned and diſputed againſt by ſome particular Parties and Sects. And the queſtion then will be, whether theſe had engroſſed *Senſe*, and *Reaſon*, and *Knowledge* among themſelves; and all the body of the Chriſtian Church, with their heads and governors, were bereft of common Senſe, and given up to believe *Nonſenſe* and *Contradictions* for *Myſteries of Faith*. But in order to the clearing this matter, I take it for granted, That *Senſe* and *Reaſon* are no *late inventions* only to be found among our *Unitarians*; but that all Mankind have

have ſuch a competent ſhare of them, as to be able to judge, what is agreeable to them, and what not, if they apply themſelves to it; *That* no men have ſo little ſenſe as to be fond of *Nonſenſe*, when ſenſe will do them equal ſervice; *That* if there be no Biaſs of Intereſt to ſway them, men will generally judge according to the evidence of reaſon; *That* if they be very much concerned for a Doctrine oppoſed by others, and againſt their intereſt, they are perſwaded of the truth of it, by other means than by *force* and *fear*; *That* it is poſſible for men of ſenſe and reaſon to believe a Doctrine to be true on the account of divine Revelation, although they cannot comprehend the manner of it; *That* we have reaſon to believe thoſe to be men of ſenſe above others, who have ſhew'd their abilities above them in other matters of Knowledge and Speculation; *That* there can be no reaſon to ſuſpect the integrity of ſuch men in delivering their own Senſe, who at the ſame time might far better ſecure their intereſt by renouncing their Faith; laſtly, *That* the more Perſons are concerned to eſtabliſh and defend a Doctrine which is oppoſed and contemned, the greater evidence they give, that they are perſwaded of the truth of it.

Theſe

These are *Postulata* so agreeable to sense and common reason, that I think it an affront to humane Nature to go about to prove them. But to shew what use we are to make of them; we must consider that it cannot be denied, that *the Doctrine of the Trinity* did meet with opposition very early in the *Christian Church*, especially among the *Jewish Christians*; I mean those who strictly adhered to the Law of *Moses*, after the Apostles had declared the freedom of Christians from the obligation of it. These (as I shall shew by and by) soon after the dispersion of the Church of *Jerusalem*, gathered into a body by themselves, distinct from that which consisted of *Jews* and *Gentiles*, and was therefore called the *Catholick Christian Church*. And this separate body, whether called *Ebionites*, *Nazarens*, or *Mineans*, did not only differ from the *Catholick Christian Church*, as to the necessity of observing the Law of *Moses*, but likewise as to the Divinity of our Saviour, which they denied, although they professed to believe him as *the Christ* or promised *Messias*.

Theodoret *haret. l.* 1. & 11.

Theodoret hath with very good judgment placed the Heresies of the first ages of the Christian Church, under two distinct

ſtinct heads, (which others reckon up confuſedly) and thoſe are ſuch as relate to the *Humanity of Chriſt*, as *Simon Magus*, and all the Sects of thoſe who are called *Gnoſticks*, which are recited in his firſt Book. In his ſecond he begins with thoſe which relate to *the Divinity of Chriſt*; and theſe are of two kinds:

1. The *Jewiſh Chriſtians* who denied it. Of theſe he reckons up the *Ebionites*, *Cerinthians*, the *Nazarens*, and *Elceſaitæ*, whom he diſtinguiſhed from the other *Ebionites*, becauſe of a *Book of Revelation*, which one *Elxai* brought among them; but *Epiphanius* ſaith, he joyned with the *Ebionites* and *Nazarens*. Epiphan. Hæreſ. 19. *n.* 5. 29. *n.* 17.

2. Thoſe of the *Gentile Chriſtians*, who were look'd on as broaching a *new Doctrine* among them: of theſe he reckons *Artemon* as the firſt, then *Theodotus*; whom others make the firſt Publiſher of it, as *Tertullian*, and the old Writer in *Euſebius*, ſuppoſed to be *Caius*, who lived near the time, and of whom a conſiderable Fragment is preſerved in *Euſebius*, which gives light to theſe matters. The next is another *Theodotus*, who framed a new Sect of ſuch as ſet up *Melchiſedeck* above Chriſt. Then follow *Paulus Samoſatenus*, and *Sabellius*, who made but Tertul. de præſcript. hæret. *c.* 52. Euſeb hiſt. Eccl. *l.* 5. *c.* 28.

one

one Perſon as well as *one God*, and ſo overthrew the Trinity; with whom *Marcellus* agreed in ſubſtance, and laſt of all *Photinus*. But *Theodoret* concludes that Book with this paſſage, viz. *That all theſe Hereſies againſt our Saviour's Divinity were then wholly extinct; ſo that there were not ſo much as any ſmall Remainders of them.* What would he have ſaid, if he had lived in our age, wherein they are not only revived, but are pretended to have been the true Doctrine of the Apoſtolical Churches? Had all men loſt their *Senſes* in *Theodoret*'s time? And yet there were as many learned and able Men in the Chriſtian Church then, as ever were in any time.

CHAP.

CHAP III.

The Socinian *Plea for the Antiquity of their Doctrine examined.*

BUT this is not the age our *Unitarians* will ſtand or fall by. They are for going backward; and they ſpeak with great comfort about the old *Ebionites* and *Nazarens* as entirely theirs; "And that "they had conſiderable men among them, "as *Theodotion* and *Symmachus*, two Tran- "ſlators of the Hebrew Bible. And among "the *Gentile Chriſtians*, they value them- "ſelves upon three Men, *Paulus Samoſa- "tenus*, *Lucianus* the moſt learned Per- "ſon, they ſay, of his age, and *Photi- "nus* Biſhop of *Sirmium*. As to the *Uni- "tarians* at *Rome*, (whom they impro- "perly call *Nazarens*) they pretended "that their Doctrine was Apoſtolical, and "the general Doctrine of the Church "till the times of *Victor* and *Zepherin*. *Hiſt. of the* Unit. p. 10. *Edit. II.*

This is the ſubſtance of their Plea, which muſt now be examin'd.

I begin with thoſe *Primitive Unitarians*, the *Ebionites*, concerning whom, I obſerve theſe things:

1. That

1. That they were a distinct, separate body of men from the Christian Church. For all the ancient Writers who speak of them, do mention them as *Hereticks*, and wholly divided from it, as appears by *Iræneus*, *Tertullian*, *Epiphanius*, *Theodoret*, S. *Augustin*, and others. *Eusebius* saith of them, *That although the Devil could not make them renounce Christianity, yet finding their weakness*, ἐσφετερίζετο, he made them *his own*. He would never have said this of any whom he look'd on as Members of the Christian Church. But wherein is it that *Eusebius* blames them? He tells it in the very next words; that it was *for the mean opinion they entertained of Christ*; for they look'd *on him as a mere Man, but very just*. And although there were *two sorts* of them; some owning the *miraculous Conception*, and others not; yet saith he, *They at last agreed in the same Impiety*, which was, *That they would not own Christ to have had any Pre-existence before his Birth; nor that he was* Θεὸς Λόγος, *God the Word*. It's true, he finds fault with them afterwards *for keeping to the Law of* Moses; but the first *Impiety* he charges them with, is the other. That which I inferr from hence is, that *Eusebius* himself (to whom they profess to shew

Euseb. *l.* 3. *c.* 27.

ſhew greater reſpect than to moſt of the ancient Writers, for his *exactneſs and diligence* in Church-Hiſtory) doth affirm the Doctrine which overthrows the *Pre-exiſtence and Divinity of Chriſt* to be an *Impiety*. And therefore, when he affirms the *firſt fifteen Biſhops of the Church of Jeruſalem who were of the Circumciſion*. viz. to the Siege of it by *Hadrian*, *did hold the genuine Doctrine of Chriſt*, it muſt be underſtood of his *Pre-exiſtence and Divinity*; for the other we ſee he accounted an *Impiety*. And he tells us, *the Church of Jeruſalem then conſiſted of believing Jews, and ſo it had done from the Apoſtles times to that of* Hadrian's *Baniſhment of the Jews*. Which is a conſiderable Teſtimony to two purpoſes:

Ante-Niceniſm p. 17.

Anſwer to Milb. p. 20.

Euſeb. l. 4. c. 5.

1. To ſhew that the Primitive Church of *Jeruſalem* did hold the Doctrine of Chriſt's *Pre-exiſtence* and *Divinity*. But ſay our *Unitarians*, *this doth not follow*. For what reaſon? When it is plain that *Euſebius* accounted that the *only genuine Doctrine*. *No*, ſay they, *he meant only the miraculous Conception, and that they held that, in oppoſition to thoſe Ebionites who ſaid that he was born as other men are*. This is very ſtrange; when *Euſebius* had diſtinguiſhed the two ſorts of *Ebionites*

Reſp. ad Judic. Eccleſ. p. 176.

onites about this matter, and had blamed both of them, even *thoſe that held him born of a Virgin*, for falling *into the ſame Impiety*. What can ſatisfie ſuch men, who are content with ſuch an anſwer? But ſay they, *Euſebius only ſpake his own ſenſe*. Not ſo neither: For he ſaith in that place, that he had ſearched the moſt ancient Records of the Church of *Jeruſalem*. *Yes*, ſay they, *for the Succeſſion of the firſt Biſhops; but as to their Doctrine he had it from* Hegeſippus, *and he was an* Ebionite *himſelf*. Then *Euſebius* muſt not be the man they take him for. For if *Hegeſippus* were himſelf an *Ebionite*, and told *Euſebius* in his Commentaries, that the Primitive Church of *Jeruſalem* conſiſted of all ſuch, then *Euſebius* muſt ſuppoſe that Church guilty of the ſame *Impiety* with which he charges the *Ebionites*; and would he then have ſaid, *That they had the true knowledge of Chriſt among them*? *No*, ſay they, Euſebius *ſpake his own opinion, but* Hegeſippus *being an* Ebionite *himſelf, meant otherwiſe*. But *Euſebius* doth not uſe *Hegeſippus* his words, but his own in that place; and withal, how doth it appear that *Hegeſippus* himſelf was an *Ebionite*? This, one of their lateſt Writers hath undertaken, but in ſuch

ſuch a manner, as is not like to convince me. It is thus, *Hegeſippus was himſelf a Jewiſh Chriſtian, and made uſe of the Hebrew Goſpel, and among the Hereticks which crept into the Church of* Jeruſalem, *he never numbers the* Ebionites *or* Cerinthians, *but only the* Gnoſticks. I will not diſpute, whether *Hegeſippus* was a Jewiſh Chriſtian or not. Grant he was ſo, yet how doth it appear that all the *Jewiſh Chriſtians* were at that time *Ebionites* or *Cerinthians*? It ſeems they were neither of them *Hereticks*, although they were oppoſite to each other; the one *held the World created by inferiour Powers*, the other *by God himſelf:* the one, we ſee, *made Chriſt a mere Man*; but the *Cerinthians* held *an illapſe of the* Λόγος *upon him, and ſo made him a kind of a God by his Preſence*, as *Neſtorius* did afterwards. But honeſt *Hegeſippus* took neither one nor the other for *Hereticks*, if our *Unitarians* ſay true. But yet it doth not appear, that *Hegeſippus* was either one or the other. For he ſpeaks of *the Church of Jeruſalem*, as is plain by *Euſebius*, and the *Cerinthians* and *Ebionites*, were in other parts; the former in *Egypt* and the *leſſer* or *Proconſular Aſia*; and the latter about *Decapolis* and *Cœleſyria*, from whence they

Anſ. to Dr. Bull, *Part* I. p. 41.

Euſeb. *l.* 4. *c.* 22.

ſpread into *Arabia* and *Armenia*, as appears by *Epiphanius*. But *Origen* ſaith, *That all the Jewiſh Chriſtians were* Ebionites. What! no *Cerinthians* among them? Were not thoſe *Jewiſh Chriſtians*? Or were they all turned *Ebionites* then? No ſuch thing appears by *Origen*'s ſaying. But we are not enquiring now, what they were *in his time*, but in the Church of *Jeruſalem*. Doth *Origen* ſay all the *Jewiſh Chriſtians* there were ſuch? And as to his own time, it is not improbable that thoſe who then made up the ſeparate Body of Jewiſh Chriſtians *were Ebionites*. But what is this to the *firſt Chriſtians* of the Church of *Jeruſalem*? *Very much*, ſay they, *becauſe the firſt Chriſtians were called Nazarens, and the Nazarens held the ſame Doctrine with the Ebionites.* But the title of *Nazarens* did not always ſignifie the ſame thing. It was at firſt uſed for *all Chriſtians*, as appears by the Sect of the *Nazarens* in *Tertullus* his Accuſation of S. *Paul*; then it was taken for the *Chriſtians* who ſtay'd at *Pella* and ſetled at *Decapolis* and thereabouts, as *Epiphanius* affirms; for although all the Chriſtians withdrew thither before the Deſtruction of *Jeruſalem*, as *Euſebius* ſaith, yet they did not all continue there, but a great number

Act. 24. 5.

Epiphan. hæret. 29. n. 7.

number returned to *Jeruſalem*, and were there ſetled under their Biſhops; but thoſe who remained about *Pella* kept the name of *Nazarens*, and never were united with the Gentile Chriſtians, but kept up their old Jewiſh cuſtoms, as to their Synagogues, even in S. *Jerom* and S. *Auguſtine*'s time. Now theſe *Nazarens* might be all *Ebionites*, and yet thoſe of the *Church of Jeruſalem* not ſo at all.

2. The next thing obſervable from this place of *Euſebius* is, that while the *Nazarens* and *Ebionites* were ſetled in *Cœleſyria*, and the parts thereabouts, there was a regular Chriſtian Church at *Jeruſalem*, under the Biſhops of the Circumciſion, to the Siege of *Hadrian*. *Euſebius* obſerves, that before the deſtruction of *Jeruſalem*, *all the Chriſtians forſook not only Jeruſalem, but the Coaſts of Judea.* But that they did not all continue there, is moſt evident from what *Euſebius* here ſaith of the Church and Biſhops of *Jeruſalem*; between the two Sieges of *Titus Veſpaſian* and *Hadrian*, which was in the 18 year of his Empire, ſaith *Euſebius*. Who produces another Teſtimony out of *Juſtin Martyr*, which ſhews that the Chriſtians were returned to *Jeruſalem*. For therein he ſaith, *That* Barchochebas *in that War uſed the* Euſeb. *l.* 3. *c.* 5. *L.* 4. *c.* 8.

Chriſtians with very great ſeverity to make them renounce Chriſtianity. How could this be, if all the Chriſtians were out of his reach, then being ſetled about *Pella?*

l. 4. *c.* 6. And although *Euſebius* ſaith, *That when the Jews were baniſhed their Country by* Hadrian's *Edict, that then the Church of Jeruſalem was made up of Gentiles*; yet we are not ſo ſtrictly to underſtand him, as though the Chriſtians who ſuffer'd under *Barchochebas*, were wholly excluded. *Oroſius* ſaith, *That they were permitted by the Emperour's Edict.* It is ſufficient for me, if they were connived at, which is very probable, although they did not think fit to have any ſuch publick Perſons as their *Biſhops* to be any other than *Gentiles.* And *Hegeſippus* is allow'd after this time, to have been a *Jewiſh Chriſtian* of the Church of *Jeruſalem:* ſo that the Church there muſt conſiſt both of *Jews* and *Gentiles*; but they can never ſhew that any of the *Ebionites* did admit any *Gentile Chriſtians* among them, which ſhews that they were then diſtinct Bodies.

Oroſ. *l.* 7. *c.* 13.

2. They were not only diſtinct in *Communion*, but had a different *rule of Faith.* This is a point of great conſequence, and ought to be well conſider'd. For, ſince our *Unitarians* own the *Ebionites* as their

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Predeceſſors, we ought to have a particular eye to the *rule of Faith* received by them, which muſt be very different from ours, if they follow the *Ebionites*, as I doubt not to make it appear. They ſay, *The Ebionites uſed only S.* Matthew's *Goſpel.* But the Chriſtian Church then, and ever ſince, have receiv'd the four Goſpels, as of divine authority. *Euſebius*, one of the moſt approved Authors in Antiquity by our *Unitarians*, reckons up the *four Evangeliſts and S.* Paul's *Epiſtles*, as writings univerſally received by the Chriſtian Church; then he mentions ſome generally rejected as ſpurious; and after thoſe which were doubted, among which he mentions *the Goſpel according to the Hebrews*, which *the Jewiſh Chriſtians follow'd.* Now here is an apparent difference put between *the Goſpel according to the Hebrews, and S.* Matthew's *Goſpel*; as much as between a Book receiv'd without controverſie, and one that was not. But if *the Goſpel according to the Hebrews* were then acknowledged to be the *true Goſpel of S.* Matthew, it was impoſſible a man of ſo much ſenſe as *Euſebius*, ſhould make this difference between them. But it is worth our obſerving, what our *Unitarians* ſay about this matter. And by

Anſwer to Dr. Bull, *p.* 42.

that we may judge very much of their opinion about the Goſpels. I ſhall ſet down their words, for fear I ſhould be thought to do them wrong. " *Symmachus* and " the *Ebionites*, ſay they, as they held " our Saviour to be the Son of *Joſeph* " and *Mary*; ſo they contended that the " firſt Chapter of S. *Matthew*'s Goſpel was " added by the *Greek* Tranſlators. S. *Mat-* " *thew* wrote his Goſpel in Hebrew, when " it was tranſlated into Greek, the Tran- " ſlator preſaced it with a Genealogy and " Narration that our Saviour was con- " ceived by the Holy Spirit of God, and " was not the Son of *Joſeph*, but this " Genealogy and Narration, ſaid *Symma-* " *chus* and the *Ebionites*, is not in the " Hebrew Goſpel of S. *Matthew*, nay is " the mere invention of the Tranſlator. " As for the other Goſpels, the *Ebionites* " and *Symmachians* did not receive the " Goſpel of S. *Luke*: and for that of S. " *John*, they ſaid it was indeed written " by *Cerinthus*, to confirm his *Platonick* " *Conceits* about the *Logos* or Word, which " he ſuppoſed to be the Chriſt or Spirit " of God, which reſted on and inhabited " the perſon of Jeſus. Let us now but join to this another paſſage, which is this, " Thoſe whom we now call *Socinians*,

Anſwer to Dr. Bull, p. 39.

" were

" were by the Fathers and the first ages " of Christianity called *Nazarens*; and " afterwards they were called *Ebionites*, " *Mineans*, *Symmachians*, &c.

If this be true, they must have the same opinions as to the Books of the new Testament; and hereby we see what sort of men we have to deal with, who under the pretence of the *old Ebionites*, undermine the Authority of the New Testament. As to S. *Matthew's Gospel*, I see no reason to question its being first written in the Language then used among the Jews, which was mixt of *Hebrew*, *Syriack* and *Chaldee*: since this is affirmed, not merely by *Papias*, whose Authority never went far; but by *Origen*, *Irenæus*, *Eusebius*, S. *Jerom*, and others. But I must distinguish between S. *Matthews's Authentick Gospel*, which *Pantænus* saw in the *Indies*, and that which was called *the Gospel according to the Hebrews*, *and the Nazaren Gospel*. S. *Jerom* in one place seems to insinuate, that S. *Matthew's Gospel* was preserved in the Library of *Pamphilus* at *Cæsarea*, and that the *Nazarens* at *Berrhæa* in *Syria* had given him leave to transcribe it. But if we compare this with other places in him, we shall find, that he question'd whether this were the Authen-

Euseb *l.* 3. *c.* 24, 39. *L.* 5. *c.* 8, 10. *L.* 6 *c.* 25. Hieron. c. Pelag *l.* 3.

Hieron de script in Matth

Authentick Goſpel of S. *Matthew* or not; he ſaith, *It is ſo called by many*; but he confeſſes it was the ſame with the *Ebionites* and *Nazarens* uſed. In which were many interpolations, as appears by the collections out of it in S. *Jerom*'s Works and other ancient Writers; which ſome learned men have put together. And S. *Jerom* often calls it *the Goſpel according to the Hebrews*. And ſo do other ancient Writers. From the laying ſeveral paſſages together, *Eraſmus* ſuſpects, that S. *Jerom* never ſaw any other than the common *Nazaren Goſpel*, and offers a good reaſon for it, *viz.* That he never made uſe of its Authority to correct the Greek of S. *Matthew*, which he would not have failed to have done in his Commentaries; and he produces the *Nazaren Goſpel* upon ſleight occaſions. But how came the Preface to be curtail'd in the *Ebionite Goſpel*? Of which *Epiphanius* gives an account, and ſhews what was inſerted inſtead of it: *No*, ſay the *Ebionites*, *the Preface was added by the Tranſlator into Greek*. From what evidence? and to what end? *To prove that Chriſt was born of the Holy Spirit*. This then muſt be look'd on as a mere Forgery; and thoſe *Ebionites* were in the right, who held him to be *the*

Comment. in Matth. c. 12.

In Iſa. c. 11. In Ezek. c. 18.

Eraſm. adverſ. Stunic. c. 1.

the Son of *Joſeph* and *Mary*. What do theſe men mean by ſuch ſuggeſtions as theſe? Are they reſolved to ſet up *Deiſm* among us, and in order thereto, to undermine the Authority of the New Teſtament? For it is not only S. *Matthew*'s *Goſpel*, but S. *Luke*'s and S. *John*'s which they ſtrike at, under the pretence of repreſenting the arguments of theſe wretched *Ebionites*. If their arguments are mean and trifling and merely precarious, why are they not ſleighted and anſwered by ſuch as pretend to be Chriſtians? If they think them good, we ſee what we have to do with theſe men; it is not the *Doctrine of the Trinity*, ſo much as the *Authority of the Goſpels*, which we are to maintain againſt them: And not thoſe only, for *the Ebionites rejected all S.* Paul's *Epiſtles and called him an Apoſtate and a Tranſgreſſor of the Law.* What ſay our *Unitarians* to this? Why truly, *This comes from* Epiphanius, *and becauſe he quotes no Author, it ſeems to be one of his malicious Tales.* This is a very ſhort way of anſwering, if it would ſatisfie any men of ſenſe. But they ought to have remembred that within a few Pages, they alledge *Epiphanius* as a very competent Witneſs about the *Ebionites*, *becauſe he was born* *Anſwer to Dr.* Bull, *p.* 35.

P. 42.

in

in Paleſtine, *and lived very near it.* But we do not rely wholly upon *Epiphanius* in this matter. For thoſe whom they allow to be the beſt Witneſſes as to the Doctrine of the *Nazarens*, ſay the ſame thing concerning them. *As the moſt learned* Origen, as they call him, *who lived a long time in* Syria *and* Paleſtine *it ſelf*; and he affirms, *that both ſorts of* Ebionites *rejected S.* Paul's *Epiſtles:* and *Theodoret*, who they ſay, *lived in* Cœleſyria, *where the Nazarens moſt abound*, affirms of them, *That they allowed only the Goſpel according to the Hebrews, and called the Apoſtle an Apoſtate:* by whom they meant S. *Paul.* And the ſame is ſaid by S. *Jerom* who converſed among them; *That they look on S.* Paul *as a Tranſgreſſor of the Law, and receive none of his Writings.* Have we not now a very comfortable account of the Canon of the *New Teſtament* from theſe ancient *Unitarians?* And if our modern ones account them their *Predeceſſors*, we may judge what a mean opinion they muſt have of the Writings of the New Teſtament. For if they had any concernment for them, they would never ſuffer ſuch ſcandalous inſinuations to paſs without a ſevere cenſure, and a ſufficient anſwer. But their Work ſeems to be rather

P. 39. Origen c. Celſ. *l.* 5. *p.* 274.

Theodor. hæret. *l.* 2. *c.* 1.

Hieron. in Matt. *c.* 12.

to

to pull down, than to eſtabliſh the Authority of revealed Religion; and we know what ſort of men are gratified by it.

CHAP. IV.

Of the conſiderable Men they pretend to have been of their Opinion in the Primitive Church.

I Now come to conſider the men of Senſe they pretend to among theſe *ancient Unitarians*.

The firſt is *Theodotion*, whom they make to be an *Unitarian*. But he was, ſaith *Euſebius* from *Irenæus*, a *Jewiſh Proſelyte*, and ſo they may very much increaſe the number of *Unitarians*, by taking in all the *Jews* as well as *Proſelytes*. But muſt theſe paſs for *men of Senſe* too, becauſe they are againſt the Doctrine of the Trinity, and much upon the ſame grounds with our modern *Unitarians*? For they cry out of *Contradictions* and *Impoſſibilities* juſt as they do; *i. e.* with as much confidence and as little reaſon. *Symmachus* is another of their ancient *Heroes*; he

Euſeb. *l.* 5. *c.* 8.

Epiph. de ponder. & menſ. n. 16. Euſeb. l. 6. c. 17. Auguſt. c. Creſcon. l. 1. c. 31. Hier. in Heb. c. 3. Adverſ. Ruffin.

he was, if *Epiphanius* may be believed, firſt a *Samaritan*, and then a *Jew*, and *Euſebius* ſaith indeed, *That he was an Ebionite, and therefore for obſerving the Law of* Moſes. *S. Auguſtin* ſaith, *That in his time the* Symmachiani *were both for Circumciſion and Baptiſm.* S. *Jerom* obſerves, that *Theodotion* and *Symmachus*, both *Ebionites, tranſlated the Old Teſtament in what concerned our Saviour, like Jews, and* Aquila *who was a Jew, like a Chriſtian*; but in another place he blames *all three* for the ſame fault. *Euſebius* goes ſomewhat farther: for he ſaith, *Symmachus wrote againſt S.* Matthew's *Goſpel to eſtabliſh his own Hereſie*, which ſhew'd he was a true *Ebionite*.

Anſwer to the Archb. Sermon, p. 44, 66.

The next they mention as one of their great Lights, was *Paulus Samoſatenus, Biſhop and Patriarch of Antioch.* But in another place they have a ſpitefull Inſinuation, that *men in ſuch places are the great Penſioners of the World*; as though they were ſway'd only by intereſt; and *that it keeps them from embracing of the truth.* Now *Paulus Samoſatenus* gave greater occaſion for ſuch a Suſpicion than any of the perſons ſo unworthily reflected upon. For he was a man noted for his Affectation of *exceſſive Vanity and Pomp, and very*

ry unjuſt methods of growing rich. It is well we have *Euſebius* his Teſtimony for this; for they ſleight *Epiphanius* for his *malicious Tales*, and S. *Jerom* for his *Legends*; but they commend *Euſebius* for his *Exactneſs* and *Diligence*. And I hope *Theodoret* may eſcape their cenſure, who affirms, that *Paulus Samoſatenus* ſuited his Doctrine to his *intereſt* with *Zenobia*, *who then governed in thoſe parts of* Syria *and* Phœnicia, *who profeſſed her ſelf to be of the Jewiſh Perſwaſion. Athanaſius* ſaith, *She was a Jew and a Favourer of* Paulus Samoſatenus. What his opinions were, our *Unitarians* do not take the pains to inform us, taking it for granted that he was of their Mind. *Euſebius* ſaith, *He had a very mean and low opinion of Chriſt, as having nothing in him above the common nature of Mankind. Theodoret* ſaith, he fell into the Doctrine of *Artemon*, to oblige *Zenobia*; and *Artemon*, he ſaith, held *that Chriſt was a mere Man born of a Virgin, but exceeding the Prophets in Excellency.* Wherethe words Ψιλὸς ἄνθρωπος are uſed to expreſs the opinion of *Artemon*, which ought to be taken notice of, becauſe our modern *Unitarians* ſay, *That thoſe words among the ancient Writers were taken in oppoſition to the miraculous Conception of our Saviour.*

Euſeb. *l.* 7. *c.* 30.

Reflect. on *Dr.* Bull, *p.* 35.

Anſwer to Milbourn, *p.* 20.

Athan. ad ſolit. vit. agent. *p.* 857.

Euſeb. *l* 3. *c.* 27.

Reſponſ. ad judicium Eccleſiæ per D. Bull, *p.* 150.

But

But *Paulus Samoſatenus* was univerſally diſowned by the Chriſtian Church of that time; although as long as *Zenobia* held her Power, he kept his See; which was for ſome time after he was firſt called in queſtion for his Hereſie. But at firſt he made uſe of many *Arts* and *Devices* to deceive the Chriſtian Biſhops of the beſt Reputation, who aſſembled at *Antioch* in order to the ſuppreſſing this dangerous Doctrine, as they all accounted it *For hearing of his opinions about our Saviour, they ran together*, ſaith *Euſebius*, *as againſt a Wolf which deſigned to deſtroy the Flock.* Now from hence it is very reaſonable to argue, that the *Samoſatenian Doctrine* was then look'd on as a very dangerous Novelty in the Chriſtian Church. For, although the *Ebionites* had aſſerted the ſame thing, as to the Divinity of our Saviour, yet they were not look'd on as true Members of the Chriſtian Church; but as S. *Jerom* ſaith, *While they affected to be both Jews and Chriſtians, they were neither Jews nor Chriſtians.* *Artemon*, whoever he was was but an obſcure perſon; and *Theodotus* had Learning, they ſay, but was of no place in the Church; but for ſuch a conſiderable perſon as the Biſhop of *Antioch* to own ſuch a Doctrine muſt unavoidably

Reſtaurans Pauli Samoſatenſis Artes & Dolos. Decret. Conc. Sardin. apud Hilar. fragment. *p* 1310. Ed. Par. 1693. Euſeb. *l.* 7. *c* 27. Theodor. hær. fab. *l.* 2. *c.* 8.

bly discover the general sense of the Christian Church concerning it. *Paulus Samosatenus* wanted neither parts, nor interest, nor experience; and he was supported by a Princess of great Spirit and Courage, enough to have daunted all the Bishops, at least in those parts, from appearing against him. But such was the zeal and concernment of the Bishops of the Christian Church in this great affair, that they not only assembled themselves, but they communicated it to *Dionysius* Bishop of *Alexandria*, and to another of the same name, Bishop of *Rome*, and others; and desired their advice and concurrence, who did all agree in the condemnation of his Doctrine. The former said, He would have gone himself to *Antioch*, but for his extreme old Age; and he died soon after the first Council, which met at *Antioch* on this occasion; but he sent his judgment and reasons thither, which we find in an *Epistle* of his still extant, whereof mention is made in the *Epistle* of the second Synod of *Antioch* to *Dionysius* Bishop of *Rome*, and *Maximus* Bishop of *Alexandria*, *and all other Bishops, Priests and Deacons of the Catholick Church*, wherein they give an account of their proceedings against *Paulus Samosa-*

Athanas. de sentent. Dionysii, p. 558.

Euſeb. *l.* 7. *c.* 30. *tenus*, and they ſay, *They had invited the Biſhops of the remoter parts to come to* Antioch *for the ſuppreſſion of this damnable Doctrine*; and among the reſt, *Dionyſius* of *Alexandria*, and *Firmilian* of *Cappadocia*, as perſons of greateſt reputation then in the Church. *Firmilian* was there at the former Synod, (of whom *Theodoret* ſaith, that he was famous both *for divine and humane Learning*) and ſo were *Gregorius Thaumaturgus* and *Athenodorus* Biſhops of *Pontus*, and *Helenus* Biſhop of *Tarſus* in *Cilicia*, and *Nicomas* of *Iconium*, and *Hymenæus* of *Jeruſalem*, and *Theotecnus* of *Cæſarea*; who all condemned his Doctrine, but they ſpared his perſon upon his ſolemn Promiſes to retract it; but he perſiſting in it when they were gone home, and freſh complaints being made of him, *Firmilian* was coming a third time to *Antioch*, but died by the way: but thoſe Biſhops who wrote the Synodical Epiſtle do all affirm, *That they were Witneſſes and many others, when he condemned his Doctrine, but was willing to forbear his perſon upon his promiſe of amendment, which they found afterwards was merely deluſory.*

Dionyſius Alexandrinus, they ſay, *would not write to him, but ſent his mind about him*

him to the Church of Antioch. Which *Epiſtle* is mention'd by S. *Jerom*, (as written by him a little before his death) as well as by *Euſebius* and *Theodoret*; and I do not ſee ſufficient reaſon to queſtion the authority of that, which *Fronto Ducæus* publiſhed from *Turrian*'s Copy, although it be denied by *H. Valeſius* and others. It's ſaid, indeed, *That he did not write to him*, i. e. he did not direct it to him, but he might ſend it to the Council in anſwer to his Letters, which he mentions. How far *it differs from his ſtyle in other Epiſtles*, I will not take upon me to judge; but the deſign is very agreeable to an *Epiſtle* from him on that occaſion. It's true, that it ſeems to repreſent the opinion of *Paulus Samoſatenus* after a different manner from what it is commonly thought to have been. But we are to conſider, that he made uſe of all the *Arts* to diſguiſe himſelf that he could; and when he found the making Chriſt to be a *mere Man* would not be born, he went from the *Ebionite* to the *Cerinthian Hypotheſis*, *viz.* That the Λόγος *did dwell in him, and that there were two Perſons in Chriſt, one Divine and the other Humane*; and two Sons, the *one by Nature the Son of God, who had a Pre-exiſtence, and the other the*

Son of David, *who had no ſubſiſtence before.* This is the opinion which *Dionyſius* ſets himſelf againſt in that *Epiſtle*; and which therefore ſome may imagine was written after *Neſtorius* his Hereſie. But that was no *new Hereſie*, as appears by the *Cerinthians*; and it was that which *Paulus Samoſatenus* fled to, as more plauſible; which not only appears by this Epiſtle, but by what *Athanaſius* and *Epiphanius* have delivered concerning it.

Athan. de Incarn. Tom. I. p. 591.

Athanaſius wrote a Book of the *Incarnation* againſt the followers of *Paulus Samoſatenus*, who held, as he ſaith, *Two Perſons in Chriſt*, viz. *One born of the Virgin*, and a divine Perſon, which *deſcended upon him and dwelt in him.* Againſt which opinion he diſputes from two places of Scripture; viz. *God was manifeſt in the Fleſh*, and *the Word was made Fleſh:* and from the ancient Doctrine of the Chriſtian Church, and the *Synod* of *Antioch* againſt *Paulus Samoſatenus.* And in another place he ſaith, that he held, *That the divine Word dwelt in Chriſt.* And the words of *Epiphanius* are expreſs to the ſame purpoſe; *That the Logos came and dwelt in the Man Jeſus.* And the Clergy

P. 635.

Ἐλθόντα δὲ τὸν λόγον καὶ ἐνοικήσαντα ἐν Ἰησοῦ Ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντι. Epiph. hær. 65. n. 1. Concil. Epheſin. part. I. Supplicatio Baſilii, &c.

gy of *Conſtantinople* charged *Neſtorius* with following the Hereſie of *Paulus Samoſatenus*. And *Photius* in his Epiſtles ſaith, *That* Neſtorius *taſted too much of the intoxicated Cups of* Paulus Samoſatenus; and in the foregoing Epiſtle, he ſaith, That *Paulus his followers aſſerted too Hypoſtaſes in Chriſt.* But ſome think, that *Paulus Samoſatenus* did not hold any ſubſiſtence of the Λόγος before, but that the Word was in God before without any ſubſiſtence of its own, and that God gave it a diſtinct ſubſiſtence when it inhabited in the Perſon of Chriſt; and ſo *Marius Mercator* and *Leontius* underſtand him; who ſay that he differ'd from *Neſtorius* therein; who aſſerted a *Divine Word with its proper ſubſiſtence.* But according to them *Paulus* by *the Word* underſtood that *Divine Energy* whereby Chriſt acted, and which dwelt in him: but *Dionyſius* ſaith *he made two Chriſts, and two Sons of God.* But the Doctrine of the Chriſtian Church, he ſaith was, *that there was but one Chriſt, and one Son, who was the Eternal Word, and was made Fleſh.* And it is obſervable, that he brings the very ſame places we do now to prove this Doctrine, as *in the beginning was the Word*, &c. and *before* Abraham *was I am.* It ſeems that ſome of

Phot. Epiſt. 35.

Marius Mercat. de 12 Anath. Neſtorii, n. 16.

Leontius de ſectis, p. 436. edit. Baſil.

the Biſhops who had been upon the examination of his Opinions before the *ſecond Synod*, which depoſed him, ſent him an account of their Faith and required his anſwer; wherein they declare the Son *not to be God, according to God's Decree*, (which he did not ſtick at) but that he was *ſo really and ſubſtantially*; and whoſoever denied this, they ſaid, *was out of the Communion of the Church, and all the Catholick Churches agreed with them in it.*

And they declare, *That they received this Doctrine from the Scriptures of the Old and New Teſtament*, and bring the ſame places we do now, as, *Thy Throne O God was for ever*, &c. *Who is over all, God bleſſed for ever. All things were made by him*, &c. And we do not find that *Paulus Samoſatenus*, as ſubtle as he was, ever imagin'd that theſe places belong'd to any other than *Chriſt*, or that the *making of all things* was to be underſtood of the *making of nothing*; but putting it into mens power to make themſelves *new Creatures*. Theſe were diſcoveries only reſerved for the *Men of Senſe* and *clear Ideas* in theſe brighter Ages of the World.

But at laſt, after all the arts and ſubterfuges which *Paulus Samoſatenus* uſed, there was a Man of Senſe, as it happen'd among

among the Clergy of *Antioch*, called *Malchion*, who was ſo well acquainted with his Sophiſtry, that he drove him out of all, and laid his Senſe ſo open before the *ſecond Synod*, that he was ſolemnly depoſed for denying *the Divinity of the Son of God, and his Deſcent from Heaven*, as appears by their *Synodical Epiſtle*. It is pity we have it not entire; but by the Fragments of it, which are preſerved by ſome ancient Writers, we find that his Doctrine of the Divinity in him by *Inhabitation* was then condemned, and the ſubſtantial Union of both Natures aſſerted. I have only one thing more to obſerve concerning him, which is, that the *Arian Party* in their Decree at *Sardica*, (or rather *Philippopolis*) do confeſs that *Paulus Samoſatenus* his Doctrine was condemned by the whole Chriſtian World. For they ſay, *That which paſſed in the Eaſtern Synod, was ſigned and approved by all.* And *Alexander* Biſhop of *Alexandria*, in his Epiſtle to *Alexander* of *Conſtantinople* affirms the ſame. And now I hope, I may deſire our *Men of Senſe* to reflect upon theſe Matters. Here was *no Fire nor Faggot* threatned, no *Imperial Edicts* to inforce this Doctrine, nay the Queen of thoſe parts, under whoſe Juriſdiction they

Euſeb. *l.* 7. *c.* 30.

Leont. *c.* Neſtor. *l.*

Hil. fragment. *p.* 1321.

Theod *l.* 1. *c.* 4.

they lived at that time, openly eſpouſed the cauſe of *Paulus Samoſatenus*, ſo that here could be nothing of *intereſt* to ſway them to act in oppoſition to her. And they found his intereſt ſo ſtrong, that he retained the Poſſeſſion of his See, till *Aurelian* had conquer'd *Zenobia*, and by his authority he was ejected. This *Synod* which depoſed him, did not ſit in the time of *Aurelian*, as is commonly thought, but before his time, while *Zenobia* had all the power in her hands in thoſe Eaſtern parts, which ſhe enjoy'd five years; till ſhe was diſpoſſeſs'd by *Aurelian*, from whence *Ant. Pagi* concludes, that *Paulus kept his See three years after the Sentence againſt him*; but upon application to *Aurelian*; he who afterwards began a Perſecution againſt all Chriſtians gave this rule, *That he with whom the* Italian *Biſhops, and thoſe of* Rome *communicated, ſhould enjoy the See*, upon which *Paulus* was at laſt turned out. By this we ſee a *concurrence* of all the *Chriſtian Biſhops* of that time againſt him that denied the *Divinity of our Saviour*; and this without *any force*, and againſt their *intereſt*, and with a general conſent of the Christian World. For there were no *mighty Awes* and *Draconic Sanctions* to compell, of which they ſome-

Pagi Critica in Bar. A.272.n.2.

Anſwer to the Archbiſhop.p.54.

ſometimes ſpeak, as if they were the only powerfull methods to make this Doctrine go down. And what greater argument can there be, that it was then the general ſenſe of the Chriſtian Church? And it would be very hard to condemn all his Oppoſers for men that wanted *Senſe and Reaſon*, becauſe they ſo unanimouſly oppoſed him.

Not ſo unanimouſly neither, ſay our *Unitarians*, *becauſe* Lucian, *a Presbyter of the Church of* Antioch, *and a very learned man, joyned with him.* It would have been ſtrange indeed, if ſo great a Man as *Paulus Samoſatenus*, could prevail with none of his own Church to joyn with him, eſpecially one that came from the ſame place of *Samoſata*, as *Lucian* did, and probably was by him brought thither.

He had an extraordinary character given him by *Euſebius*, both *for his Life and Learning*; and ſo by S. *Jerom*, without the leaſt reflection upon him as to matter of Faith. But on the other ſide, *Alexander* Biſhop of *Alexandria* in his Epiſtle concerning *Arius* to *Alexander* of *Conſtantinople*, doth ſay, *That he follow'd* Paulus Samoſatenus, *and held ſeparate Communion for many years, under the three following Biſhops.* He doth not ſay that he died ſo, when he ſuffer'd Martyrdom under

Euſeb *l.* 8, 13, 9 *c.* 6.

Theod. *l.* 1. *c.* 4

under *Maximinus* at *Nicomedia*; neither doth he ſay the contrary. Upon which learned Men are divided, whether he perſiſted in that opinion or not. *Petavius* and *Valeſius* give him up; on the other ſide *Baronius* vindicates him, and ſaith, The miſ-report of him came from his zeal againſt *Sabellianiſm*; and that *Alexander* wrote that of him before his Books were throughly examin'd; that *Athanaſius* never joyns him with *Paulus Samoſatenus*; that the *Arians* never produced his authority in their debates, as they would have done, ſince the Emperor's Mother had built a City in the place where he ſuffer'd Martyrdom. It cannot be doubted that the *Arian* Party would have it believed that they came out of *Lucian's* School, as appears by *Arius* his Epiſtle to *Euſebius* of *Nicomedia*; but on the other ſide, the great argument to me is, That this very Party at the Council of *Antioch*, produced a *Creed*, which they ſaid, was there found written with *Lucian's own hand*, which is directly contrary to the *Samoſatenian* Doctrine. Now, either this was true or falſe: if it were true, then it was falſe that he was a *Samoſatenian*; if it were falſe, how came the *Arian* Party to give it out for true? Eſpecially thoſe who valued themſelves for coming

Petav. de Trinit. *l.*1. *c.* 4. *n.* 13. H. Valeſius in Theod. *l.*1. *c.*4. Baron. A. 318. *n.* 75, &c.

Soz *l* 3. *c.* 5.

coming out of his *School*. They were far enough from being ſuch weak men to produce the authority of *Lucian* at *Antioch*, where he was ſo much eſteemed, for a Doctrine utterly inconſiſtent with that of *Paulus Samoſatenus*, if it were there known, that he was his Diſciple, and ſeparated from three Biſhops on that account. For therein the Son is owned to be *God of God, begotten of the Father before all Ages, perfect God of perfect God*, &c. Suppoſe they had a mind to ſubvert the *Nicene Faith* by this Creed under the name of *Lucian*, (only becauſe ὁμοούσιος was left out) yet what an improbable way did they take, when they ſupported the main points by his Authority, and that at *Antioch*, where it was greateſt? If *Philoſtorgius* may be credited, the great men of the *Arian Party* had been his Scholars, as beſides *Euſebius* of *Nicomedia*, *Maris* of *Chalcedon*, *Theognis* of *Nice*, *Leontius* of *Antioch*, and ſeveral other leading Biſhops, and even *Arius* himſelf pretended to it. Which makes me apt to think, that *Alexander* knowing this, and at firſt not being able ſo well to judge of *Lucian*'s opinion, charged him with following *Paulus Samoſatenus*, from whence the *odium* would fall upon his Scholars. For

Philoſt. *l.* 2. *c.* 15, 16.

For his design is to draw the succession down from *Ebion* and *Artemon*, and *Paulus Samosatenus*, and *Lucian*, to *Arius* and his Associates; and charges them with holding the same Doctrine, wherein he was certainly mistaken; and so he might be about *Lucian*'s separation from the following Bishops on that account.

The last our *Unitarians* mention among their great men, is *Photinus* Bishop of *Sirmium*. They take it for granted that he was of their opinion. This is certain, that whatever it was, it was generally condemned, as well by the *Arians* as others; and after several Councils called he was deposed for his Heresie. The first time we find him condemned, was by the *Arian Party* in a second Council at *Antioch*, as appears by the profession of Faith drawn up by them, extant in *Athanasius* and *Socrates*. There they anathematize expresly *the Disciples of* Marcellus *and* Photinus, *for denying the Pre-existence and Deity of Christ*. But by *Christ*, they understood, *The Person born of the Virgin, who was the Son of God*; but they did not deny the *Pre-existence* of the Λόγος, and never dream'd that any could think that Christ was to be called the Λόγος, from his *Office of Preaching*, as

Athanas. Tom. 1. *p.* 898.
Socr. *l.* 2. *c.* 19.

as our modern *Unitarians* assert. But *Photinus* his opinion was, *That the* Λόγος *was before all Ages, but not Christ, or the Son of God, which divine word was partly internal, and so it was ever with God, and partly external, when it was communicated to the Person of Christ, whereby he became the Son of God.* But the *Arians* there declare their Belief, *That Christ was the living Word, and Son of God before all Worlds, and by whom he made all things.* The next time he is said to be condemned, was in that which is called the Council at *Sardica*, but was the Council of the Eastern Bishops after their parting from the Western. This is mention'd by *Epiphanius* and *Sulpitius Severus*, the latter saith he differ'd from *Sabellius* only *in the point of Union*, i. e. because *Sabellius* made the Persons to be merely *Denominations* which was then called the Heresie of the *Unionitæ*; and therefore *Photinus* must assert an *Hypostasis* to the Λόγος, or else he did not at all differ from *Sabellius*. And it appears by *Epiphanius*, that *Photinus* did distinguish between *Christ and the Word. In the Beginning was the Word*, said he, *but not the Son, which title was promised and foretold, but did not belong to Christ till he was born of the Holy Ghost and* Mary, so he

Athan. de Synodis Arim. &c. p. 897.

Epiph. hæret. 71. Sulpit. Sever. l. 2. p. 397.

Prudent. Apoth.

Epiph n. 2.

he expreſſes it. Herein, ſaith *Epiphanius*,
N. 1, 2. he follow'd *Paulus Samoſatenus*, *but exceeded him in his Inventions.* In anſwer to him, he ſaith, that S. *John*'s words are not, *In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was in God, but the Word was*
N. 4. *with God, and the Word was God.* Little did either ſide imagine that this was to be underſtood of *the beginning of the Goſpel*, as our modern *Photinians* would make us believe they think; but *Photinus* himſelf was a Perſon of too much Sagacity to take up with ſuch an abſurd and inſipid ſenſe. I paſs over the freſh condemnations of *Photinus* in the Councils at *Milan* and *Rome*, becauſe his opinion is not to be learnt from them; and come to that at *Sirmium*, where it is more particularly ſet forth, as well as condemned. But here we muſt diſtinguiſh the two Councils at *Sirmium*; in the former, he was *condemned*, but *the people would not part with him*; but in the *ſecond*, he was not only *condemned*, but effectually depoſed, the Emperor *Conſtantius* a profeſſed *Arian*, forcing him to withdraw: But it was upon his own Appeal to the Emperor againſt
Epiph. hæret. 71. Socr. *l.* 2. *c.* 30. the Judgment of the Council, who appointed Judges Delegates to hear this cauſe: and *Baſilius Ancyranus* was the manager of

of the debate with him, wherein he is ſaid to have been ſo much too hard for *Photinus*, that the Emperor himſelf order'd his Baniſhment. And I can find nothing of his return; but our *Unitarians* have found out (but they do not tell us where) *That the people recall'd him, and ſo he planted his Doctrine among them, that it overſpread and was the Religion of the* Illyrican *Provinces, till the Papacy on one hand, and the* Turk *on the other, ſwallow'd up thoſe Provinces.* This looks too like *making Hiſtory* to ſerve a turn, unleſs ſome good proof were brought for it. But inſtead of *Photinus his returning, and his Doctrine prevailing and continuing there,* we find *Valentinian* calling a Council in *Illyricum*, and eſtabliſhing the *Nicene Faith* there: and a Council at *Aquileia* againſt the *Arians*, where the Biſhop of *Sirmium* was preſent, and declared againſt *Arianiſm*, and joyned with S. *Ambroſe*, who condemns *Photinus* for making *Chriſt the Son of* David, *and not the Son of God. Paulinus* ſaith in his Life, that he went on purpoſe to *Sirmium* to conſecrate an Orthodox Biſhop there; which he did, notwithſtanding the power of *Juſtina* the Empreſs, who favoured the *Arians*. S. *Jerom* in his *Chronicon* ſaith, that *Photi-*

Soz *l.* 4 *c.* 6. Hiſt. Tripart. *l.* 5. *c.* 8.

Hiſtory of the Unit. *p.* 10.

Concil general. To. II. *p.* 888.

Ib. *p.* 989.

Ambroſ. Apol. David. *c.* 4.

nus

nus died in *Galatia* which was his own Country; ſo that there is no probability in what they affirm of *Photinus* his ſettling his Doctrine in thoſe parts, *till the Papacy and the* Turk *ſwallow'd thoſe Provinces*; for any one that looks into the Hiſtory of thoſe parts may be ſoon ſatisfied, that *not the Pope*, *nor the* Turk, but the *Huns* under *Attila*, made the horrible Devaſtations not only at *Sirmium*, but in all the conſiderable places of that Country: So that if theſe mens reaſon be no better than their *Hiſtory*, there is very little cauſe for any to be fond of their Writings.

But as though it were not enough to mention ſuch things once; in their anſwer to the late *Archbiſhop*'s Sermons, they inlarge upon it. For he having juſtly rebuked them for the *Novelty of their Interpretations*, they, to avoid this, boaſt of the concurrence of the ancient *Unitarians*, the followers of *Paulus* and *Photinus*, who, they ſay, *abounded every-where, and even poſſeſſed ſome whole Provinces*. This paſſage I was not a little ſurprized at: Since *Theodoret*, who, I think, was ſomewhat more to be credited than *Sandius*, doth ſo expreſly ſay, *That the* Samoſatenians *and* Photinians *were extinct in his time*, in

Anſwer to the Archbiſhop's Sermon, p. 53.

Theodor. hæret. Fab. l. 2. in *Photino*.

in a place already mention'd. But upon ſearch I could find no other ground for it, but a paſſage or two in *Sandius*, who is none of the exacteſt Hiſtorians. In one place he ſaith from an obſcure *Poliſh Chronicle* (extant in no other Language but of that Country) *that the* Bulgarians *when they firſt received Chriſtianity embraced Photinianiſm.* And is not this very good Authority among us? From hence he takes it for granted, *that they all continued* Photinians *to the time of Pope* Nicolas, *who converted them.* But all this is grounded on a ridiculous miſtake in *Platina*, who in the Life of *Nicolas* ſaith, *That the Pope confirmed them in the Faith, pulſo Photino*; whereas it ſhould be *pulſo Photio*; for *Photius* at that time was *Patriarch* of *Conſtantinople*, and as appears by his firſt Epiſtle, aſſumed their Converſion to himſelf; and inſiſted upon the right of Juriſdiction over that Country. *Sandius* refers to *Blondus*, who ſaith no ſuch thing, but only *that the* Bulgarians *were converted before*, which is true; and the Greek Hiſtorians, as *Joh. Curopalates*, *Zonoras* and others, give a particular Account of it; but not a word of *Photinianiſm* in it. So that the *Archbiſhop* had very great reaſon to charge their Interpretation with *Novelty*;

Sand. *Hiſt.* Enucl. *l.* 3. *p.* 357.

P. 372.

Blond. *Dec.* 2. *l.* 2.

velty; and that not only becauſe the *Photinians* had no ſuch *Provinces*, as they boaſt of; but that neither *Paulus Samoſatenus*, nor *Photinus*, nor any of their followers, that we can find, did ever interpret *the beginning of S.* John, as they do; i. e. *Of the New Creation, and not of the Old*; and ſo, *as the Word had no Pre-exiſtence before he was born of the Virgin.* I do not confine them to the *Niceniſts*, as they call them; but let them produce any one among the *Samoſatenians*, or *Photinians*, who ſo underſtood S. *John.* And therein *Sandius* was in the right (which ought to be allow'd him, for he is not often ſo) when he ſaith, *That no Chriſtian Interpreter before* Socinus *ever held ſuch a ſenſe of the word as he did*; *and therefore his followers, he ſaith, ought to be called* Socinians *only*, *and not* Ebionites, Samoſatenians, *or* Photinians.

Sand. *Hiſt.* Eccleſ. *l.* 1. *p.* 64. 93.

But to return to *Photinus* his Opinion. It is obſervable, what *Socrates* ſaith, concerning his being depoſed at *Sirmium*, *viz.* that what was done in that matter was univerſally approved, *not only then*, *but afterwards.* So that here we have the general Conſent of the Chriſtian World, in that divided time, againſt the *Photinian* Doctrine. And yet it was not near ſo

Socr. *l.* 2. *c.* 29. Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ὡς καλῶς καὶ δικαίως γενόμενον πάντες ἐπῄνεσαν καὶ τότε καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα.

ſo unreaſonable as our *Unitarians*; for *Photinus* aſſerted the *Pre-exiſtence* of the λόγ. and *its inhabiting in Chriſt from his Conception*; wherein he differ'd from *Paulus Samoſatenus* who aſſerted it to have been *upon the Merit of his Virtue*. In the *Anathema's* of the Council of *Sirmium* againſt *Photinus*, one is *againſt any one that aſſerts that there is one God, but denies Chriſt to have been the Son of God before all Worlds, and that the World was made by him in obedience to the Will of the Father*. Others againſt *him that aſſerts that there was a Dilatation of the Divine Subſtance to make him the Son of God, who was a Man born of the Virgin Mary*; this appears from *Anath.* 6, 7, 9. put together. Which is beſt explained by *Hilary* himſelf in another place, where he mentions this as the *Photinian* Doctrine, *That God the Word did extend himſelf ſo far, as to inhabit the perſon born of the Virgin*. This he calls a *ſubtle and dangerous Doctrine*. And therein he ſaith *Photinus* differ'd from *Sabellius*; that the latter denied *any difference between Father and Son, but only in Names*; but *Photinus* held a real difference, but not before the Nativity of Chriſt; then he ſaid, *The divine Word inhabiting in Chriſt made him to be the real Son of God*.

Hilar. de Synod. p. 1175. Ed. Pariſ.

Hilar. de Trinit. *l.* 10. *n.* 50.

Hilar. de Trin. *l.* 7. *n.* 7.

The only doubt is, whether *Photinus* held, *the Word* to have had a diſtinct *Hypoſtaſis* before or not. *Marius Mercator*, an Author of good credit, who lived in S. *Auguſtin*'s time (and to whom an Epiſtle of his is extant in the new Edition of his Works) gives a very particular account of the Opinion of *Photinus* with relation to the *Neſtorian* Controverſie, in which he was very well verſed. In an *Epiſtle* written by him on purpoſe, he ſhews that *Neſtorius* agreed with *Photinus* in aſſerting, *That the Word had a Pre-exiſtence; and that the name of Son of God did not belong to the Word, but to Chriſt after the inhabitation of the Word.* But he there ſeems to think, that *Photinus* did not hold the Word to have had a *real Hypoſtaſis* before the Birth of Chriſt: but when he comes after to compare their Opinions more exactly, he then affirms, that *Photinus* and *Neſtorius* were agreed, *and that he did not deny the Word to be Conſubſtantial with God; but that he was not the Son of God till Chriſt was born in whom he dwelt.* By which we ſee how little reaſon our *Unitarians* have to boaſt of *Photinus* as their *Predeceſſor.*

Auguſt. *Ep.* 193.

Marii Mercat. Oper. *Par.* 2. *p.* 17.

De. 12. Anath. Neſtorii *p.* 128.

As to the boaſt of *the firſt* Unitarians *at* Rome, *that theirs was the general Doctrine*,

ctrine, before the time of Victor; it is ſo fully confuted by the ancient Writer in *Euſebius*, who mentions it, from the Scriptures and the firſt Chriſtian Writers, named by him, that it doth not deſerve to be taken notice of; eſpecially ſince he makes it appear, that it was not heard of among them at *Rome*, till it was firſt broached there by *Theodotus*, as not only he, but *Tertullian* affirms; as I have already obſerved. Euſeb. *l.* 5. *c.* 28.

Thus I have clearly proved, that the *Doctrine of the Trinity*, was ſo far from being embraced only *on the account of force and fear*, that I have ſhewed there was in the firſt Ages of the Chriſtian Church, *a free and general Conſent* in it, even when they were *under Perſecution*; and after the *Arian Controverſie* broke out, yet thoſe who denied the *Pre-exiſtence*, and *Co-eternity* of the Son of *God* were univerſally condemned; even the *Arian Party* concurring in the Synods mention'd by *Hilary*. But our *Unitarians* are ſuch great Pretenders to *Reaſon*, that this Argument from the Authority of the whole Chriſtian Church, ſignifies little or nothing to them.

Therefore they would conclude ſtill that they have the better of us in point of Reaſon, becauſe they tell us, that they

have clear and diſtinct Perceptions, that what we call *Myſteries of Faith*, are *Contradictions*, *Impoſſibilities*, and *pure Non-ſenſe*; and *that they do not reject them, becauſe they do not comprehend them, but becauſe they do comprehend them to be ſo.*

This is a very bold Charge, and not very becoming the Modeſty and Decency of ſuch, who know at the ſame time that they oppoſe the Religion publickly eſtabliſhed, and in ſuch things which we look on as ſome of the principal Articles of the Chriſtian Faith.

CHAP. V.

Of their Charge of Contradiction in the Doctrine of the Trinity.

BUT I ſhall not take any Advantages from thence, but immediately proceed to the next thing I undertook in this Diſcourſe, *viz.* To conſider what *Grounds* they have for ſuch a Charge as this, of *Contradiction* and *Impoſſibility*. In my Sermon which gave occaſion to theſe Expreſſions (as is before intimated) I had undertaken

dertaken to prove, that conſidering the infinite Perfections of the Divine Nature, which are ſo far above our reach, God may juſtly oblige us to believe thoſe things concerning himſelf which we are not able to comprehend; and I inſtanced in ſome Eſſential Attributes of God, as his Eternity, Omniſcience, Spirituality, *&c.* And therefore, if there be ſuch Divine Perfections, which we have all the Reaſon to believe, but no Faculties ſufficient to comprehend, there can be no ground from Reaſon to reject ſuch a Doctrine which God hath revealed, becauſe the manner of it may be incomprehenſible by us. And what anſwer do they give to this?

Anſwer to the Serm. about the Trinity, p. 4, 5, 8.

They do not deny it in general, that God may oblige us to believe things above our Comprehenſion; but he never obliges us to believe Contradictions, and that they Charge *the Doctrine of the Trinity* with; and for this they only referr me to their Books, where they ſay it is made out. But I muſt ſay, that I have read and conſider'd thoſe Tracts, and am very far from being convinced that there is any ſuch *Contradiction* in this Doctrine, as it is generally received in the *Chriſtian Church*; or as it is explained in the *Athanaſian Creed.* And I ſhall ſhew the unrea-

ſonableneſs of this Charge from theſe things.

1. That there is a Difference between a *Contradiction* in *Numbers*, and in the *Nature* of *things*.

2. That it is *no Contradiction* to aſſert *three Perſons* in *One Common Nature*.

3. That it is *no Contradiction* to ſay that *there are three diſtinct Perſons in the Trinity and not three Gods*. If I can make out theſe things, I hope I may abate ſomething of that ſtrange and unreaſonable confidence, wherewith theſe men charge the Doctrine of the Trinity with *Contradictions*.

1. I begin with the firſt of them. And I ſhall draw up the Charge in their own words. In one of their late Books they have theſe Words.

Hiſtory of the Unitar. *p.* 9. *n.* 7. *Theirs*, they ſay, *is an Accountable and Reaſonable Faith, but that of the* Trinitarians *is abſurd and contrary both to Reaſon and to it ſelf; and therefore not only falſe but impoſſible.* But wherein lies this *Impoſſibility*? That they ſoon tell us. *Becauſe we affirm that there are Three Perſons, who are ſeverally and each of them true God, and yet there is but one true God. Now*, ſay they, *this is an Error in counting or numbring, which when ſtood in is of all others*

others the moſt brutal and inexcuſable; and not to diſcern it is not to be a Man. What muſt theſe men think the Chriſtian Church hath been made up of all this while? What? were there *no Men* among them but the *Unitarians*? none that had common ſenſe, and could tell the difference between One and Three? But this is too choice a Notion to be deliver'd but once; we have it over and over from them. In another place they ſay, *We cannot be miſtaken in the Notion of One and Three; we are moſt certain that One is not Three, and Three are not one.* This it is to be Men! But the whole Chriſtian World beſides are in *Brutal* and *Inexcuſable* Errors about *One* and *Three.* This is not enough, for they love to charge home; for one of their terrible Objections againſt the *Athanaſian Creed* is, *That here is an Arithmetical, as well as Grammatical Contradiction. For in ſaying God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghoſt, yet not three Gods but one God; a Man firſt diſtinctly numbers three Gods, and then in ſumming them up, brutiſhly ſays, not three Gods but one God. Brutiſhly* ſtill! Have the *Brutes* and *Trinitarians* learnt *Arithmetick* together? Methinks ſuch Expreſſions do not become ſuch whom the

Defence of the Hiſtory of the Unitarians, p. 7.

Acts of Athanaſius, p. 13.

the Chriſtian Church hath ſo long ſince condemned for Hereſies. But it may be with the ſame Civility they will ſay, *It was brutiſhly done of them.* But can theſe Men of Senſe and Reaſon think, that the Point in Controverſie ever was, whether in Numbers, *One could be Three*, or *Three One?* If they think ſo, I wonder they do not think of another thing, which is the begging all *Trinitarians* for *Fools*, becauſe they cannot count *One, Two and Three*; and an *Unitarian* Jury would certainly caſt them. One would think ſuch Writers had never gone beyond *Shop-books*; for they take it for granted, that all depends upon *Counting*. But theſe terrible Charges were ſome of the moſt common and trite Objections of Infidels. S. *Auguſtin* mentions it as ſuch, when he ſaith, *The Infidels ſometimes ask us, what do you call the Father? we anſwer, God. What the Son? we anſwer, God. What the Holy Ghoſt, we anſwer, God.* So that here the Infidels make the ſame Objection, and draw the very ſame Inference. *Then*, ſay they, *the Father, Son and H. Ghoſt are three Gods.* But what ſaith S. *Au-*

Interrogant enim nos aliquando Infideles, & dicunt, Patrem quem dicitis, Deum dicitis? Reſpondemus Deum. Filium quem dicitis, Deum dicitis? Reſpondemus Deum. Spiritum Sanctum quem dicitis, Deum dicitis? Reſpondemus Deum. Ergo inquiunt, Pater & Filius & Spiritus Sanctus tres ſunt Dei. Reſpondemus, Non. Turbantur, quia non illuminantur, cor clauſum habent quia clavem fidei non habent. *Aug.* in *Joh.* Tr. 39.

S. *Auguſtin* to this? Had he no more skill in *Arithmetick* than to ſay *there are Three and yet but One?* He ſaith plainly, *that there are not three Gods. The Infidels are troubled, becauſe they are not enlighten'd, their heart is ſhut up, becauſe they are without Faith.* By which it is plain, he look'd on theſe as the proper Objections of Infidels and not of Chriſtians. But may not Chriſtians have ſuch doubts in their minds? He doth not deny it; but then he ſaith, *Where the true foundation of Faith is laid in the heart, which helps the Underſtanding; we are to embrace with it, all that it can reach to; and where we can go no farther, we muſt believe without doubting:* which is a wiſe reſolution of this matter. For there are ſome things revealed, which we can entertain the notion of in our minds, as we do of any other matters, and yet there may be ſome things belonging to them which we cannot diſtinctly conceive. We believe God to have been from all Eternity; and that becauſe God hath revealed it; but here is ſomething we can conceive, viz. *that he was ſo*; and here is ſomething we cannot conceive, viz. *How he was ſo.* This

Nos ergo Fratres, fide præcedente, quæ ſanat oculum cordis noſtri, quod intelligimus ſine obſcuritate capiamus, quod non intelligimus ſine dubitatione credamus. *Ibid.*

Inſtance

Inſtance I had produced in my *Sermon*, to ſhew that we might be obliged to believe ſuch things concerning God, of which we cannot have a clear and diſtinct Notion; as that God was from all Eternity, although we cannot conceive in our minds, how he could be from himſelf. Now, what ſaith the *Unitarian* to this, who pretended to anſwer me? He ſaith, *If God muſt be from himſelf, then an Eternal God is a Contradiction; for that implies, that he was before he was; and ſo charges me with eſpouſing the cauſe of Atheiſts.* I wiſh our *Unitarians* were as free from this Charge as I am. But this is malicious cavilling. For my deſign was only to ſhew, that we could have no diſtinct conception of ſomething which we are bound to believe. For upon all accounts we are bound to believe an Eternal God, and yet we cannot form a diſtinct and clear Idea of the manner of it. Whether being from himſelf be taken *poſitively*, or *negatively*, the matter is not cleared; the one is Abſurd, and the other unconceivable by us. But ſtill I ſay, it is a thing that we are bound to believe ſtedfaſtly, although it is above our comprehenſion. But inſtead of anſwering to this, he runs out into an Examination of one notion of Eternity; and

Anſwer to Serm. p. 5.

as

as he thinks, ſhews ſome Abſurdities in that, which are already anſwer'd. But that was not my meaning, but to ſhew that we could have no clear and diſtinct Notion of Eternity; and if his Arguments were good they prove what I aimed it, at leaſt as to that part; and himſelf produces my own Words to ſhew, that there were ſuch difficulties every way, which we could not maſter; and yet are bound to believe, that neceſſary Exiſtence is an inſeparable Attribute of God. So that here we have a clear inſtance of what S. *Auguſtin* ſaith, That we may believe ſomething upon full Conviction, as that God is eternal; and yet there may remain ſomething which we cannot reach to by our underſtanding, *viz.* the manner how Eternity is to be conceived by us; which goes a great way towards clearing the point of the *Trinity*, notwithſtanding the Difficulty in our conceiving the manner how Three ſhould be One, and One Three.

But S. *Auguſtin* doth not give it over ſo; *Let us keep ſtedfaſt*, ſaith he, *to the Foundation of our Faith, that we may arrive to the top of Perfection; the*

A fundamento fidei non recedamus, ut ad culmen Perfectionis veniamus. Deus eſt Pater, Deus eſt Filius, Deus eſt Spiritus Sanctus, & tamen Pater non eſt qui Filius; nec Filius eſt qui Pater, nec Spiritus Sanctus, Patris & Filii Spiritus, Pater eſt aut Filius. *Ibid.*

Father

Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghoſt is God; the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father, nor the Holy Ghoſt either Father or Son. And he goes on, *The Trinity is one God, one Eternity, one Power, one Majeſty, Three Perſons and one God.* So it is in *Eraſmus* his Edition; but the late Editors ſay, that the word *Perſonæ* was not in their Manuſcript. And it is not material in this Place, ſince elſewhere he approves the uſe of the word *Perſons*, as the fitteſt to expreſs our meaning in this Caſe. *For ſince ſome Word muſt be agreed upon, to declare our Senſe by*, he ſaith, *thoſe who underſtood the Propriety of the Latin tongue, could not pitch upon any more proper than that, to ſignifie that they did not mean three diſtinct Eſſences, but the ſame Eſſence with a different Hypoſtaſis, founded in the relation of one to the other; as Father and Son have the ſame Divine Eſſence, but the Relations being ſo different that one cannot be confounded with the other, that which reſults from the Relation being joyned with the Eſſence, was it which was called a Perſon.*

Trinitas unus Deus, Trinitas una Æternitas, una Poteſtas, una Majeſtas, tres Perſonæ ſed non tres Dii.

Non audemus dicere unam Eſſentiam tres Subſtantias, ſed unam Eſſentiam vel Subſtantiam, tres autem Perſonas, quemadmodum multi Latini iſta tractantes & digni auctoritate dixerunt, cum alium modum aptiorem non invenirent, quo enunciarent verbis, quod ſine verbis intelligebant *Aug. de Trinit. l. 5. c. 8.*

But

But ſaith S. *Auguſtin, The Caviller will ask, if there be Three, what Three are they? He anſwers, Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt.* But then he diſtinguiſhes between what they are in themſelves, and what they are to each other. *The Father as to himſelf is God, but as to the Son he is Father: the Son as to himſelf is God, but as to the Father he is the Son.*

Nunc mihi Calumniator reſpondeat, quid ergo tres? Ecce inquit tres dixiſti, ſed quid tres exprime? Immo tu numera. Nam ego compleo tres cum dico, Pater & Filius & Spiritus Sanctus. *Id. ubi ſupra.* Id enim quod Pater ad ſe eſt, Deus eſt, quod ad Filium eſt, Pater eſt: quod Filius ad ſeipſum eſt, Deus eſt: quod ad Patrem eſt, Filius eſt.

But how is it poſſible to underſtand this? Why, ſaith he, *Take two men, Father and Son; the one as to himſelf is a Man, but as to the Son a Father; the Son, as to himſelf is a Man, but as to the Father, he is a Son: but theſe two have the ſame common Nature.*

But, ſaith he, *Will it not hence follow, that as theſe are two Men, ſo the Father and Son in the Divine Eſſence muſt be two Gods? No, there lies the difference between the Humane and Divine Nature. That one cannot be multiplied and divided as the other is.*

Sed non quomodo illi duo homines ſunt ſic iſti duo Dii. Quare hoc non eſt ita ibi? Quia illud aliud, hoc autem aliud eſt, quia illa Divinitas eſt, hæc humanitas.

And therein lies the true Solution of the Difficulty, as will appear afterwards.

When

Ubi cogitare cœperis, incipis numerare; ubi numeraveris, quid numeraveris, non potes reſpondere. Pater, Pater eſt; Filius, Filius; Spiritus Sanctus, Spiritus Sanctus eſt. Quid ſunt iſti tres? non tres Dii? Non Non tres omnipotentes? Non, ſed unus Omnipotens. Hoc ſolo numerum inſinuant, quod ad invicem ſunt non quod ad ſe ſunt.

When you begin to count, ſaith he, *you go on, One, Two and Three. But when you have reckon'd them what is it you have been Counting? The Father is the Father, the Son the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt, the Holy Ghoſt. What are theſe Three? Are they not three Gods? No, are they not three Almighties? No, They are capable of Number as to their Relation to each other; but not as to their Eſſence which is but One.*

The ſubſtance of the Anſwer lies here, the Divine Eſſence is that alone which makes God, that can be but One, and therefore there can be no more Gods than one. But becauſe the ſame Scripture, which aſſures us of the Unity of the Divine Eſſence, doth likewiſe joyn the Son and Holy Ghoſt in the ſame Attributes, Operations and Worſhip, therefore as to the mutual Relations, we may reckon Three, but as to the Divine Eſſence, that can be no more than One.

Boëth. oper. p. 1121.

Boethius was a great Man in all reſpects, for his *Quality*, as well as for his *Skill* in *Philoſophy* and *Chriſtianity*; and he wrote a ſhort but learned Diſcourſe to clear this matter.

Matter. *The Catholick Doctrine of the Trinity*, ſaith he. *is this*; *the Father is God, the Son God and the Holy Ghoſt*; *but they are not three Gods but one God.* And yet (which our *Unitarians* may wonder at) this very man hath written a learned Book of *Arithmetick.* But how doth he make this out? How is it poſſible for *Three to be but One*? Firſt he ſhews, "That there can "be but one Divine Eſſence; for to make "more than One muſt ſuppoſe a Diver-"ſity. *Principium enim Pluralitatis Alte-"ritas eſt.* If you make a real difference "in Nature as the *Arians* did, then there "muſt be as many Gods, as there are "different Natures. Among men, there "are different individuals of the ſame "kind; but, ſaith he, it is the Diverſity "of Accidents which makes it; and if "you can abſtract from all other Acci-"dents, yet they muſt have a different "Place, for two Bodies cannot be in the "ſame place. The Divine Eſſence is "ſimple and immaterial, and is what it "is of it ſelf; but other things are what "they are made, and conſiſt of Parts, and "therefore may be divided. Now that "which is of it ſelf can be but One; and "therefore cannot be numbred. And "one God cannot differ from another, ei-

" ther by Accidents or ſubſtantial Diffe-
" rences. But ſaith he, there is a two-
" fold Number; one by which we reckon;
" and another in the things reckoned.
" And the repeating of Units
" in the former makes a Plu-
" rality, but not in the lat-
" ter. It may be ſaid, that this
" holds where there are only
" different Names for the ſame
" thing; but here is a real
" Diſtinction of Father, Son
" and Holy Ghoſt. But then
" he ſhews, " That the diffe-
" rence of Relation, can make no Alte-
" ration in the Eſſence; and where there
" is no Diverſity, there can be but one
" Eſſence, although the different Relation
" may make three Perſons.

Numerus enim duplex eſt, unus quidem, quo numeramus, alter verò qui in rebus numerabilibus conſtat; Ergo in Numero quo numeramus, repetitio unitatum facit Pluralitatem; in rerum vero numero non facit Pluralitatem Unitatum repetitio.

Ita igitur ſubſtantia continet Unitatem, relatio verò multiplicat Trinitatem. Nam idem Pater qui Filius non eſt; nec idem uterque qui Spiritus Sanctus. Idem tamen Deus eſt, Pater, Filius & Spiritus Sanctus.

This is the ſubſtance of what he ſaith concerning this Difficulty, which, as he ſuggeſts, ariſes from our Imaginations, which are ſo filled with the Diviſion and Multiplicity of compound & material things, that it is a hard matter for them ſo to recollect themſelves as to conſider the firſt Principles and Grounds of *Unity* and *Diverſity*. But if our *Unitarians* have

have not throughly conſider'd thoſe foundations, they muſt, as they ſay to one of their Adverſaries, *argue like novices in theſe queſtions*. For theſe are ſome of the moſt neceſſary Speculations for underſtanding theſe matters; as what that *Unity* is which belongs to a perfect Being; what *Diverſity* is required to multiply an infinite Eſſence, which hath *Unity* in its own Nature: whether it be therefore poſſible, that there ſhould be more divine Eſſences than one, ſince the ſame eſſential Attributes muſt be, where ever there is the divine Eſſence? Whether there can be more *Individuals*, where there is no *Diſſimilitude*, and can be no *Diviſion* or *Separation*? Whether a *ſpecifick divine Nature* be not inconſiſtent with the abſolute Perfection, and neceſſary Exiſtence which belongs to it? Whether the divine Nature can be *individually the ſame*, and yet there be ſeveral individual Eſſences: Theſe and a great many other Queſtions it will be neceſſary for them to reſolve, before they can ſo peremptorily pronounce, that the Doctrine of the Trinity doth imply a Contradiction on the account of the *Numbers* of *Three* and *One*. And ſo I come to the ſecond Particular.

Anſwer to Milb. *p* 52.

CHAP IV.

No Contradiction for three Perſons to be in one common Nature.

II. THat it is no contradiction to aſſert *three Perſons* in one *common Nature*. I ſhall endeavour to make theſe matters as clear as I can; for the greateſt difficulties in moſt mens minds have riſen from the want of clear and diſtinct apprehenſions of thoſe fundamental Notions, which are neceſſary in order to the right underſtanding of them.

1. We are to diſtinguiſh between the *Being of a thing*, and a *thing in Being*; or between *Eſſence* and *Exiſtence*.

2. Between the *Unity* of *Nature* or *Eſſence*, and of *Exiſtence* or *Individuals* of the ſame Nature.

3. Between the Notion of *Perſons* in a *finite and limited Nature*, and in a *Being uncapable of Diviſion and Separation*.

1. Between the *Being of a thing*, and a *thing in Being*. By the former we mean the Nature and Eſſential Properties of a thing; whereby it is diſtinguiſhed from all

all other kinds of Beings. So God and his Creatures are eſſentially diſtinguiſhed from each other by ſuch Attributes which are incommunicable; and the Creatures of ſeveral kinds are diſtinguiſhed by their Natures or Eſſences; for the Eſſence of a Man and of a Brute are not barely diſtinguiſhed by *Individuals*, but by their kinds. And that which doth conſtitute a diſtinct kind is One and Indiviſible in it ſelf: for the Eſſence of a Man is but one and can be no more; for if there were more, the kind would be alter'd; ſo that there can be but one common Nature or Eſſence to all the Individuals of that kind. But becauſe theſe Individuals may be or may not be, therefore we muſt diſtinguiſh them as they are in actual Being, from what they are in their common Nature; for that continues the ſame, under all the Variety and Succeſſion of Individuals.

2. We muſt now diſtinguiſh the *Unity* which belongs to the *common Nature*, from that which belongs to the Individuals in *actual Being*. And the *Unity* of *Eſſence* is twofold:

1. Where the Eſſence and Exiſtence are the ſame, *i. e.* where neceſſary Exiſtence doth belong to the Eſſence, as it

is in God, and in him alone; it being an eſſential and incommunicable Perfection.

2. Where the Exiſtence is contingent, and belongs to the Will of another; and ſo it is in all Creatures, Intellectual and Material, whoſe actual being is dependent on the Will of God.

The *Unity* of *Exiſtence* may be conſider'd two ways.

1. As to it ſelf, and ſo it is called *Identity*; or a thing continuing the ſame with it ſelf: the Foundation whereof in Man is that vital Principle which reſults from the Union of Soul and Body. For as long as that continues, notwithſtanding the great variety of changes in the material Parts, the Man continues entirely the ſame.

2. The *Unity* of *Exiſtence* as to Individuals may be conſider'd as to others, *i. e.* as every one ſtands divided from every other Individual of the ſame kind; although they do all partake of the ſame common Eſſence. And the clearing of this is the main point, on which the right Notion of theſe matters depends.

In order to that, we muſt conſider two things.

1. What that is, whereby we perceive the difference of Individuals?

2. What

2. What that is, which really makes two Beings of the ſame kind to be different from each other?

1. As to the reaſon of our Perception of the difference between Individuals of the ſame kind, it depends on theſe things.

1. Difference of outward Accidents, as Features, Age, Bulk, Meen, Speech, Habit and Place.

2. Difference of inward Qualities and Diſpoſitions; which we perceive by obſervation, and ariſe either from Conſtitution, or Education, or Company, or acquired Habits.

2. As to the true ground of the real Difference between the Exiſtence of one Individual from the reſt, it depends upon the *ſeparate Exiſtence* which it hath from all others. For that which gives it a Being diſtinct from all others and divided by Individual Properties, is the true ground of the difference between them, and that can be no other but the Will of God. And no conſequent Faculties or Acts of the Mind by Self-Reflection, *&c.* can be the reaſon of this difference; becauſe the difference muſt be ſuppoſed antecedent to them. And nothing can be ſaid to make that, which muſt be ſuppoſed to be before it ſelf; for there muſt

be a diſtinct Mind in Being from all other Minds, before it can reflect upon it ſelf.

But we are not yet come to the bottom of this matter. For as to *Individual Perſons*, there are theſe things ſtill to be conſider'd.

1. *Actual Exiſtence* in it ſelf, which hath a *Mode* belonging to it, or elſe the humane Nature of Chriſt could not have been united with the divine, but it muſt have had the *perſonal Subſiſtence*, and conſequently there muſt have been *two Perſons* in *Chriſt*.

2. A *ſeparate* and *divided Exiſtence* from all others, which ariſes from the actual Exiſtence, but may be diſtinguiſhed from it; and ſo the humane Nature of Chriſt, although it had the Subſiſtence proper to Being, yet had not a *ſeparate Exiſtence*, after the *Hypoſtatical Union*.

3. The *peculiar manner* of *Subſiſtence*, which lies in ſuch properties as are incommunicable to any other; and herein lies the proper reaſon of *Perſonality*. Which doth not conſiſt in a mere *Intelligent Being*, but in that peculiar manner of Subſiſtence, in that Being which can be in no other. For when the common Nature doth ſubſiſt in Individuals, there is not only a ſeparate Exiſtence, but ſome-

thing

thing ſo peculiar to it ſelf, that it can be communicated to no other. And this is that which makes the diſtinction of Perſons.

4. There is a *common Nature* which muſt be joyned with this manner of Subſiſtence to make a *Perſon*; otherwiſe it would be a mere *Mode*; but we never conceive a *Perſon* without the Eſſence in Conjunction with it. But here appears no manner of contradiction in aſſerting ſeveral Perſons in one and the ſame common Nature.

5. The Individuals of the ſame kind are ſaid to differ in number from each other, becauſe of their different Accidents and ſeparate Exiſtence. For ſo they are capable of being numbred. Whatever is compounded is capable of number as to its parts, and may be ſaid to be one by the Union of them; whatever is ſeparated from another is capable of number by diſtinction. But where there can be no Accidents nor Diviſion, there muſt be perfect Unity.

6. There muſt be a *Separation in Nature*, where-ever there is a difference of Individuals under the ſame kind. I do not ſay there muſt be an *actual Separation* and *Diviſion* as to place, but that there is

and

and must be so in Nature, where one *common Nature* subsists in several Individuals. For *all Individuals must divide the Species, and the common Nature unites them.* And this *Philoponus* understood very well, and therefore he never denied such a *Division* and *Separation* in the divine Persons, as is implied in distinct *Individuals*; which is the last thing to be consider'd here.

Διαιρετικὸν μὲν ἀεὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, συλλητικὸν δὲ καὶ ἑνοποιὸν τὸ κοινόν. Porphyr. Ilag. c. 2. 36. Niceph. Callist. l. 18. c. 47.

3. We are now to enquire how far these things will hold as to the *Persons* in the Trinity, and whether it be a *Contradiction* to assert *three Persons* in the Godhead and but *one God.* We are very far from disputing the *Unity* of the *divine Essence*, which we assert to be so perfect and indivisible, as not to be capable of such a difference of Persons as is among Men. Because there can be no difference of Accidents, or Place, or Qualities in the divine Nature; and there can be no separate Existence, because the Essence and Existence are the same in God; and if *necessary Existence* be an inseparable Attribute of the divine Essence, it is impossible there should be any separate Existence; for what always was and must be, can have no other Existence than what is implied in the very Essence. *But will*

will not this overthrow the diſtinction of Perſons, and run us into Sabellianiſm? By no means. For our *Unitarians* grant, *That the* Noetians *and* Sabellians *held, that there is but one divine Subſtance, Eſſence or Nature, and but one Perſon.* And how can thoſe who hold *three Perſons, be Sabellians? Yes*, ſay they, *the Sabellians held three relative Perſons.* But did they mean three *diſtinct Subſiſtences*, or only one Subſiſtence ſuſtaining the Names, or Appearances, or Manifeſtations of three Perſons? The latter they cannot deny to have been the true ſenſe of the *Sabellians*, But ſay they, *Theſe are three Perſons in a claſſical critical Senſe.* We meddle not at preſent with the Diſpute which *Valla* hath againſt *Boethius* about the proper Latin Senſe of a *Perſon* (and *Petavius* ſaith *Valla*'s Objections are mere *Jeſts* and *Trifles*) but our Senſe of a *Perſon* is plain, that it ſignifies the Eſſence with a particular manner of Subſiſtence, which the Greek Fathers called an *Hypoſtaſis*, taking it for that incommunicable Property which makes a *Perſon*.

Diſcourſe concerning the nominal and real Trinitarian, p. 16.

Petav. de Trinit. *l.* 4 *c.* 4.

But ſay our *Unitarians*, a Perſon is an *intelligent Being, and therefore three Perſons muſt be three intelligent Beings.* I anſwer, that this may be taken two ways.

Defence of the Hiſtory of the Unit. p. 5.

1. That

1. That there is no Perſon where there is no intelligent Nature to make it a Perſon, and ſo we grant it. 2. That a Perſon implies an intelligent Being, ſeparate and divided from other Individuals of the ſame kind, as it is among men: and ſo we deny it as to the Perſons of the Trinity, becauſe the Divine Eſſence is not capable of ſuch Diviſion and Separation as the humane Nature is.

Ib. But ſay they again, *The Fathers did hold a ſpecifical Divine Nature, and the Perſons to be as ſo many Individuals.* This they repeat very often in their *late Books*; and after all, referr us to *Curcellæus* for *undeniable Proofs* of it. Let us for the preſent ſuppoſe it, then I hope the Fathers are freed from holding *Contradictions* in the Doctrine of the Trinity; for what *Contradiction* can it be, to hold three individual Perſons in the Godhead, and one common Nature, more than it is to hold that there are three humane Perſons in *One* and the *ſame common Nature* of Man? Will they make this a *Contradiction* too? But ſome have ſo uſed themſelves to the Language of *Jargon*, *Nonſenſe*, *Contradiction*, *Impoſſibility*, that it comes from them, as ſome men ſwear, when they do not know it. But I am not willing to go off with

Ib. *Anſwer to* La Moth. *p.* 5. *Explicat.* p. 13. *Letter to the Univerſity*, p. 13.

with this Anſwer; For I do take the Fathers to have been men of two great Senſe and Capacity to have maintained ſuch an abſurd Opinion, as that of a *Specifick Nature* in God. For either it is a mere Logical Notion, an Act of the Mind without any real Exiſtence belonging to it as ſuch, which is contrary to the very Notion of God, which implies a neceſſary Exiſtence; or it muſt imply a Divine Nature, which is neither Father, Son, nor Holy Ghoſt. Which is ſo repugnant to the Doctrine of the Fathers, that no one that is any ways converſant in their Writings on this Argument, can imagine they ſhould hold ſuch an Opinion. And I am ſo far from being convinced by *Curcellæus* his *undeniable Proofs*, that I think it no hard matter to bring *undeniable Proofs* that he hath miſtaken their meaning.

Of which I ſhall give an Account in this Place, becauſe I fear his Authority hath had too much ſway with ſome, as to this matter. I ſhall not inſiſt upon his groſs miſtake in the very entrance of that Diſcourſe, where he ſaith, *That the Biſhops of* Gaul *and* Germany *diſliked the* Homouſion, *and gave three Reaſons againſt it*; whereas *Hilary* ſpeaks of the *Eaſtern Biſhops* whom he goes about to vindicate

Curcell. de vocibus Trinit. Sect. 70.

to

to the Weſtern Biſhops, who were offended with them for that reaſon; as any one that reads *Hilary de Synodis* may ſee. But I come to the main Point. His great Argument is *from the uſe of the Word* Ὁμοούσιος *which may extend to Individuals of the ſame kind.* Who denies it? But the Queſtion is whether the Fathers uſed it in that ſenſe, ſo as to imply a difference of Individuals in the ſame common Eſſence? There were two things aimed at by them in their Diſpute with the *Arians.*

(1.) To ſhew, That the Son was of the ſame Subſtance with the Father, which they denied, and made him of an inferior created Subſtance of another kind. Now the Fathers thought this term very proper to expreſs their Senſe againſt them. But then this Word being capable of a larger Senſe than they intended, they took care, (2.) To aſſert a perfect Unity and Indiviſibility of the Divine Eſſence. For the *Arians* were very ready to charge them with one of theſe two things. (1.) That they muſt fall into *Sabellianiſm*, if they held a perfect Unity of Eſſence: or (2.) When they clear'd themſelves of this, that they muſt hold *Three Gods*; and both theſe they conſtantly denied. To make this clear, I ſhall produce the Teſtimonies

nies of ſome of the chief both of the *Greek* and *Latin Fathers*, and anſwer *Curcellæus* his Objections.

Athanaſius takes notice of both theſe Charges upon their Doctrine of the Trinity: As to *Sabellianiſm* he declared, *That he abhorred it equally with* Arianiſm; and he ſaith, *it lay in making Father and Son to be only different Names of the ſame Perſon*; and ſo they aſſerted but *one Perſon in the Godhead*. As to the other Charge of *Polytheiſm*, he obſerves, *That in the Scripture Language, all mankind was reckon'd as one, becauſe they have the ſame Eſſence; and if it be ſo, as to Men, who have ſuch a difference of Features, of Strength, of Underſtanding, of Language, how much more may God be ſaid to be One, in whom is an undivided Dignity, Power, Counſel and Operation?* Doth this prove ſuch a difference, as is among Individuals of the ſame kind among men? No man doth more frequently aſſert the *indiviſible Unity of the Divine Nature than he*. He expreſly denies *ſuch divided Hypoſtaſes, as are among men*; and ſaith, *That in the Trinity there is a Conjunction without confuſion, and a diſtinction without Diviſion; that in the Trinity there is ſo perfect an Union, and that it is ſo undivided and united in it ſelf; that where-*

Athanaſ. de Sententi. Dionyſ. p. 558, 567. Orat. 4. de Arian. p. 456.

De Communi Eſſent. &c. p. 214.

Expoſ. Fidei, p. 251. In illud Omnia mihi trad. p. 154.

where-ever the Father is, there is the Son and the Holy Ghoſt, and ſo the reſt, *becauſe there is but one Godhead, and one God who is over all, and through all, and in all.* But ſaith *Curcellæus*, *The contrary rather follows from this* περιχώρησις *or mutual Inexiſtence, for that could not be without diſtinct Subſtance, as in Water and Wine.* But this is a very groſs miſtake of the Fathers Notion, who did not underſtand by it a *Local In-exiſtence* as of bodies, but ſuch an *indiviſible Unity that one cannot be without the other*, as even *Petavius* hath made it appear from *Athanaſius* and others.

Ep ad Serap p. 259.

Orat. 4 c. Arian p. 554, 456, 459, &c.

Curcell. Sect. III.

Petav. de Trinit. l. 4. c. 16.

Athanaſius upon all Occaſions aſſerts the Unity of the Divine Nature to be *perfect and indiviſible.* God, ſaith he, *is the Father of his Son* ἀμερίστως, *without any Diviſion of the Subſtance.* And in other places, *that the Subſtance of the Father and Son admit of no Diviſion*, and he affirms this to have been *the ſenſe of the Council of* Nice; ſo that the διοούσιος muſt be underſtood of the *ſame indiviſible Subſtance. Curcellæus* anſwers, That *Athanaſius* by this *indiviſible Unity* meant only a *cloſe and indiſſoluble Union.* But he excluded *any kind of Diviſion*, and that of a *Specifick Nature* into ſeveral individuals as a real *Diviſion in Nature*; for no man who-ever treated

De Decret. Synod. Nic. p. 259. 269, 274, 276.

Orat. 5. c. Arian. p. 514.

De Decret. Synod. p. 275.

Curcell. Differt. 2. 106.

ted of thoſe matters denied, that a *Specifick Nature was divided*, when there were ſeveral individuals under it. But what is it which makes the *Union indiſſoluble?* Is it the *Unity* of the *Eſſence* or not? If it be, is it the ſame individual Eſſence, or not? If the ſame individual Eſſence makes the inſeparable Union, what is it, which makes the difference of individuals? If it be ſaid, *The incommunicable Properties of the Perſons*; I muſt ſtill ask how ſuch *Properties* in the ſame individual Eſſence, can make different individuals? If it be ſaid to be the ſame *Specifick Nature*; then how comes that which is in it ſelf capable of *Diviſion* to make an *indiſſoluble Union*?

But ſaith Curcellæus, Athanaſius *makes Chriſt to be of the ſame Subſtance as* Adam, *and* Seth, *and* Abraham, *and* Iſaac *are ſaid to be Con-ſubſtantial with each other.* And what follows? *That the Father and Son are divided from each other, as they were?* This is not poſſible to be his Senſe; conſidering what he ſaith of the Indiviſibility of the Divine Nature. And *Athanaſius* himſelf hath given ſufficient warning againſt ſuch a Miſ-conſtruction of his Words; and ſtill urges *that our Conceptions ought to be ſuitable to the Divine Nature,*

Curcell. n. 82.

Athanaſ. de Synod. Arim. & Seluc. p. 916, 920. 928.

ture, not taken from what we ſee among men. And it is obſervable, that when *Paulus Samoſatenus* had urged this as the beſt Argument againſt the term Ὁμοούσιος, *That it made ſuch a difference of Subſtances as is among men*; for that Reaſon ſaith *Athanaſius, his Judges were content to let it alone, for the Son of God is not in ſuch a ſenſe Con-ſubſtantial; but afterwards, the* Nicene *Fathers finding out the Art of* Paulus, *and the ſignificancy of the Word to diſcriminate the* Arians, *made uſe of it, and only thought it neceſſary to declare, that when it is applied to God, it is not to be underſtood, as among individual Men.*

P. 919.

As to the *Dialogues* under *Athanaſius* his Name, on which *Curcellæus* inſiſts ſo much; it is now very well known that they belong not to him, but to *Maximus*; and by comparing them with other places in him, it may appear, that he intended *no Specifick Nature in God.*

Curcell. n. 84.

Maxim. Oper. T. II. p. 384. T. I. p. 413.

But ſaith *Curcellæus, If the Fathers intended any more than a Specifick Nature, why did they not uſe Words which would expreſs it more fully,* As Μονούσιος and ταυτούσιος? For that very Reaſon, which he mentions from *Epiphanius, becauſe they would ſeem to approach too near to Sabellianiſm.*

Curcell. Sect. 73.

S. *Baſil*

S. *Basil* was *a great Man*, (notwithstanding the flout of our *Unitarians*,) and apply'd his thoughts to this matter, to clear the Doctrine of the Church from the Charge of *Sabellianism* and *Tritheism*. As to the former, he saith, in many places, That *the Heresie lay in making but one Person as well as one God*, or one Substance with three several Names. As to the latter, no man asserts the individual Unity of the Divine Essence in more significant Words than he doth. For he uses the ταυτότης and τὸ τῆς θεότητος ταυτὸν, as S *Cyril* of *Alexandria* doth likewise, and yet both these are produced by *Curcellæus* for a *Specifick Nature*.

A Discourse concerning Nominal and real Unitar. *p.* 26.

Basil Hom. 27. *p.* 602, 604. Epist. 141. 391, 64.

T I. *p.* 605. T. II. *p.* 926. Cyril. Alex. Dialog. de Trinit. 3. *p.* 498, 500. Curcell. *n.* 74.

But saith *Curcellæus*, S. *Basil* in his *Epistle* to *Gregory Nyssen* doth assert the difference between *Substance* and *Hypostasis* to consist in this, That *the one is taken for common Nature, and the other for individual*, and so making *three Hypostases*, he must make *three Individuals*, and *One common* or *Specifick Nature*. I answer, That it is plain by the design of that *Epistle*, that by *three Hypostases* he could not mean *three Individual Essences*. For he saith, The design of his writing it, was to clear the difference between *Substance* and *Hypostasis*. For saith he, *From the*

want of this ſome aſſert but one Hypoſtaſis, as well as one Eſſence; and others, becauſe there are three Hypoſtaſes, ſuppoſe there are three diſtinct Eſſences. For both went upon the ſame Ground, that *Hypoſtaſis* and *Eſſence* were the ſame. Therefore ſaith he, thoſe who held three *Hypoſtaſes*, did make τὴν τῶν ὐσιῶν διαίρεσιν *a Diviſion of Subſtances*. From whence it follows, that S. *Baſil* did look upon the Notion of three diſtinct Subſtances as a miſtake: I ſay *diſtinct Subſtances*, as *Individuals* are diſtinct; for ſo the firſt Principles of Philoſophy do own that Individuals make a Διαίρεσις, or *Diviſion of the Species* into ſeveral and diſtinct Individuals.

But doth not S. Baſil *go about to explain his Notion by the common Nature of man, and the ſeveral Individuals under it; and what can this ſignifie to his purpoſe, unleſs he allows the ſame in the Godhead?* I grant he doth ſo, but he ſaith the *Subſtance* is that which is common to the whole kind; the *Hypoſtaſis* is that which properly diſtinguiſheth one Individual from another; which he calls the τὸ ἰδιάζον the peculiar incommunicable Property. Which he deſcribes by *a Concourſe of diſtinguiſhing Characters in every Individual.* But how doth he apply theſe things

Συνδρομὴ τῶν περιεχόντων ἰδιωμάτων.

to the divine Nature? For therein lies the whole difficulty. Doth he own ſuch a *Community of Nature*, and *Diſtinction of Individuals* there? He firſt confeſſes the divine Nature to be incomprehenſible by us; but yet we may have ſome diſtinct Notions about theſe things. As for inſtance, *In the Father we conceive ſomething common to him and to the Son; and that is the divine Eſſence: and the ſame as to the Holy Ghoſt. But there muſt be ſome proper characters to diſtinguiſh theſe one from another; or elſe there will be nothing but confuſion:* which is *Sabellianiſm.* Now *the eſſential Attributes and divine Operations are common to them*; and therefore theſe cannot diſtinguiſh them from each other. And thoſe are the *peculiar Properties of each Perſon*, as he ſhews at large.

But may not each Perſon have a diſtinct Eſſence belonging to him, as we ſee it is among men?

For this S. *Baſil* anſwers: (1.) He utterly denies any poſſible *Diviſion in the divine Nature.*

And he never queſtion'd, but the diſtinction of Individuals under the ſame *Species* was a ſort of *Diviſion*, although there were no *Separation.* And the followers of *Joh. Philoponus* did hold *an in-*

οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐπινοῆσαι τομὴν, ἢ διαίρεσιν καθ' ἣν ἕνα τέμνον, p. 810. B.

diſſoluble Union between the three individual Eſſences in the divine Nature; but they held a diſtinction of *peculiar Eſſences*, beſides the *common Nature*, which they called μερικὰς οὐσίας ἢ ἰδικὰς θεότητας and ἰδικὰς φύσεις; as appears by *Photius*, who was very able to judge. And it appears by one of themſelves in *Photius*, that the controverſie was, whether an *Hypoſtaſis* could be without an individual Eſſence belonging to it ſelf; or whether the *peculiar Properties* and *Characters* did make the *Hypoſtaſis*. But as to S. *Baſil*'s Notion we are to obſerve; (2.) That he makes the divine Eſſence to be *uncapable of number*, by reaſon of its perfect Unity. Here our *Unitarians* tell us, that when S. *Baſil* ſaith, *That God is not one in number, but in nature, he means; as the Nature of Man is one, but there are many particular Men, as* Peter, James *and* John, &c. *ſo the Nature of God, or the common Divinity is one, but there are as truely more Gods in number, or more particular Gods, as there are more particular Men.* But that this is a groſs miſtake or abuſe of S. *Baſil*'s meaning, I ſhall make it plain from himſelf. For, they ſay, *That he held, that as to this queſtion, How many Gods? it muſt be anſwer'd, Three Gods in number, or three Perſonal Gods, and one in Nature,*

Phot. Cod. 24.

Cod. 234.

Diſcourſe concerning the nominal and real Unitar. *p.* 26, 27.

Baſil. Ep. 141.

Nature, or divine Properties; whereas he is ſo far from giving ſuch an anſwer, that he abſolutely denies that there can be more Gods than one in that very place. He mentions it as an Objection, that ſince he ſaid, *That the Father is God, the Son God, the Holy Ghoſt God; he muſt hold three Gods*; to which he anſwers, *We own but one God, not in Number, but in Nature*: Then, ſay they, *He held but one God in Nature and more in Number.* That is ſo far from his meaning, that I hardly think any that read the paſſage in S. *Baſil*, could ſo wilfully pervert his meaning. For his intention was ſo far from aſſerting *more Gods in Number*, that it was to prove ſo perfect a Unity in God, that he was not capable of number, or of being *more* than *one.* For, ſaith he, *That which is ſaid to be one in Number, is not really and ſimply one, but is made up of many, which by compoſition become one; as we ſay, the world is one, which is made up of many things. But God is a ſimple uncompounded Being; and therefore cannot be ſaid to be one in Number. But the World is not one by Nature, becauſe it is made up of ſo many things, but it is one by Number, as thoſe ſeveral parts make but one World.* Is not this fair dealing with ſuch a Man as S. *Baſil*, to repreſent his

Senſe quite otherwiſe than it is? As though he allow'd *more Gods than one in Number? Number*, ſaith he again, *belongs to Quantity, and Quantity to Bodies, but what relation have theſe to God, but as he is the Maker of them? Number belongs to material and circumſcribed Beings; but*, ſaith he, *the moſt perfect Unity is to be conceived in the moſt ſimple and incomprehenſible Eſſence.* Where it is obſervable, that he uſes thoſe Words which are allow'd to expreſs the moſt perfect and ſingular Unity. Which *Petavius* himſelf confeſſeth, that they can *never be underſtood of a ſpecifick Nature:* and *Curcellæus* cannot deny, *That* μόνος *being added to* Εἷς; *doth reſtrain the Senſe more to a numerical Unity*, as he calls it. How then is it poſſible to underſtand S. *Baſil* of more *Gods than one in number*? And in the very ſame Page he mentions the ταυτότης τῆς φύσεως, the *Sameneſs of the divine Nature*, by which the διιοούσιον is better underſtood.

ἡ δὲ Μονὰς καὶ Ἑνὰς τῆς ἀγαθῆς καὶ ἀπειλήπτου οὐσίας ὅτι νοηματική. Baſil. Tom. II. p. 926 Petav. de Trinit. l. 4. c. 13. n. 10.

Cur n: 106.

But *Curcellæus* will have no more than a *ſpecifick Unity* underſtood. Before he ſaid, that ταυτοῦσιος *would have ſignified more*, but now he finds it uſed, the caſe is alter'd: So that the Fathers could not mean any other than a *ſpecifick Unity*, let them uſe what expreſſions they pleas'd.

But

But theſe, I think, are plain enough to any one that will not ſhut his Eyes.

In another place, S. *Baſil* makes the ſame objection and gives the ſame anſwer. *One God the Father, and one God the Son; how can this be, and yet not two Gods? Becauſe*, ſaith he, *the Son hath the very ſame Eſſence with the Father. Not two Eſſences divided out of one, as two Brothers; but as Father and Son, the Son ſubſiſting as from the Father, but in the ſame individual Eſſence:* τὸ δὲ τῆς οὐσίας ταυτόν. Baſil T. I. p. 604.

But *Curcellæus* hath one ſetch yet, *viz. That S.* Baſil *denied God to be one in Number, and made him to be one in Nature, becauſe he look'd on a ſpecifick Unity or Unity of Nature as more exact than numerical.* S. *Baſil* look'd on the divine Nature as ſuch to have the *moſt perfect Unity*, becauſe of its *Simplicity*, and not in the leaſt ſpeaking of it as a *ſpecifick Unity*; but *Curcellæus* himſelf calls this, *an Unity by a mere Fiction of the Mind*; and can he imagine this to have been more *accurate* than a real Unity? Theſe are hard ſhifts in a deſperate cauſe. Cur. n. 113. N. 105.

After all, our *Unitarians* tell us, *That S.* Baſil *doth againſt* Eunomius *allow a diſtinction in Number with reſpect to the Deity.* But how? *As to the Eſſence?* By no means. T. II. p. 30.

means. For he aſſerts the *perfect Unity* thereof in the ſame place, even the *Unity of the Subſtance*. But as to the *characteriſtical Properties of the Perſons*, he allows of *Number*, and no farther. But ſay they, *This is to make one God as to eſſential Properties, and three as to Perſonal.* How can that be? when he ſaith ſo often, there can be but one God, becauſe there can be but one divine Eſſence; and therefore thoſe Properties can only make diſtinct *Hypoſtaſes*, but not *diſtinct Eſſences*. And is this indeed *the great Secret* which *this bold Man*, as they call him, hath diſcover'd? I think thoſe are much *more bold*, (I will not ſay impudent) who upon ſuch ſlight grounds, charge him with aſſerting *more Gods than one in number*. But *Gregory Nyſſen*, ſaith *Curcellæus*, ſpeaks more plainly in his Epiſtle to *Ablabius*; for ſaith he, *To avoid the difficulty of making three Gods, as three Individuals among Men are three Men; he anſwers, that truly they are not three Men, becauſe they have but one common Eſſence, which is exactly one, and indiviſible in it ſelf, however it be diſperſed in Individuals: the ſame, he ſaith, is to be underſtood of God.* And this *Petavius* had charged him with before, as appears by *Curcellæus* his *Appendix*.

Cur. n. 106. Greg. Nyſſen. Tom. III. p. 17.

Petav. de Trin. l. 4. c. 9. n. 2,3.

This

This ſeems the hardeſt paſſage in Antiquity for this purpoſe, to which I hope to give a ſatisfactory anſwer from *Gregory Nyſſen* himſelf.

1. It cannot be denied, that he aſſerts the *Unity of Eſſence* to be *Indiviſible in it ſelf*, and to be the true ground of the Denomination of Individuals; as *Peter* hath the name of a Man, not from his *individual Properties*, whereby he is diſtinguiſhed from *James* and *John*; but from that *one indiviſible Eſſence*, which is common to them all, but yet receives no Addition or Diminution in any of them.

2. He grants a *Diviſion* of *Hypoſtaſes* among Men, notwithſtanding this *Indiviſibility of one common Eſſence*: For ſaith he, among Men, although the Eſſence remain one and the ſame in all, without any Diviſion; yet *the ſeveral Hypoſtaſes are divided from each other, according to the individual Properties belonging to them.* So that here is a double conſideration of the Eſſence: as in it ſelf, ſo it is one and indiviſible; as it ſubſiſts in Individuals, and ſo it is actually divided according to the Subjects. For although the Eſſence of a Man be the ſame in it ſelf, in *Peter*, *James* and *John*; yet taking it as in the Indi-

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὑποστάσεων λόγος διὰ τὰς ἐνθεωρουμένας ἰδιότητας τὴν διαμερισμὸν ἐπιδέχεται.

Individuals, ſo the particular Eſſence in each of them is divided from the reſt. And ſo *Philoponus* took *Hypoſtaſis* for *an Eſſence individuated by peculiar Properties*; and therefore aſſerted, that where-ever there was an *Hypoſtaſis*, there muſt be a diſtinct Eſſence; and from hence he held the three Perſons to have three diſtinct Eſſences.

Niceph. Calliſt. hiſt. *l.* 18. *c.* 47.

3. We are now to conſider, how far *Gregory Nyſſen* carried this, whether he thought it held equally as to the *divine Hypoſtaſis*; and that he did not, appears to me from theſe arguments:

1. He utterly denies *any kind of Diviſion* in the divine Nature; for in the concluſion of that Diſcourſe, he ſaith, *it is not only* ἀπαραλλακτος (a Word often uſed by the Greek Fathers on this occaſion, from whence *Athanaſius* againſt *Macedonius* inferr'd an *Identity*, and *Cæſarius* joyns τὸ ταυτὸν τῆς οὐσίας ἢ τὸ ἀπαραλλακτον τῆς θεότητος; and ſo S. *Baſil* uſes it) but he adds another Word, which is ἀδιαίρετος, Indiviſible. *Yes, as all Eſſences are indiviſible in themſelves; but they may be divided in their Subjects, as* Gregory Nyſſen *allows it to be in Men.* I grant it, but then he owns a Diviſion of ſome kind, which he here abſolutely de-

Athan. T. II. *p.* 280. Cæſar. Quæſt. 3. *p.* 12.

nies

nies as to the divine Nature; for his words are, that it is ἀδιαίρετος διὰ πάσης ἐννοίας in any consideration whatsoever. *Then he must destroy the Hypostases.* Not so neither, for he allows that there is a διαφορὰ as to the *Hypostases* however. For he proposes the Objection himself, *That by allowing no difference in the divine Nature, the Hypostases would be confounded.* To which he answers, *That he did not deny their difference, which was founded in the relation they had to one another*; which he there explains; and that *therein only consists the difference of the Persons.* Which is a very considerable testimony, to shew that both *Petavius* and *Curcellæus* mistook *Gregory Nyssen*'s meaning. But there are other arguments to prove it.

Ὅτι τὸ ἀπαράλλακτον τῆς φύσεως ὁμολογοῦντες τὴν κτ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ αἰτιατὸν διαφορὰν οὐκ ἀρνούμεθα, ἐν ᾧ μόνῳ διακρίνεσθαι τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου καταλαμβάνομεν.

2. He asserts such a difference between the divine and human Persons, as is unanswerable, *viz.* the *Unity of Operation. For*, saith he, *among Men, if several go about the same Work, yet every particular Person works by himself, and therefore they may well be called many; because every one is circumscribed: but in the divine Persons he proves that it is quite otherwise, for they all concurr in the Action towards*

us;

us; as he there ſhews at large. *Petavius* was aware of this, and therefore he ſaith, *he quitted it and returned to the other*; whereas he only ſaith, *If his Adverſaries be diſpleaſed with it, he thinks the other ſufficient.* Which in ſhort is, that Eſſence in it ſelf is one and indiviſible; but among Men it is divided according to the Subjects; that the divine Nature is capable of no Diviſion at all, and therefore the difference of *Hypoſtaſes* muſt be from the different Relations and Manner of *Subſiſtence.*

3. He expreſſes his meaning fully in another place. For in his *Catechetical Oration*, he ſaith, *he looks on the Doctrine of the Trinity as a profound Myſtery* (which three *individual Perſons* in one *ſpecifick Nature* is far from.) But wherein lies it? Chiefly in this, *That there ſhould be Number and no Number; different View and yet but One; a diſtinction of Hypoſtaſes, and yet no Diviſion in the Subjects.* For ſo his words are, καὶ οὐ μεμέρισται τὸ ὑποκείμενον; which is contrary to what he ſaid of *human Hypoſtaſes.* Now, what is the *Subject* in this caſe? According to *Curcellæus* his Notion, it muſt be an *Individual.* But ſince he aſſerts there can be *no Diviſion in the Subjects*, then he muſt overthrow

Greg Nyſſen, Tom. III. *p.*

overthrow any ſuch *Individuals*, as are among Men. Theſe are the chief Teſtimonies out of the *Greek Fathers*, whoſe authority *Curcellæus* and others rely moſt upon, as to this matter, which I have therefore more particularly examin'd.

But *S. Jerom*, ſaith *Curcellæus*, in his Epiſtle to *Damaſus*, *thought three Hypoſtaſes implied three diſtinct Subſtances; and therefore when the* Campenſes *would have him own them, he refuſed it and asked his Advice.* Then it is plain, *S. Jerom* would not own *three diſtinct Subſtances*, and ſo could not be of *Curcellæus* his mind. But ſaith he, *S. Jerom* meant *by three Subſtances, three Gods different in kind, as the* Arians *did.* But how doth that appear? *Doth he not ſay, the* Arian *Biſhop, and the* Campenſes *put him upon it?* But who was this *Arian Biſhop*, and theſe *Campenſes*? No other than the *Meletian Party*; for *Meletius* was brought in by the *Arians*, but he joyned againſt them with *S. Baſil* and others, who aſſerted three *Hypoſtaſes*; and the *Campenſes* were his People who met without the Gates, as the Hiſtorians tell us. But it is evident by *S. Jerom*, that the Latin Church underſtood *Hypoſtaſis* to be the ſame then with *Subſtance*; and the reaſon why they would

Cur. n. 48.

N. 107.

would not allow three *Hypoſtaſes*, was, becauſe they would not aſſert *three Subſtances*. So that *Curcellæus* his *Hypotheſis* hath very little colour for it among the *Latin Fathers*; ſince S. *Jerom* there ſaith, it would be *Sacrilege to hold three Subſtances*, and he freely beſtows an *Anathema* upon any one that aſſerted more than one.

But *Hilary*, ſaith *Curcellæus*, *owns a ſpecifick Unity*, for in his Book *de Synodis*, he ſhews, *That by one Subſtance, they did not mean one individual Subſtance, but ſuch as was in* Adam *and* Seth, *that is of the ſame kind.* No man aſſerts the *Unity* and *Indiſcrimination* of the divine Subſtance more fully and frequently than he doth; and that without any Difference or Variation, as to the Father and the Son. And although againſt the *Arians* he may uſe that for an Illuſtration, of *Adam* and *Seth*; yet when he comes to explain himſelf, he declares it muſt be underſtood in a way agreeable to the divine Nature. And he denies any *Diviſion of the Subſtance* between Father and Son, but he aſſerts one and the ſame Subſtance to be in both; and *although the Perſon of the Son remains diſtinct from the Perſon of the Father, yet he ſubſiſts in that Subſtance of which he was begotten,*

Cur. *n.* 89.

Hilar. de Synod. *n.* 67.

Hilar. de Trinit. *l.* 4 *n.* 6.

begotten, and nothing is taken off from the ſubſtance of the Father, by his being begotten of it.

But doth he not ſay, *That he hath a Legitimate and proper Subſtance of his own begotten Nature from God, the Father? And what is this, but to own two diſtinct Subſtances?* Hilar. de Synod. n. 18.

How can the *Subſtance be diſtinct*, if it be the very ſame; and the *Son ſubſiſt in that Subſtance of which he was begotten?* And that *Hilary* (beſides a multitude of paſſages to the ſame purpoſe in him) cannot be underſtood of two diſtinct Subſtances will appear by this Evidence.

The *Arians* in their Confeſſion of Faith before the Council of *Nice* ſet down among the ſeveral Hereſies which they condemned; that of *Hieracas*, who ſaid *the Father and Son were like two Lamps ſhining out of one common Veſſel of Oil. Hilary* was ſenſible that under this that Expreſſion was ſtruck at, *God of God, Light of Light*, which the Church owned. His Anſwer is, *Luminis Naturæ Unitas eſt, non ex connexione porrectio.* i. e. they are not two divided Lights, from one common Stock; but the ſame Light remaining after it was kindled that it was before. As appears by his Words, *Light* Hilar. de Trinit. l. 6. n. 12.

of light, ſaith he, implies, That it gives to another that which it continues to have it ſelf. And *Petavius* ſaith, that the Opinion of *Hieracas* was, *That the ſubſtance of the Father and Son differ'd Numerically as one Lamp from another.* And *Hilary* calls it an Error of humane Underſtanding which would judge of God, by what they find in one another.

Lumen ex lumine, quod ſine detrimento ſuo naturam ſuam præſtat ex ſeſe, & quod dat habet, & quod dederit habeat, naſcaturq; quod ſit.

Petav. de Trinit. *l.* 5 *c.* 8. *n.* 9, 12.

Doth not S. *Ambroſe* ſay, as *Curcellæus* quotes him, *That the Father and Son are not two Gods, becauſe all men are ſaid to be of one Subſtance?*

Curcell. *n.* 96.

But S. *Ambroſe is directly againſt him.* For, he ſaith, *The* Arians *objected, that if they made the Son true God, and Conſubſtantial with the Father, they muſt make two Gods; as there are two men, or two Sheep of the ſame Eſſence; but a Man and a Sheep are not ſaid to be Men, or two ſheep. Which they ſaid to excuſe themſelves, becauſe they made the Son of a different kind and ſubſtance from the Father.* And what Anſwer doth S. *Ambroſe* give to this?

Ambroſ. de Fide *l.* 5 *c.* 3. ed. Nov.

1. He ſaith, *Plurality according to the Scriptures rather falls on thoſe of different kinds*; and therefore when they make them of ſeveral kinds, they muſt make ſeveral Gods. 2. That

2. That we who hold but *One Subſtance, cannot make more Gods than One.*

3. To his inſtance of Men, he anſwers, *That although they are of the ſame Nature by Birth, yet they differ in Age, and Thought, and Work, and Place from one another; and where there is ſuch Diverſity, there cannot be Unity: but in God there is no difference of Nature, Will, or Operation; and therefore there can be but one God.*

The laſt I ſhall mention is S. *Auguſtin*, whom *Curcellæus* produces to as little purpoſe; for although he doth mention the ſame inſtance *of ſeveral Men being of the ſame kind*; yet he ſpeaks ſo expreſly againſt a *Specifick Unity* in God: that he ſaith, *The Conſequence muſt be, that the three Perſons muſt be three Gods; as three humane Perſons are three Men.* And in another place, *That the Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt, are One in the ſame individual Nature.* And what ſaith *Curcellæus* to theſe places, for he was aware of them. To the latter he ſaith, *That by Individual, he means Specifick.* This is an extraordinary Anſwer indeed. But what Reaſon doth he give for it? *Becauſe they are not divided in Place or Time, but they may have their proper Eſſences however.*

Cur. n. 97.

Aug de Trinit. l. 7. c. 6.

C. Maxim. l. 1.

Cur. n. 114.

But where doth S. *Auguſtin* give any

Auguſt. de Trinit *l.* 4. *c.* 21. *l.* 5. *c.* 3, 5, 8. *l.* 6. *c.* 1. De Agone Chriſt. *c.* 16. C. Maxim. *l.* 3. *c.* 10.

ſuch Account of it? He often ſpeaks upon this Subject; but always gives another Reaſon, *viz.* becauſe they are but *one and the ſame Subſtance. The Three Perſons are but One God, becauſe they are of One Subſtance; and they have a perfect Unity, becauſe there is no Diverſity of Nature, or of Will.* But it may be ſaid, *That here he ſpeaks of a Diverſity of Nature.* In the next Words he explains himſelf, that the three Perſons are One God, *propter ineffabilem conjunctionem Deitatis*; but the Union of three *Perſons* in *one Specifick Nature, is* no *ineffable Conjunction*, it being one of the commoneſt things in the World; and in the ſame Chapter, *propter Individuam Deitatem unus Deus eſt*; & *propter uniuſcujuſque Proprietatem tres Perſonæ ſunt.* Here we find one Individual Nature; and no difference but in the peculiar Properties of the Perſons.

In the other place he is ſo expreſs againſt *a Specifick Unity*, that *Curcellæus* his beſt Anſwer is, *That in that Chapter he is too intricate and obſcure.* i. e. He durſt not to ſpeak his Mind.

Cur. *n.* 114.

Thus much I thought fit to ſay in anſwer to thoſe *undeniable Proofs* of *Curcellæus*, which our *Unitarians* boaſt ſo much of, and whether they be ſo or not, let the Reader examine and judge. CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

The Athanaſian Creed *clear'd from Contradictions.*

III. I Now come to the laſt thing I propoſed, *viz.* to ſhew, *That it is no contradiction to aſſert three Perſons in the Trinity and but one God*; and for that purpoſe, I ſhall examine the charge of *Contradictions* on the *Athanaſian Creed. The ſumm of the firſt Articles*, ſay they, *is this, The one true God is three diſtinct Perſons, and three diſtinct Perſons, Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt are the one true God. Which is plainly, as if a Man ſhould ſay*, Peter, James *and* John, *being three Perſons are one Man; and one Man is theſe three diſtinct Perſons*, Peter, James *and* John. *Is it not now a ridiculous attempt as well as a barbarous Indignity, to go about thus to make Aſſes of all Mankind, under pretence of teaching them a Creed.* This is very freely ſpoken, with reſpect, not merely to our Church, but the Chriſtian World, which owns this Creed to be a *juſt and true Explication* of the Doctrine of the Trinity. But there are ſome Creatures as remarkable for their untoward

Notes on Athanaſius *his Creed*, p. 11.

kicking, as for their Stupidity. And is not this great skill in these Matters, to make such a Parallel between *three Persons in the Godhead* and *Peter*, *James* and *John*? Do they think there is no difference between an infinitely perfect Being, and such finite limited Creatures as Individuals among Men are? Do they suppose the divine Nature capable of such *Division* and *Separation* by Individuals, as humane Nature is? *No*, they may say, *but ye who hold three Persons must think so*: For what reason? We do assert three Persons, but it is on the account of divine Revelation, and in such a manner, as the divine Nature is capable of it. For it is a good rule of *Boethius*, *Talia sunt prædicata, qualia subjecta permiserint.* We must not say that there are Persons in the Trinity, but in such a manner as is agreeable to the divine Nature; and if that be not capable of *Division* and *Separation*, then the Persons must be in the same undivided Essence. The next Article is, Neither confounding the Persons, nor dividing the Substance; *But how can we*, say they, *not confound the Persons that have, as ye say, but one numerical Substance? And how can we but divide the Substance, which we find in three distinct di-*

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vided Perſons? I think the terms *numerical Subſtance* not very proper in this caſe; and I had rather uſe the Language of the *Fathers*, than of the *Schools*; and ſome of the moſt judicious and learned Fathers would not allow the terms of *one numerical Subſtance* to be applied to the divine Eſſence. For their Notion was, That *Number* was only proper for compound Beings, but God being a pure and ſimple Being was *one by Nature* and *not by Number*, as S. *Baſil* ſpeaks (as is before obſerved) becauſe he is not compounded, nor hath any beſides himſelf to be reckon'd with him. But becauſe there are different *Hypoſtaſes*, therefore they allow'd the uſe of *Number* about them, and ſo we may ſay the Hypoſtaſes or Perſons are *numerically different*; but we cannot ſay that the Eſſence is *one Numerically*. But why muſt they *confound the Perſons, if there be but one Eſſence?* The relative Properties cannot be confounded; for the Father cannot be the Son, nor the Son the Father; and on theſe the difference of Perſons is founded. For, there can be no difference, as to eſſential Properties, and therefore all the difference, or rather diſtinction muſt be from thoſe that are Relative. A Perſon of it ſelf imports Baſil Ep. 141.

no *Relation*, but the Perſon of the Father or of the Son muſt; and theſe Relations cannot be confounded with one another. And if the Father cannot be the Son, nor the Son the Father, then they muſt be diſtinct from each other. But how? *By dividing the Subſtance*? That is impoſſible in a Subſtance that is indiviſible. It may be ſaid, *That the Eſſence of created Beings is indiviſible, and yet there are divided Perſons.* I grant it, but then a created Eſſence is capable of different accidents and qualities to divide one Perſon from another, which cannot be ſuppoſed in the divine Nature; and withal the ſame power which gives a Being to a created Eſſence, gives it a ſeparate and divided Exiſtence from all others. As when *Peter*, *James* and *John* received their ſeveral diſtinct Perſonalities from God; at the ſame time he gave them their ſeparate Beings from each other, although the ſame Eſſence be in them all.

But how can we but divide the Subſtance which we ſee in three diſtinct divided Perſons? The queſtion is, Whether the diſtinct Properties of the Perſons do imply a *Diviſion* of the *Subſtance*? We deny that the *Perſons* are *divided* as to the *Subſtance*, becauſe that is impoſſible to be divided;

vided; but we ſay, they are and muſt be diſtinguiſhed as to thoſe incommunicable Properties which make the Perſons diſtinct. The *eſſential Properties* are uncapable of being divided, and the *Relations* cannot be confounded; ſo that there muſt be *one undivided Subſtance* and yet *three diſtinct* Perſons.

But every Perſon muſt have his own proper Subſtance; and ſo the Subſtance muſt be divided if there be three Perſons. That every Perſon muſt have a *Subſtance* to ſupport his Subſiſtence is not denied, but the queſtion is, Whether that *Subſtance* muſt be *divided* or not. We ſay, where the Subſtance will bear it, as in created Beings, a Perſon hath a ſeparate Subſtance, *i. e.* the ſame Nature diverſified by Accidents, Qualities and a ſeparate Exiſtence, but where theſe things cannot be, there the *ſame Eſſence* muſt remain undivided, but with ſuch *relative Properties* as cannot be confounded. *But may not the ſame undivided Subſtance be communicated to three divided Perſons; ſo as that each Perſon may have his own proper Subſtance, and yet the divine Eſſence be in it ſelf undivided?* This is not the caſe before us. For the queſtion upon the Creed is, Whether the Subſtance can be divided? And here

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it is allow'd to remain undivided. *Yet in it ſelf, but it may be divided in the Perſons.* The Subſtance, we ſay, is uncapable of being divided any way; and to ſay, that a Subſtance wholly undivided in it ſelf, is yet divided into as many proper and peculiar Subſtances, as there are Perſons, doth not at all help our underſtanding in this matter; but if no more be meant, as is expreſly declared, than *That the ſame one divine Nature is wholly and entirely communicated by the eternal Father to the eternal Son, and by Father and Son to the eternal Spirit, without any Diviſion or Separation*; it is the ſame which all *Trinitarians* aſſert. And it is a great pity, that any *new Phraſes* or Ways of Expreſſion ſhould cauſe unreaſonable Heats among thoſe who are really of the ſame Mind. For thoſe who oppoſe the Expreſſions of *three diſtinct Subſtances* as new and dangerous; yet grant, *That it is one peculiar Prerogative of the divine Nature and Subſtance, founded in its infinite, and therefore tranſcendent Perfection, whereby it is capable of reſiding in more Perſons than one; and is accordingly communicated from the Father to the Son and Holy Ghoſt; but this is done without any Diviſion or Multiplication.* Now if both Parties

Parties mean what they ſay, where lies the difference? It is ſufficient for my purpoſe that they are agreed, that there can be no *Diviſion* as to the *divine Eſſence* by the diſtinction of Perſons. And ſo this paſſage of the *Athanaſian* Creed holds good, *Neither confounding the Perſons nor dividing the Subſtance.*

The next Article, as it is ſet down in the *Notes on* Athanaſius *his Creed*, is a contradiction to this. For there it runs, "There is one Subſtance of the Father, "another of the Son, another of the "Holy Ghoſt. They might well charge it with *Contradictions* at this rate. But that is a plain miſtake for *Perſon*; for there is no other variety in the Copies but this, that *Bayfius* his Greek Copy hath ὑπόστασις, and that of *Conſtantinople* πρόσωπον, but all the Latin Copies *Perſona*. But what conſequence do they draw from hence? *Then*, ſay they, *the Son is not the Father, nor is the Father the Son, nor the Holy Ghoſt either of them.* If they had put in *Perſon*, as they ought to have done, it is what we do own. And what follows? *If the Father be not the Son, and yet is the one true God, then the Son is not the one true God, becauſe he is not the Father.* The *one true God* may be taken

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two ways: 1. The *one true God*, as having the *true divine Nature* in him, and ſo the *Father* is the *one true God*; but not excluſive of the Son, if he have the ſame *divine Nature*. 2. The *one true God*, as having the *divine Nature* ſo *wholly in himſelf*, as to make it incommunicable to the Son; *ſo* we do not ſay, that the Father is *the one true God*, becauſe this muſt exclude the Son from being God; which the Scripture aſſures us that he is; and therefore though the Son be not the Father, nor the Father the Son, yet the Son may be the *one true God* as well as the Father, becauſe they both partake of the *ſame divine Nature*, ſo that there is no contradiction in this, *That there is but one true God, and one of the Perſons is not the other*. For that ſuppoſes it impoſſible, that there ſhould be three Perſons in the ſame Nature; but if the diſtinction of *Nature* and *Perſons* be allow'd, as it muſt be by all that underſtand any thing of theſe matters, then it muſt be granted, that although one Perſon cannot be another, yet they may have the ſame common Eſſence. As for inſtance, let us take their own, *Peter*, *James* and *John*. What pleaſant arguing would this be, *Peter* is not *James* nor *John*, nor *James*

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nor *John* are *Peter*, but *Peter* hath the true Eſſence of a Man in him; and the true Eſſence is but one and indiviſible; and therefore *James* and *John* cannot be true Men, becauſe *Peter* hath the *one* and *indiviſible Eſſence* of a *Man* in him? But they will ſay, *We cannot ſay that* Peter *is the One true Man*, as we ſay, *That the Father is the One true God*. Yes, we ſay the ſame in other Words, for he can be ſaid to be the *One true God* in no other Reſpect, but as he hath the *One true divine Eſſence*. All the difference lies, that a finite Nature is capable of *Diviſion*, but an infinite is not.

It follows, " The Godhead of the Fa-
" ther, and of the Son, and of the Holy
" Ghoſt is all one, the Glory Equal, the
" Majeſty Co-eternal.

To this they ſay, *That this Article doth impugn and deſtroy it ſelf.* How ſo? *For, if the Glory and Majeſty be the ſame in Number, then it can be neither Equal, nor Co eternal. Not Equal for it is the ſame, which Equals never are, nor Co-eternal for that intimates that they are diſtinct. For, nothing is Co-eternal, nor Co temporary with it ſelf.*

There is no appearance of Difficulty or Contradiction in this, if the Diſtinction of *Perſons* is allowed; for the *three*

Perſons

Persons may be well said to be *Co-equal and Co-eternal*; and if we *honour the Son, as we honour the Father*, we must give *equal Glory* to him.

But one great Point of *Contradiction* remains, *viz.* "So that the Father is God, "the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is "God, and yet there are not three Gods, "but one God.

First, they say, *This is as if a Man should say, the Father is a Person, the Son a Person, and the Holy Ghost a Person, yet there are not three Persons, but one Person.* How is this possible, if a *Person* doth suppose some *peculiar Property*, which must distinguish him from all others? And how can *three Persons* be *one Person*, unless three incommunicable Properties may become one communicated Property to three Persons? But they are aware of a Distinction in this Case, *viz.* that the term God is used *Personally*, when it is said *God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost*; but when it is said, *There are not three Gods, but one God, the term God is used Essentially*, and therefore comprehends the whole three Persons, so that there is neither a *Grammatical*, nor *Arithmetical Contradiction.* And what say our *Unitarians* to this? Truly, no less, *Than that*

Notes on Athanas. *his Creed.* p 13.

that the Remedy is worſe, (if poſſible) than the Diſeaſe. Nay then, we are in a very ill Caſe. But how I pray doth this appear? 1. Say they, *Three perſonal Gods, and one Eſſential God make four Gods; if the Eſſential God be not the ſame with the perſonal Gods: and tho' he is the ſame, yet ſince they are not the ſame with one another, but diſtinct, it follows, that there are three Gods, i. e. three perſonal Gods.* 2. *It introduces two ſorts of Gods, three Perſonal and one Eſſential. But the Chriſtian Religion knows and owns but One, true and moſt high God of any ſort.* So far then, we are agreed, *That there is but One, true and moſt high God*; and that becauſe of the perfect *Unity* of the *Divine Eſſence*, which can be no more than One, and where there is but *One Divine Eſſence*, there can be but *One true God*, unleſs we can ſuppoſe a God without an Eſſence, and that would be a ſtrange ſort of God. He would be a *perſonal God* indeed in their critical Senſe of a *Perſon* for a ſhape or appearance. *But may not the ſame Eſſence be divided?* That I have already ſhew'd to be impoſſible. Therefore we cannot make ſo many *perſonal Gods*, becauſe we aſſert one and the ſame Eſſence in the three Perſons of Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt. *But they*

are

are diſtinct, and therefore muſt be diſtinct Gods, ſince every one is diſtinct from the other. They are diſtinct as to *perſonal Properties*, but not as to *Eſſential Attributes*; which are and muſt be the ſame in all: So that here is but one Eſſential God, and three Perſons.

But after all, why do we aſſert three Perſons in the Godhead? Not becauſe we find them in the *Athanaſian Creed*; but becauſe the Scripture hath revealed that there are *Three*, Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt; to whom the Divine Nature and Attributes are given. This we verily believe, that the Scripture hath revealed; and that there are a great many places, of which, we think no tolerable Senſe can be given without it, and therefore we aſſert this Doctrine on the ſame Grounds, on which we believe the Scriptures. And if there are *three Perſons* which have the *Divine Nature* attributed to them; what muſt we do in this Caſe? Muſt we caſt off the *Unity of the Divine Eſſence*? No, that is too frequently and plainly aſſerted for us to call it into Queſtion. Muſt we reject thoſe Scriptures which attribute Divinity to the Son and Holy Ghoſt, as well as to the Father? That we cannot do, unleſs we caſt off thoſe Books of Scripture, wherein

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thoſe things are contained.

But why do we call them Perſons, when that Term is not found in Scripture, and is of a doubtfull Senſe? The true Account whereof I take to be this. It is obſerved by *Facundus Hermianenſis*, that *the Chriſtian Church received the Doctrine of the Trinity before the Terms of three Perſons were uſed. But* Sabellianiſm *was the occaſion of making uſe of the name of Perſons.* It's true, That the *Sabellians* did not diſlike one Senſe of the Word *Perſon*, (which they knew was not the Churches Senſe) as it was taken for an *Appearance*, or an *external Quality*; which was conſiſtent enough with their *Hypotheſis*, who allow'd but *One real Perſon* with *different Manifeſtations*. That this was their true Opinion, appears from the beſt account we have of their Doctrine, from the firſt Riſe of *Sabellianiſm*. The Foundations of it were laid in the earlieſt and moſt dangerous Hereſies in the Chriſtian Church, *viz.* that which is commonly called by the name of the *Gnoſticks*, and that of the *Cerinthians* and *Ebionites*. For how much ſoever they differ'd from each other in other things; yet they both agreed in this, that there was no ſuch thing as a *Trinity*, conſiſting of *Father, Son and*

Facund. *l.* 1. *p.* 19. Ed. Serm.

Holy Ghoſt; but that all was but different *Appearances* and *Manifeſtations* of God to Mankind. In conſequence whereof, the *Gnoſticks* denied the very *Humanity* of Chriſt, and the *Cerinthians* and *Ebionites* his *Divinity*. But both theſe ſorts, were utterly rejected the Communion of the Chriſtian Church; and no ſuch thing as *Sabellianiſm* was found within it. Afterwards, there aroſe ſome Perſons who ſtarted the ſame Opinion within the Church: the firſt we meet with of this ſort, are thoſe mention'd by *Theodoret*, *Epigonus*, *Cleomenes*, and *Noetus*, from whom they were called *Noetians*; not long after, *Sabellius* broached the ſame Doctrine in *Pentapolis*, and the Parts thereabouts; which made *Dionyſius* of *Alexandria* appear ſo early and ſo warmly againſt it. But he happening to let fall ſome Expreſſions, as though he aſſerted an *Inequality* of *Hypoſtaſes* in the *Godhead*, Complaint was made of it to *Dionyſius* then Biſhop of *Rome*; who thereupon explained that, which he took to be the true Senſe of the Chriſtian Church in this matter. Which is ſtill preſerved in *Athanaſius*: Therein he diſowns the *Sabellian Doctrine*, which *confounded the Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt, and made them to be the ſame*; and withal, he rejected thoſe

Theod. hæret. Fab. *l.* 2. *c.* 3.

Athan. de Sent. Dionyſ. *p.* 558.

Athanaſ. de Decret. Fidei Nicen. *p.* 275.

thoſe who held *three diſtinct and ſeparate Hypoſtaſes*; as the *Platoniſts*, and after them the *Marcioniſts* did. *Dionyſius* of *Alexandria*, when he came to explain himſelf, agreed with the others, and aſſerted the Son to be *of the ſame Subſtance with the Father*; as *Athanaſius* hath proved at large: but yet he ſaid, *That if a diſtinction of Hypoſtaſes were not kept up, the Doctrine of the Trinity would be loſt*; as appears by an Epiſtle of his in S. *Baſil*. *Athanaſius* ſaith, *That the Hereſie* of *Sabellius* lay in making *the Father and Son to be only different Names of the ſame Perſon*; *ſo that in one reſpect he is the Father, and in another the Son*. *Gregory Nazianzen* in oppoſition to *Sabellianiſm*, ſaith, *We muſt believe one God, and three Hypoſtaſes*, and commends *Athanaſius* for preſerving the true Mean, in aſſerting *the Unity of Nature, and the Diſtinction of Properties*. S. *Baſil* ſaith, *That the* Sabellians *made but one Perſon of the Father and Son: that in Name they confeſſed the Son; but in Reality they denied him*. In another place, *that the* Sabellians *aſſerted but one Hypoſtaſis in the divine Nature; but that God took ſeveral Perſons upon him, as occaſion required: ſometimes that of a Father, at other times of a Son*; and ſo *of*

Athanaſ. de Sent. Dionyſ.

Baſil de Sp. Sancto c. 29.

Athan. Or. 4. c. Arian p. 456.

Greg. Nazian. Or I. p. 16, 17.

Or. XXI. p. 380.

Baſil Hom. 27. p. 602, 604.

Baſil Epiſt. 141.

the Holy Ghoſt. And to the ſame purpoſe, in other places he ſaith, *That there are diſtinct Hypoſtaſes with their peculiar Properties; which being joyned with the Unity of Nature make up the true Confeſſion of Faith.* There were ſome who would have but *One Hypoſtaſis*; whom he oppoſes with great vehemency; and the Reaſon he gives, is, *That then they muſt make the Perſons to be mere Names*; which is *Sabellianiſm*. And he ſaith, *That if our Notions of diſtinct Perſons have no certain Foundation they are mere Names, ſuch as* Sabellius *called Perſons.* But by this *Foundation* he doth not mean any *diſtinct Eſſences*, but *the incommunicable Properties belonging to them, as Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt.*

Epiſt. 64. 391.

It is plain from hence, that the neceſſity of aſſerting *three Hypoſtaſes*, came from thence, that otherwiſe they could not ſo well diſtinguiſh themſelves from the *Sabellians* whoſe Doctrine they utterly diſowned, as well as *Arianiſm* and *Judaiſm*; and it appears by the Teſtimonies of *Athanaſius*, *Gregory Nazianzen*, and S. *Baſil*, that they look'd on one *as bad as the other*; and they commonly joyn *Judaiſm*, and *Sabellianiſm* together.

Athanaſ. p. 567. Greg Naz. p. 16. Baſil. Hom 27.

But yet there aroſe Difficulties, whether they were to hold one *Hypoſtaſis* or *three.*

three. The former inſiſted on the generally received Senſe of *Hypoſtaſis* for *Subſtance* or *Eſſence*; and therefore they could not hold three *Hypoſtaſes* without three *diſtinct Eſſences*, as the *Platoniſts* and *Marcioniſts* held. Upon this a Synod was called at *Alexandria* to adjuſt this matter, where both Parties were deſired to explain themſelves. Thoſe who held three Hypoſtaſes were asked, *Whether they maintained three Hypoſtaſes as the* Arians *did, of different Subſtances and ſeparate Subſiſtences, as Mankind and other Creatures are? Or as other Hereticks, three Principles or three Gods?* All which they ſtedfaſtly denied. Then they were asked, *Why they uſed thoſe terms?* They anſwered, *Becauſe they believed the Holy Trinity to be more than mere Names; and that the Father, and Son, and Holy Ghoſt had a real Subſiſtence belonging to them; but ſtill they held but one Godhead, one Principle, and the Son of the ſame Subſtance with the Father; and the Holy Ghoſt not to be a Creature, but to bear the ſame proper and inſeparable Eſſence with the Father and the Son.* Then the other ſide were asked, *When they aſſerted but one Hypoſtaſis, whether they held with* Sabellius *or not; and that the Son and Holy Ghoſt had*

Ruffin. l. 2. 11. hiſt. l. 1. Athan. Ep. ad Antioch. p. 577.

no Eſſence or Subſiſtence? which they utterly denied; but ſaid, that their meaning was, *That Hypoſtaſis was the ſame with Subſtance; and by one Hypoſtaſis, they intended no more, but that the Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt were of the ſame individual Subſtance*; (for the words are διὰ τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς φύσεως) and ſo they held *but one Godhead and one divine Nature*: and upon theſe terms they agreed. From whence it follows, that the Notion of *three Hypoſtaſes*, as it was received in the Chriſtian Church, was to be underſtood ſo as to be conſiſtent with the *Individual Unity* of the *divine Eſſence*. And the great rule of the Chriſtian Church was to keep in the middle, between the Doctrines of *Sabellius* and *Arius*; and ſo by degrees, the Notion of *three Hypoſtaſes* and *one Eſſence* was look'd on in the Eaſtern Church, as the moſt proper Diſcrimination of the Orthodox from the *Sabellians* and *Arians*.

But the Latin Church was not ſo eaſily brought to the uſe of three *Hypoſtaſes*, becauſe they knew no other Senſe of it, but for *Subſtance* or *Eſſence*; and they all denied that there was any more than *one divine Subſtance*, and therefore they rather embraced the Word *Perſona*; and did

did agree in the name of *Perſons*, as moſt proper to ſignifie their meaning, which was, *That there were three which had diſtinct Subſiſtences, and incommunicable Properties, and one and the ſame divine Eſſence.* And ſince the Notion of it is ſo well underſtood, to ſignifie ſuch a peculiar Senſe, I ſee no reaſon why any ſhould ſcruple the uſe of it. As to its *not being uſed in Scripture*, *Socinus* himſelf deſpiſes it, and allows it to be no good reaſon. For when *Franciſcus Davides* objected, *That the terms of Eſſence and Perſon were not in Scripture*; *Socinus* tells him, *That they expoſed their cauſe who went upon ſuch grounds*; *and that if the ſenſe of them were in Scripture, it was no matter whether the terms were or not.* Socin. Vol. I. p. 778.

Having thus clear'd the Notion of *three Perſons*, I return to the *Senſe* of *Scripture* about theſe matters. And our *Unitarians* tell us, that *we ought to interpret Scripture otherwiſe.* How doth that appear? They give us very little encouragement to follow their *Interpretations*, which are ſo new, ſo forced, ſo different from the general Senſe of the Chriſtian World, and which I may ſay, reflect ſo highly on the Honour of Chriſt and his Apoſtles, *i. e.* by making uſe of ſuch Expreſſions,

preſſions, which if they do not mean, what to honeſt and ſincere Minds they appear to do, muſt be intended (according to them) to ſet up *Chriſt* a *mere Man* to be *a God*. And if ſuch a thought as this could enter into the Mind of a thinking Man, it would tempt him to ſuſpect much more as to thoſe Writings than there is the leaſt colour or reaſon for. Therefore theſe bold inconſiderate Writers ought to reflect on the conſequence of ſuch ſort of Arguments, and if they have any regard to Chriſtianity, not to trifle with *Scripture* as they do.

Notes on Athanaſ. his Creed, p 13. But ſay they, *The queſtion only is, Whether we ought to interpret Scripture when it ſpeaks of God, according to reaſon or not, that is like Fools or like wiſe Men?* *Like wiſe Men* no doubt, if they can hit upon it, but they go about it as untowardly as ever Men did. For is this *to interpret Scripture like wiſe Men*, to take up ſome *novel Interpretations*, againſt the *general Senſe* of the Chriſtian Church from the Apoſtles times? Is this to act *like wiſe Men*, to raiſe Objections againſt the Authority of the Books, they cannot anſwer, and to cry out of falſe *Copies* and *Tranſlations* without reaſon, and to render all places ſuſpicious, which make againſt

gainſt them? Is this *to interpret Scripture like wiſe Men*, to make our Saviour affect to be thought a *God*, when he knew himſelf to be a *mere Man*, and by their own Confeſſion had not his *divine Authority* and *Power* conferr'd upon him? And to make his Apoſtles ſet up the *Worſhip* of a *Creature*, when their deſign was to take away the Worſhip of all ſuch, *who by Nature are not Gods*? Is this *like wiſe Men*, to tell the World, *that theſe were only ſuch Gods whom they had ſet up, and God had not appointed*; as though there were no *real Idolatry* but in *giving divine Worſhip* without God's Command.

Anſwer to my Sermon, p. 14.

CHAP. VIII.

The Socinian *Senſe of Scripture examined.*

BUT they muſt not think to eſcape ſo eaſily for ſuch a groundleſs and preſumptuous ſaying; that *they interpret the Scripture not like Fools, but likewiſe Men*: becauſe the *true Senſe of Scripture* is really the main point between us; and therefore

fore I ſhall more carefully examine the *Wiſe Senſe* they give of the chief places which relate to the matter in hand.

1. Is this *to interpret Scripture like wiſe Men*, to make the Author to the *Hebrews* in one Chapter, and that but a ſhort one, to bring no leſs than four places out of the *Old Teſtament*, and according to their Senſe, not one of them proves that which he aimed at? *viz.* that *Chriſt was ſuperiour to Angels*, as will appear by the Senſe they give of them. *Heb.* 1. 5. *For unto which of the Angels ſaid he at any time, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee?* *Theſe words*, ſay they, *in their original and primary Senſe are ſpoken of* David, *but in their myſtical Senſe are a Prophecy concerning Chriſt.* Was this *myſtical Senſe* primarily intended or not? If not, they are only an accommodation and no proof. But they ſay, even in that *myſtical Senſe, they were intended not of the Lord Chriſt's ſuppoſed eternal Generation from the Eſſence of the Father, but of his Reſurrection from the dead.*

Hiſt. of the Unit. p. 15. Edit. 2.

But if that be not taken as an *Evidence* of his being *the eternal Son of God*, how doth this prove him *above Angels?*

Heb. 1. 6. *And again, when he bringeth his firſt begotten into the World, he ſaith,*

And

And let all the Angels of God Worſhip him. This, one would think home to the buſineſs. But our *wiſe Interpreters* tell us plainly, *That the words were uſed by the Pſalmiſt on another occaſion*, i. e. they are nothing to the purpoſe. But being told of this, inſtead of mending the matter, they have made it far worſe; for upon *ſecond thoughts*, (but not *wiſer*) they ſay, *The words are not taken out of the Pſalm, but out of Deut.* 32. 43. where the words are not ſpoken *of God, but of God's People*; and *if this be ſaid of God's People*, they hope it may be ſaid of Chriſt too, without *concluding from thence, that Chriſt is the ſupreme God.* But we muſt *conclude* from hence, that theſe are far from being *wiſe Interpreters*; for what conſequence is this, *the Angels worſhip God's People*, therefore Chriſt is ſuperiour to Angels?

Hiſt. of the Unit. p.17.

Defence of of the Hiſt. of Unitar. p. 35.

Heb. 1. 8. *Thy Throne O God is for ever and ever*, i. e. ſay they, *God is thy Throne for ever.* And ſo they relate not *to Chriſt* but *to God.* And to what purpoſe then are they brought?

Hiſt. of the Unit. p.16.

Heb. 1. 10. *Thou Lord in the beginning haſt laid the foundation of the Earth, and the Heavens are the work of thy Hands. Theſe words*, ſay they, *are to be underſtood not*

Ibid. p.17.

not of Chriſt, but of God. Which is to charge the Apoſtle with arguing out of the old Teſtament very impertinently. Is this *interpreting the Scriptures like wiſe Men?* Is it not rather expoſing and ridiculing them?

2. *Is this to interpret Scripture like wiſe Men*, to give ſuch a forced Senſe of *the beginning of S.* John*'s Goſpel*, as was never thought of from the writing of it, till ſome in the laſt Age thought it neceſſary to avoid the proof of Chriſt's Divinity from it. For the Λόγος was never taken, in the Senſe they put upon it, for him that *was to preach the Word* in S. *John*'s time; but the ſignification of it was then well underſtood from the *Alexandrian School* (as appears by *Philo*) whence it was brought by *Cerinthus* into thoſe parts of *Aſia*, where S. *John* lived when he wrote his Goſpel: and one of themſelves confeſſes, that *Cerinthus* did by the Λόγος mean *ſomething divine, which reſted upon, and inhabited the Perſon of Jeſus, and was that power by which God created original Matter and made the World, but as the Chriſt or the Word deſcended on Jeſus at his Baptiſm, ſo it left him at his Crucifixion.* That which I obſerve from hence is, that there was a known and current

Anſwer to Dr. Wallis *his Letter*, p. 9.

Anſwer to my Sermon, p. 9.

Reflections on Dr. Bull, *p.* 39. 46.

current Senſe of the Λόγος at the time of *S. John*'s writing his Goſpel, very different from that *of a Preacher of the Word of God*; and therefore I cannot but think it the wiſeſt way of *interpreting S.* John, to underſtand him in a Senſe then *commonly known*; and ſo he affirms the Λόγος to have been *in the beginning*, i. e. before the Creation (for he ſaith afterwards, *All things were made by him*) and that *he was with God, and was God*; and this Word did not inhabit *Jeſus*, as *Cerinthus* held, but *was made Fleſh and dwelt among us.* And ſo S. *John* clearly aſſerted the *Divinity* and *Incarnation of the Son of God.* And in all the Diſputes afterwards with *Paulus Samoſatenus* and *Photinus*, it appears, that they underſtood the Λόγος not for any *mere Man*, but for ſome *Divine Power*, which reſted upon the Perſon of *Jeſus*. So that this was a very late, and I think no very *Wiſe Interpretation* of S. *John*. And even *Sandius* confeſſes, *That* Socinus *his Senſe was wholly new and unheard of in the ancient Church; not only among the Fathers, but the Hereticks*, as I have before obſerved. For they agreed (except their good Friends the *Alogi* who went the ſureſt way to work) that by the Word *no mere Man was underſtood. Let them* Sand p. 93.

them produce one if they can, ſaith *Sandius* (even the learned and judicious *Sandius.*) Did they all *interpret the Scriptures like Fools, and not like wiſe Men*? But if the *Chriſtian Interpreters were ſuch Fools*; what think they of the *Deiſts*, whom they ſeem to have a better opinion of, as to their *Wiſdom*? What, if Men without Biaſs of Intereſt, or Education think ours the more proper and agreeable Senſe?

Anſwer to Archbiſh. P. 54.

The late Archbiſhop to this purpoſe had mention'd *Amelius the Platoniſt, as an indifferent Judge.* But what ſay our *Wiſe Interpreters* to this? Truly they ſay, *That the Credit of the* Trinitarian *Cauſe runs very low, when an uncertain Tale of an obſcure* Platoniſt *of no reputation for Learning or Wit, is made to be a good part of the Proof which is alledged for theſe Doctrines.* If a Man happen to ſtand in their way, he muſt be content with ſuch a Character as they will be pleaſed to give him. If he had deſpiſed S. *John's Goſpel*, and manner of expreſſion, he had been as *Wiſe* as the *Alogi*; but notwithſtanding the extraordinary Character given of Friend *Amelius* (as they call him) by *Euſebius*, by *Porphyrius*, by *Proclus*, and by *Damaſcius*, this very Saying of his ſinks his Reputation for ever with them. What would

Euſeb. Præp Evang. *l.* 11. *c.* 18.

would *Julian* have given for ſuch a *Wiſe Interpretation of* S. *John*? when he cannot deny, but that he did ſet up the *Divinity of Chriſt* by theſe Expreſſions; and upbraids the *Chriſtians* of *Alexandria, for giving Worſhip to Jeſus as the Word and God*? With what ſatisfaction would he have received ſuch a Senſe of his Words; when he Complemented *Photinus* for denying the *Divinity of Chriſt*; while other *Chriſtians* aſſerted it? Cyril. *c.* Julian. *l.* 10. *p.* 427. 335. Julian ep. 51. Facund. *l.* 4. *p.* 163.

But they do not by any means deal fairly with the late Archbiſhop as to the Story of *Amelius*; for they bring it in, as if he had laid the weight of the Cauſe upon it; whereas he only mentions it, as a Confirmation, of a probable Conjecture, *That* Plato *had the Notion of the Word of God from the* Jews; *becauſe that was a Title which the* Jews *did commonly give to the Meſſias, as he proves from* Philo, *and the* Chaldee *Paraphraſt*. To which they give no manner of Anſwer. But they affirm in anſwer to my Sermon, *p.* 9. That *Socinus* his Senſe was, *That Chriſt was called the Word, becauſe he was the Bringer or Meſſenger of God's Word*. But were not the *Jews* to underſtand it in the Senſe it was known among them? And if the *Chaldee* Paraphraſt had uſed it in that

that Senſe, he would never have applied it to a Divine Subſiſtence, as upon Examination it will appear that he doth. Of which *Rittangel* gives a very good Account, who had been a *Jew* and was very well skilled in their ancient Learning. He tells us, That he had a Diſcourſe with a learned *Unitarian* upon this Subject, who was particularly acquainted with the Eaſtern Languages; and he endeavoured to prove, *That there was nothing in the* Chaldee *Paraphraſts* uſe of מימרא, *becauſe it was promiſcuouſly uſed by him for* דבר *where it was applied to God.* This *Rittangel* denied; and offer'd to prove, that the Chaldee *Paraphraſt* did never uſe that Word in a common manner, but as it was appropriated to a Divine Subſiſtence. He produces ſeveral places where מימרא יי is put, and nothing anſwering to *Word* in the *Hebrew*, as *Gen.* 20. 21. The *Chaldee* hath it, *The Word of Jehovah ſhall be my God*, Exod. 2. 25. And *Jehovah* ſaid, *He would redeem them by his Word*, Exod. 6. 8. *Your murmurings are not againſt us, but againſt the Word of Jehovah*, Exod. 19. 17. *And Moſes brought the People out to meet the Word of Jehovah*, Levit. 26. 46. *Theſe are the Statutes and Judgments, and Laws, which Jehovah gave between his Word and the*

Rittangel *in* Jezirah *p.* 96.

the Children of Iſrael by the hand of Moſes, Numb. 11. 20. *Ye have deſpiſed the Word of Jehovah whoſe Divinity dwelt among you*, Num. 23. 21. *The Word of Jehovah is with him, and the Divinity of their King is among them*, Deut. 1. 30. *The Word of Jehovah ſhall fight for you*, Deut. 2. 7. *Theſe forty years the Word of Jehovah hath been with thee*, Deut. 1. 32. *Ye did not believe in the Word of Jehovah your God*, Deut. 4. 24. *Jehovah thy God, his Word is a conſuming fire*, Deut. 5. 5. *I ſtood between the Word of Jehovah and you, to ſhew you the Word of the Lord*, Deut. 32. 6. 8. *Jehovah thy God, his Word ſhall go with thee*, with many other places, which he brings out of *Moſes* his Writings; and there are multitudes to the ſame purpoſe in the other Books of Scripture; which ſhews, ſaith he, that this Term *the Word of God*, was ſo appropriated for many Ages; as appears by all the *Chaldee Paraphraſts* and the ancient Doctors of the *Jews*. And he ſhews by ſeveral places, that the *Chaldee Paraphraſt* did not once render דבר by ממרא when there was occaſion for it; no, not when the Word of God is ſpoken of with reſpect to a Prophet; as he proves by many Teſtimonies; which are particularly enumerated by him. The reſult of the

Conference was, that the *Unitarian* had ſo much Ingenuity to confeſs, *That unleſs thoſe Words had another Senſe, their Cauſe was loſt; and our Faith had a ſure Foundation.*

Morinus Exerc. Bibl. *l.* 3. Exerc. 8. *c.* 6.

But it may be objected that *Morinus* hath ſince taken a great deal of pains to prove the *Chaldee Paraphraſts, not to have been of that Antiquity, which they have been ſuppoſed by the Jews to be of.*

In anſwer to this, we may ſay in general, that *Morinus* his great Proofs are againſt another *Chaldee Paraphraſt* of very ſmall reputation, *viz.* of *Jonathan* upon the Law; and not that of *Onkelos*, which *Rittangel* relied upon in this Matter. And none can deny this to have been very ancient; but the *Jews* have ſo little knowledge of their own Hiſtory, but what is in Scripture, that very little certainty can be had from them. But we muſt compare the Circumſtances of things, if we would come to any reſolution in this Matter. Now it is certain, that *Philo* the *Alexandrian Jew*, who lived ſo very near our Saviours time, had the ſame Notion of *the Word of God*, which is in the *Chaldee Paraphraſt:* whoſe Teſtimonies have been produced by ſo many already, that I need not to repeat them.

And

And *Euſebius* ſaith, *The* Jews *and* Chriſtians *had the ſame Opinion as to Chriſt, till the former fell off from it in oppoſition to the* Chriſtians; and he particularly inſtances in his *Divinity*. But if *Morinus* his Opinion be embraced, as to the lateneſs of theſe *Chaldee Paraphraſes*, this inconvenience will neceſſarily follow, *viz.* That the *Jews* when they had changed ſo much their Opinions, ſhould inſert thoſe Paſſages themſelves which aſſert the *Divinity of the Word*. And it can hardly enter into any man's head that conſiders the Humour of the Jewiſh Nation, to think, that after they knew what S. *John* had written concerning *the Word*; and what uſe the *Chriſtians* made of it to prove *the Divinity of Chriſt*, they ſhould purpoſely inſert ſuch paſſages in that *Paraphraſe* of the Law which was in ſuch eſteem among them, that *Elias Levita* ſaith, *They were under Obligation to read two* Paraſcha's *out of it every Week, together with the Hebrew Text.* Now, who can imagine that the *Jews* would do this upon any other account, than that it was deliver'd down to them, by ſo ancient a Tradition, that they durſt not diſcontinue it. And it is obſerved in the place of Scripture which our Saviour read in the Synagogue, that

Euſebius Dem. Evang. l. 4. c. 1.

Bichin. Happe-raſch p. 21.

he ſollow'd neither the Hebrew nor the Greek, but in probability the *Chaldee Paraphraſe*; and the Words he uſed upon the Croſs, were in the *Chaldee* Dialect.

The later *Jews* have argued againſt the *Trinity*, and the *Divinity* of *Chriſt* like any *Unitarians*, as appears by the Collection out of *Joſeph Albo*, *David Kimchi*, &c. publiſhed by *Genebrard*, with his Anſwers to them. And is it any ways likely, that thoſe who were ſo much ſet againſt theſe Doctrines, ſhould themſelves put in ſuch Expreſſions, which juſtifie what the *Evangeliſt* ſaith about *the Word*, *being in the Beginning*, *being with God*, *and being God?*

Paris, A. D. 1566.

The Subſtance of what I have ſaid, as to S. *John*'s Notion of the *Word*, is this; That there is no colour for the Senſe which *Socinus* hath put upon it; either from the uſe of it among other Authors, or any Interpretation among the Jews. But that there was in his time a current ſenſe of it, which from the Jews of *Alexandria*, was diſperſed by *Cerinthus* in thoſe parts where he lived. That for ſuch a Notion there was a very ancient Tradition among the Jews, which appears in the moſt ancient Paraphraſe of the Law, which is read in their Synagogues. And therefore according to all reaſonable ways of inter-

interpreting Scripture, the *Word* cannot be underſtood in S. *John*, for one whoſe Office it was *to preach the Word*, but for that *Word* which *was with God* before any thing was made, and *by whom all things were made.*

3. Is this *to interpret Scripture like wiſe Men*, to give a new Senſe of ſeveral Places of Scripture from *a matter of Fact* of which there is no proof, the better to avoid the proof of the Divinity of the Son of God?

This relates to the ſame beginning of S. *John's Goſpel*, *the Word was with God*; and ſeveral other places, making mention of his deſcent from Heaven. The ſenſe which theſe wiſe interpreters put upon them is, that Chriſt *was rapt up into Heaven, before he entred upon his Preaching.* But where is this ſaid? What proof, what Evidence, what credible Witneſſes of it, as there were of his *Tranſfiguration*, *Reſurrection* and *Aſcenſion*? Nothing like any Proof is offer'd for it; but it is a *wiſe Way* they think of avoiding a preſſing difficulty.

Joh. 1. 1. 3. 13. 6. 38, 62. 8. 42.

Anſwer to the Archbiſhop's Serm. p. 56.

Anſwer to my Sermon, p. 10.

But they have a farther reach in it, *viz.* to ſhew how Chriſt, being a *mere Man*, ſhould be qualified for ſo great an undertaking as the founding the Chriſtian

Church; and therefore they ſay, *That before our Lord entred upon his Office of the Meſſias, he was taken up to Heaven to be inſtructed in the Mind and will of God* (as Moſes *was into the Mount*, Exod. 24. 1,2,12.) *and from thence deſcended to execute his Office, and declare the ſaid Will of God.* In another place, *That when it is ſaid, the Word was with God*; that is, *the Lord Chriſt was taken up into Heaven to be inſtructed in all points relating to his Ambaſſage or Miniſtry.* In a third, they ſay, *That our Saviour before he entred upon his Miniſtry, aſcended into Heaven,* as Moſes *did into the Mount, to be inſtructed in all things belonging to the Goſpel Doctrine and Polity which he was to eſtabliſh and adminiſter.* Now conſidering what ſort of Perſon they make Chriſt to have been, *viz. a meer Man*; this was not ill thought of by them; to ſuppoſe him *taken up into Heaven and there inſtructed in what he was to teach and to do,* as Moſes *was into the Mount* before he gave the Law. But here lies a mighty difference; when *Moſes* was called up *into the Mount*, the People had publick notice given of it; and *he took* Aaron *and his Sons, and Seventy Elders of* Iſrael with him; *who ſaw the Glory of God*, v. 10. *And all* Iſrael *beheld the*

Hiſt. of the Unit. p. 29.

Anſwer to my Sermon, p. 9.

Anſ. to the Archbiſhop, p. 56.

the Glory of the Lord as a devouring Fire on the Top of the Mount, v. 17. and after the 40 days were over, it is ſaid, *That* Moſes *came down from the Mount, and the Children of* Iſrael *ſaw him with his Face ſhining*, Exod. 34. 40. Now if Chriſt were *taken up into Heaven*, as Moſes *was into the Mount*, why was it not made publick at that time? why no Witneſſes? why no Appearance of the Glory to ſatisfie Mankind of the truth of it? And yet we find, that when he was *transfigured on the holy Mount, he took* Peter, *and* James, *and* John *with him*; which circumſtance is carefully mention'd by the *Evangeliſts*. And *Peter*, who was one of the *Witneſſes* then preſent, lays great weight upon this being done in *the preſence of Witneſſes*. *For we have not follow'd cunningly deviſed Fables, when we made known unto you the Power and coming of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, but were Eye-witneſſes of his Majeſty. For he received from God the Father, Honour and Glory, when there came ſuch a voice to him from the excellent Glory ——. And this voice which came from Heaven we heard, when we were with him in the holy Mount.* Now let any one compare this with the account which they give of *Chriſt's A-*

Matt. 17. 1. Mar. 9. 2. Luk. 9. 28.

2 Pet. 1. 16.

17.

18.

ſcenſion into Heaven. The *Transfiguration* was intended only for a particular Teſtimony of God's Favour, before his ſuffering; but even in that, he took care there ſhould be very credible Witneſſes of it. And is it then poſſible to believe, there ſhould be ſuch an *Aſcenſion of Chriſt into Heaven*, for no leſs a purpoſe, than *to be inſtructed in his Ambaſſage, and to underſtand the Mind and Will of God as to his Office*; and yet not one of the Evangeliſts give any account of the circumſtances of it? They are very particular, as to his Birth, Faſting, Baptiſm, Preaching, Miracles, Sufferings, Reſurrection and Aſcenſion; but not one Word among them all as to the circumſtances of his *being taken up into Heaven* for ſo great a purpoſe? If it were neceſſary to be believed, why is it not more plainly revealed? Why not the time and place mention'd in Scripture, as well as of his *Faſting* and *Temptation*? Who can imagine it conſiſtent with that *Sincerity* and *Faithfulneſs* of the Writers of the *New Teſtament*, to conceal ſo material a part of Chriſt's Inſtructions and Qualifications; and to wrap it up in ſuch doubtful Expreſſions, that none ever found out this meaning till the days of *Socinus*? *Enjedinus* mentions

tions it only as *a poſſible Senſe*; but he confeſſes, *That the New Teſtament ſaith nothing at all of it*; *but*, ſaith he, *neither doth it mention other things before he entred upon his Office.* But this is a very weak Evaſion, for this was of greateſt importance with reſpect to his Office, more than his *Baptiſm*, *Faſting* and *Temptation*; yet theſe are very fully ſet down. Enjed. in Joh. 6. 62.

And after all, our *Unitarians* themſelves ſeem to miſtruſt their own *Interpretations*; for in their *anſwer to my Sermon*, they ſay, *it is not the Doctrine of all the* Unitarians, *and refer me to another account given of theſe Texts in the Hiſtory of the* Unitarians. There indeed I find *Grotius* his interpretation (as they call it) preſer'd before that of *Socinus*. But they ſay, *Grotius was Socinian all over, and that his Annotations are a compleat Syſtem of Socinianiſm*; *and his Notes on the firſt of S.* John *are written artificially, but the Senſe at the bottom is theirs.* In ſhort *That the Word, according to* Grotius, *is not an eternal Son of God, but the Power and Wiſdom of God*; *which abiding without meaſure on the Lord Chriſt, is therefore ſpoken of as a Perſon and as one with Chriſt, and he with that. And this Notion of the Word*

Anſwer to my Sermon, p. 10.

Hiſtory of the Unit. p. 26.

P. 11.

P. 28.

Word leads a man through all the difficulties of this Chapter, with far more eaſe than any hitherto offer'd. But theſe *wiſe Interpreters* have as much miſinterpreted *Grotius*, as they have done the *Scriptures*, as I ſhall make it appear.

(1.) *Grotius* on *John* 6. 62. interprets *Chriſt's Aſcenſion into Heaven*, of his *corporal Aſcent* thither after his *Reſurrection*, where the Λόγος or *Word* was before, of whom it is ſaid, *That the Word was with God.* But how comes Chriſt to aſſume that to *himſelf* which belong'd *to the Word?* He anſwers, *Why not, ſince we call Body and Soul by the Name of the Man?* But if no more were meant by the Word, but a divine Attribute of *Wiſdom* and *Power*, what colour could there be for the *Son of Man* taking that to himſelf, which belonged to an Attribute of God? What ſtrange way of arguing would this have been? *What, and if ye ſhall ſee the Son of Man aſcending where he was before?* For according to this Senſe, how comes a divine Attribute to be called the *Son of Man?* How could the *Son of Man* be ſaid *to aſcend* thither, where a divine Attribute was before? The words ὅπου ἦν τὸ πρότερον, muſt relate to *him* ſpoken of before; and how could the Power and Wiſdom

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of God be ever ſaid to be the *Son of Man*? But if we ſuppoſe a perſonal Union of the Word with the human Nature in Chriſt, then we have a very reaſonable Senſe of the Words; for then no more is imply'd, but that Chriſt, as conſiſting of both Natures, ſhould aſcend thither, where the *Word was before*; when it is ſaid, that *the Word was with God*; and ſo *Grotius* underſtands it.

(2.) *Grotius* doth not make *the Word* in *the beginning of S.* John's *Goſpel to be a mere Attribute of Wiſdom and Power*, but *the eternal Son of God*. This I ſhall prove from his own Words.

1. He aſſerts in his *Preface* to *S. John's Goſpel*, that the chief cauſe of his writing was univerſally agreed to have been to prevent the ſpreading of that Venom which had been then diſperſed in the Church; which he underſtands of the *Hereſies* about Chriſt and the Word. Now among theſe, the Hereſie of *Cerinthus* was this very Opinion which they faſten upon *Grotius*; viz. that the *Word was the Divine Wiſdom and Power inhabiting in the Perſon of Jeſus*, as I have ſhew'd before from themſelves. And beſides, *Grotius* ſaith, *That the other Evangeliſts had only intimated the divine Nature of Chriſt from his miraculous Conception, Miracles, knowing Mens Hearts*,

Hearts, perpetual Preſence, promiſe of the Spirit, remiſſion of Sins, &c. *But S.* John, *as the time required, attributed the Name and Power of God to him from the beginning.* So that by the *Name and Power of God*, he means the ſame which he called *the divine Nature* before.

2. He ſaith, that when it is ſaid, *The Word was with God*; it ought to be underſtood as *Ignatius* explains it, *with the Father*; what can this mean, unleſs he underſtood the Word to be *the eternal Son of God?* And he quotes *Tertullian*, ſaying that *he is the Son of God, and God* ex unitate Subſtantiæ; *and that there was a Prolation of the Word without Separation.* Now what *Prolation* can there be of a meer Attribute? How can that be ſaid to be *the Son of God begotten of the Father, without Diviſion, before all Worlds*, as he quotes it from *Juſtin Martyr?* And that *he is the Word, and God of God*, from *Theophilus Antiochenus?* And in the next Verſe, when it is ſaid, *The ſame was in the beginning with God*; it is repeated on purpoſe, ſaith he, That we might conſider, that God is ſo to be underſtood, that a Diſtinction is to be made between *God, with whom he was, and the Word who was with God*; *ſo that the Word doth not comprehend all that is God.* But

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our *Wiſe Interpreters* put a ridiculous Senſe upon it; as though all that *Grotius* meant was, *That Gods Attributes are the ſame with himſelf* (which although true in it ſelf, is very impertinent to *Grotius* his purpoſe) and that the Reaſon why he ſaith, *That the Word is not all that God is*, was, *becauſe there were other Attributes of God beſides.* But where doth *Grotius* ſay any thing like this? Is this *Wiſe interpreting?* or honeſt and fair dealing? For *Grotius* immediately takes notice from thence of the Difference of *Hypoſtaſes*; which he ſaith was taken from the *Platoniſts*, but with *a change of the Senſe.*

3. When it is ſaid, *v.* 3. *That all things were made by him*; *Grotius* underſtands it of *the old Creation, and of the Son of God.* For, he quotes a paſſage of *Barnabas*, where he ſaith, *The Sun is the Work of his hands*; and ſeveral paſſages of the *Fathers* to prove, *That the World and all things in it were created by him*; and he adds, *That nothing but God himſelf is excepted.* What ſay our *Wiſe Interpreters* to all this? Nothing at all to the purpoſe; but they cite *the Engliſh Geneva Tranſlation* (when they pretend to give *Grotius* his Senſe) and add, *That the Word now begins to be ſpoken of as a Perſon*

Perſon by the ſame Figure of Speech, that Solomon *ſaith, Wiſdom hath builded her houſe,*&c. Doth *Grotius* ſay any thing like this? And yet they ſay, *Let us hear* Grotius *interpreting this ſublime Proeme of S.*John's *Goſpel.* But they leave out what he ſaith, and put in what he doth not ſay; is not this *interpreting like Wiſe men?*

4. *The Word was made fleſh,* v. 14. i.e. ſay the *Unitarians* as from *Grotius*; *It did abode on, and inhabit a humane Perſon, the Perſon of Jeſus Chriſt*; *and ſo was in appearance made fleſh or man.* But what ſaith *Grotius* himſelf? *The Word that he might bring us to God, ſhew'd himſelf in the Weakneſs of humane Nature*; *and he quotes the words of S.*Paul *for it,* 1 Tim. 3. 16. *God was manifeſt in the fleſh:* and then produces ſeveral Paſſages of the Fathers to the ſame purpoſe. Is not this a rare *Specimen* of *Wiſe interpreting*, and *Fair dealing* with ſo conſiderable a Perſon, and ſo well known, as *Grotius?* Who, after all, in a Letter to his intimate Friend *Ger. J. Voſſius*, declares that he owned the *Doctrine of the Trinity*; both in his *Poems* and his *Catechiſm*, after his reviewing them; which Epiſtle is Printed before the laſt Edition of his Book about *Chriſt's Satisfaction*; as an account to the World of *his*

H. Grot. Opuſc. p. 294. T. 3.

his Faith as to the Trinity. And in the laſt Edition of his *Poems*, but little before his Death, he gives a very different Account of *the Son of God* from what theſe *Unitarians* faſten upon him. And now let the World judge, how *wiſely* they have *interpreted* both S. *John*, and his Commentator *Grotius*?

Chriſte caput rerum viræ melioris Origo,
Immenſi menſura Patris, quem mente Suprema
Miratus ſeſe Genitor, de Lumine Lumen
Fundit, & æquali ſe ſpectat imagine totum.
H. Grot. Syl. *p.* 8. *Ed.* 1643.

IV. Is this *to interpret Scripture like Wiſe men*, to make our Saviour's meaning to be expreſsly contrary to his Words? For when he ſaid: *Before Abraham was, I am*; they make the Senſe to be that really he was not, but only *in God's Decree*, as any other man may be ſaid to be. This place the late *Archbiſhop* (who was very far from being a *Socinian*, however his Memory hath been very unworthily reproached in that, as well as other Reſpects, ſince his Death) urged againſt the *Socinians*, ſaying, *That the obvious ſenſe of the Words is, that he had a real Exiſtence, before* Abraham *was actually in Being, and that their Interpretation about the Decree is ſo very flat, that he can hardly abſtain from ſaying it is ridiculous.* And the wiſe Anſwer they give is, *That the words cannot be true in any other Senſe, being ſpoken* Joh. 8. 58.

Anſwer to the Archbiſhop. p. 58.

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of one who was a Son, and Deſcendant of Abraham. Which is as ridiculous as the Interpretation; for it is to take it for granted, he was no more than a *Son of Abraham.*

V. Is this *to interpret Scripture like Wiſe men,* to ſay, that when our Saviour
Joh. 10. 36. ſaid in his Conference with the *Jews, I am the Son of God,* his chief meaning was,
Anſwer to Milb. *p.* 31. *That he was the Son of God in ſuch a Senſe, as all the faithful are called Gods Children?* Is not this doing great Honour to our Saviour? Eſpecially when they ſay, *That he never ſaid of himſelf any higher thing than*
Ib. *p.* 30. *this, which is true of every good man, I am the Son of God.* And yet the *Jews* accuſed him of *Blaſphemy, for making himſelf the Son of God*; and the High Prieſt adju-
Joh. 19. 7. Matt. 26. 63. red him to tell, *Whether he were the Chriſt the Son of God.*

Did they mean no more, but *as any Good man is?*

Selden de Jure Nat. & Gent. *l.* 2. *c.* 12. Pocock Not. Miſcel. ad Maim. *p.* 307, &c. But Mr. *Selden* ſaith, that by *the Son of God the* Jews *meant, the Word of God* (*as he is called in the* Chaldee Paraphraſt) *which was all one, as to profeſs himſelf God:* And our learned Dr. *Pocock* ſaith, that *according to the Senſe of the ancient Jews, the Son of God ſpoken of,* Pſal. 2. *was the eternal Son of God, of the ſame Subſtance with the Father.* And

And by this we may understand *S. Peter's* Confession, *Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God*; and *Nathanael's*, *Thou art the Son of God.* But it is plain the *Jews* in the Conference thought *he made himself God*, by saying, *I and my Father are One. Not one God*, say our *Wise Interpreters, but as Friends are said to be One.* And what must they think of our Saviour the mean time, who knew the *Jews* understood him quite otherwise, and would not undeceive them? Matt. 16. 16. S. Joh. 6. 69. 1. 49. 10. 30. 33. *Hist. of* Unitar. p. 29.

But they say, *The* Jews *put a malicious Construction upon his Words.* How doth that appear? Do they think the *Jews* had not heard what passed before in some former Conferences, when they thought he had made himself *equal with God*; and that he said, *That all Men should honour the Son, even as they honoured the Father?* *Answer to* Milb. p. 29. Joh. 5. 18. 23.

These sayings no doubt stuck with them; and therefore from them, they had Reason to think that he meant something extraordinary, by his saying, *I and my Father are One.* And if they were so *Wise* in *interpreting Scripture*, as they pretend, they would have considered, that if these things did not imply his being really the Son of God, according to the old Jewish Notion, he would have severely checked any such

Miſ-conſtructions of his meaning, and have plainly told them, he was but *the Son of Man.* But S. *Paul*'s Character of him doth plainly ſhew, that he was far from any thing like Vanity or Oſtentation, *Although he was in the form of God, and thought it no Robbery to be equal with God*; which muſt imply that he was very far from aſſuming any thing to himſelf; which he muſt do in a very high meaſure, if he were not really the Son of God, ſo as to be *equal with God.* The meaning whereof, ſay our *Wiſe Interpreters,* is, *he did not rob God of his Honour by arrogating to himſelf to be God, or equal with God.* But what then do they think of theſe paſſages in his *Conferences* with the *Jews?* Was he not bound to undeceive them, when he knew they did ſo groſsly miſ-underſtand him, if he knew himſelf to be a *meer Man* at the ſame time? This can never go down with me, for they muſt either Charge him with affecting Divine Honour, which is the higheſt Degree of Pride and Vanity, or they muſt own him to be, as he was, *The eternal Son of God.*

Phil. 2. 6, 7.

Hiſt. of Unitar. *p.* 38.

VI. Is this *Interpreting Scripture like Wiſe men,* to deny *Divine Worſhip* to be given to our Saviour when the Scripture ſo plainly requires it? When I had urged them

them in my *Sermon* with the Argument from *Divine Worſhip* being given to Chriſt; they do utterly *deny, it,* and ſay, *I may as well charge them with the blackeſt Crimes.* This I was not a little ſurprized at, knowing how warmly *Socinus* had diſputed for it. But that I might not miſunderſtand them, I look'd into other places in their late Books, and from them I gather theſe things. *Anſwer to Serm. p. 13.*

1. *They make no Queſtion but ſome Worſhip is due to the Lord Chriſt, but the Queſtion is concerning the kind or ſort of Worſhip.* *Anſwer to Mil. p. 49.*

2. *They diſtinguiſh three ſorts of Worſhip.* 1. *Civil Worſhip from Men to one another.* 2. *Religious Worſhip given on the account of a Perſons Holineſs, or Relation to God; which is more or leſs, according to their Sanctity or nearer Relation to God.* 3. *Divine Worſhip which belongs only to God; which conſiſts in a Reſignation of our Underſtandings, Wills and Affections, and ſome peculiar Acts of Reverence and Love towards him. The two former may be given to Chriſt,* they ſay, *but not the laſt.*

From whence it follows, that they cannot according to their own Principles, *reſign their Underſtandings, Wills, and Affections* to Chriſt; becauſe this is *proper Divine Worſhip.* Are not theſe very good

Chriſtians the mean while? How can they believe ſincerely, and heartily what he hath revealed, unleſs they *reſign their Underſtandings* to him; How can they Love and Eſteem him, and place their Happineſs in him, if they cannot *reſign their Wills and affections* to him? I think never any who pretended to be Chriſtians, durſt venture to ſay ſuch things before, and all for fear they ſhould be thought to give *Divine Worſhip to Chriſt.*

But they confeſs, *That they are divided among themſelves about the Invocation of*
Ib. Col. 1. *Chriſt. Thoſe who are for it*, ſay, *That he may be the object of Prayer, without making him God, or a Perſon of God, and without aſcribing to him the Properties of the Divine Nature, Omnipreſence, Omniſcience, or Omnipotence. Thoſe who deny it*, they ſay, *do only refuſe it, becauſe they ſuppoſe he hath forbidden it, which makes it a meer Error. And in the New Teſtament*, they ſay, *The Charge is frequently renewed, that*
Anſwer to Archbiſhop Serm. p. 25. P. 59. *they are to Worſhip God only.* And as great Writers as they have been theſe laſt ſeven years, they affirm that, *They have wrote no Book in that time, in which they have not been careful to profeſs to all the World, that a like Honour or Worſhip (much leſs the ſame) is not to be given to Chriſt as to God.*

And

And now I hope we underſtand their opinion right as to this matter. The queſtion is, Whether this be *interpreting thoſe Scriptures* which ſpeak of the *Honour and Worſhip due to Chriſt, like wiſe Men?* And for that I ſhall conſider,

1. That herein they are gone off from the opinion of *Socinus* and his Followers, as to the *Senſe of Scripture* in thoſe places.

2. That they have done it in ſuch a way, as will juſtifie the *Pagan* and *Popiſh Idolatry*; and therefore have not *interpreted Scripture like wiſe Men*

1. That they are gone off from the opinion of *Socinus* and his followers, who did allow *divine Worſhip* to Chriſt. This appears by the diſputes he had with *Franciſcus Davidis* and *Chriſtianus Francken* about it. The former was about the *Senſe of Scripture*. *Socinus* produced all thoſe places which mention *the Invocation of Chriſt*, and all thoſe wherein S. *Paul* ſaith, *The Grace of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt be with you all*; and *the Lord Jeſus Chriſt direct our way*, &c. and all thoſe wherein a divine Power and Authority is given to Chriſt as head of the Church, for the ſupport of the Faith and Hope of all thoſe who believe in him in order to Salvation. And this *Socinus* truly judged to be

proper divine Worſhip. *Georg. Blandrata* was unſatisfied, that *Socinus* did not ſay enough to prove the neceſſity of the Invocation of Chriſt, which he ſaid he could do *from his Prieſthood and his Power, from the Examples of the Apoſtles, and the very Nature of Adoration.* And *Blandrata* was a Man of great authority among the *Unitarians*; and he thought *Socinus* ought to aſſert the *neceſſity* of it; or elſe he would do *injury both to Chriſt and to his Cauſe.*

In the diſpute with *Francken, Socinus* went upon this ground, that divine Authority was a ſufficient ground for divine Worſhip, although there were not thoſe eſſential Attributes of *Omniſciency* and *Omnipotency.* But I obſerve that *Socinus* did not look on this as a matter of Liberty, as our *Unitarians* now ſeem to do; for in the Preface to the former Diſpute, he calls the Error of denying the Invocation of Chriſt, not, as they now do, a *ſimple Error* or a *meer miſtake*; but a *moſt filthy and pernicious Error, an Error that leads to Judaiſm, and is in effect the denying of Chriſt*; and in the latter Diſpute he ſaith, *That it tends to Epicuriſm and Atheiſm.* And *Smalcius* ſaith, *That they are no Chriſtians who refuſe giving divine Worſhip to Chriſt.*

De divin. Chriſti, c. 24.

2. Is

2. Is it *like wiſe Men*, to go upon ſuch grounds as will juſtifie both *Pagan* and *Popiſh Idolatry*? This they have been charged with, and we ſhall ſee what wiſe Men they are, by the Defences they make for themſelves.

1. As to *Pagan Idolatry*, they ſay,

1. *They had no divine command for ſuch a Worſhip.* This was well thought of, when they confeſs, that ſome among themſelves deny that there is any command for invocating Chriſt, and therefore they muſt charge all thoſe who do it with Idolatry. But this is no very wiſe Notion of Idolatry, which depends upon the Nature of the Worſhip, and not the meer poſitive Will of God. *Defence of the Hiſt. of the* Unit. p. 54.

2. *They ſet up the Creatures more than the Creator, as S.* Paul *ſaith. S. Paul* doth not think them ſuch Fools, that they took the Creatures to be above the Creator, which was impoſſible, while they owned one to be the Creator, and the other the Creatures; but that they gave ſuch acts of Worſhip to them, as belonged only to the Creator, and exceeded in the Worſhip of them thoſe bounds which ought to be between them.

3. *They ſet up an infinite Number of Gods who had been meer Men.* This is, as

if the queſtion were only, whether one, or a great many were to have ſuch Worſhip given them: as if it were a diſpute about a Monarchy or a Common-wealth of Gods. But if it be lawfull to give divine Worſhip to one Creature, it is to a hundred.

4. *Their Worſhip was terminated on them, and ſo they made true Gods of Men.* Suppoſe they aſſerted one ſupreme God, and made the reſt ſubordinate to him, and appointed by him to be the immediate Directors of humane Affairs. I deſire to know, Whether the Adoration of ſuch were Idolatry or not? If it were, they cannot be excuſed who give Adoration to Chriſt, while they eſteem him a mere Creature; if not, all the wiſer Pagans muſt be excuſed.

2. As to the *Papiſts* the difference they make, is not like *wiſe Interpreters of Scripture*; for they ſay,

1. *They have no Text of Scripture, which commands them to worſhip S.* Peter, *S.* Paul *and S.* Francis. So ſome among them ſay, there is none for the Invocation of Chriſt, and with them the caſe is Parallel. But if *Socinus* his Principle be true, that communicated Excellency is a ſufficient Foundation for Worſhip, becauſe it

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is relative to the Giver, then the Papiſts muſt be juſtified in all their relative Acts of Worſhip without any Text to command it.

2. *They exceed the Bounds of Honour and Reſpect due to glorified Saints.* But who is to ſet theſe Bounds but themſelves in all Acts of relative Worſhip, becauſe they depend upon the intention of the Perſons? And they hold the very ſame things concerning communicated Knowledge and Power from God, which our *Unitarians* make uſe of to juſtifie their Notion of the Invocation of Chriſt.

VII. Is this *interpreting Scripture like wiſe Men*, to turn S. *Paul*'s words, *Of whom as concerning the Fleſh Chriſt came, who is over all, God bleſſed for ever*, into a Thankſgiving to God for the Exaltation of Chriſt, *i. e. God who is over all be bleſſed for ever.* But what reaſon do they give for ſuch a forced and unuſual Senſe, beſides the avoiding the difficulty of having the Name of *God* given here to Chriſt? A very ſubſtantial one. *If the words had been intended of Chriſt, it would have been in the Greek* ὃς ὢν and not ὁ ὢν, which they have taken up from *Eraſmus* and *Curcellæus*. But *Beza*, who underſtood Greek as well as either, (and *Curcellæus* owned him

Rom. 9. 5. *Hiſt. of the Unit. p.* 35.

Anſwer to Mlib. p. 35.

him for his Maſter in that Tongue) ſaith, *He could not ſufficiently wonder at this Criticiſm of* Eraſmus, and *thinks it a violent and far fetched Interpretation, and not agreeable to the Greek Idiom*, and that ὁ ὢν is the ſame there with ὃς ἐστι. And which may ſignifie more to our *Unitarians*, one of the learnedſt Men they have had among them, utterly diſowns this Interpretation, and ſaith, *That the whole Verſe belongs to Chriſt.* But if that will not do, they have another fetch in the caſe, *viz. That it is very probable that the word God was not originally in the Text.* How doth this appear to be *very probable*? Of that, we have this account: *Grotius obſerves, that the Greek Copies uſed by the Author of the Syriac, had not the word God, and that* Eraſmus *had noted, that the Copies of S.* Cyprian, *S.* Hilary *and S.* Chryſoſtom *had only bleſſed over all, or above all, without the word God; upon which he charges his Adverſary with no leſs than Impiety in concealing this*; and calls it, *cheating his Reader.* But how if all this prove a groſs Miſtake in him; unleſs it be only, that *Grotius* and *Eraſmus* come in for their ſhares. It's true, that *Grotius* ſaith, *That the word God was left out in the Syriac Verſion.* But *F. Simon*, whoſe authority they

Ante-Nicen. p. 29, 78.

Anſwer to Milb. p. 34.

Anſ. to the Archbiſhop, p. 29.

Anſwer to Milb. p. 3.

they ſometimes magnifie as to *critical Learning*, ſaith plainly, *That was miſtaken, and that the word God is in all the old Copies, and in all the old Verſions.* And upon his bringing *Eraſmus* to prove that it was not in S. *Cyprian*, S. *Hilary*, and S. *Chryſoſtome*, he cries out, *Where is Sincerity?* Eraſmus *had met with one faulty Edition which had it not, but he ſaith, all the reſt of the MSS. have it.* And the learned *Oxford Annotators*, both on S. *Cyprian*, and the *Greek Teſtament* compar'd with MSS. (which excellent Work we hope will ſhortly appear more publickly) declare, that they found it in all the MSS. they could meet with; and even *Eraſmus* himſelf ſaith, *That the Omiſſion in S.* Hilary *might be only by the negligence of the Tranſcribers*; and ſo it appears by the late *Edition* out of the beſt MSS. where the words are, *Ex quibus Chriſtus qui eſt ſuper omnia Deus.* And for S. *Chryſoſtom*, all that is ſaid, is, *That it doth not appear that he read it, but he thinks it might be added afterwards.* But what a ſort of proof is this againſt the general conſent of MSS. for S. *Chryſoſtom* doth not ſay he thought ſo. *Eraſmus* very plainly ſaith, that it is clearer than the Sun, *that Chriſt is called God in other places*

Hiſtoir Critique du Nov. Teſt. To. III. c. 54. p. 813.

Annot. in Cypr. adverſ. Judæos.

Hilar. in Pſal. 122.

places of Scripture; but *Grotius* can by no means be excuſed, nor thoſe that rely upon him as to this place.

VIII. Is this *interpreting Scripture like wiſe Men*, to take advantage of all *Omiſſions* in *Copies*, when thoſe which are entire ought to be preferr'd? This I mention for the ſake of another noted place, 1 *Tim.* 3. 16. *God was manifeſt in the Fleſh.* Here our *wiſe Interpreters* triumph unreaſonably; *viz. For*, they ſay, *it appears by the* Syriac, Latin, Æthiopick, Armenian, Arabick, *and moſt ancient Greek Bibles, that the word God was not originally in this Text but added to it.* But the *Arabick* in all the *Polyglotts* hath *God* in; the *Syriac* and *Æthiopick*, if we believe their Verſions, read it in the Maſculine Gender, and therefore in the King of *Spain*'s Bible, *Guido Fabricius Boderianus* puts in *Deus.* As to the *Armenian*, I have nothing to ſay, but what *F. Simon* tells us from *Uſcan an Armenian Biſhop*; that *there was great variety in their Copies*; *and that their firſt Tranſlation was out of Syriac and not out of Greek.* And the main point is, as to the *old Greek Copies*; and we are aſſured, that there is but One, *viz.* the *Clermont Copy* which leaves out *God*, but that it is in the *Alexandrian*, the

Hiſt. of the Unit. p. 40.

Hiſt. Critique du Nov. To. II. c. 17.

the *Vatican* and all others; and *Curcellæus* mentions no more than the *Clermont Copy*.

It is therefore neceſſary to Examine in this place, the Authority of this *Clermont Copy*, (as it is called) whoſe reading is ſet up againſt all other ancient Greek Copies. *Beza* affirms it with great Confidence, *That all the Greek Copies have God with one Conſent.* But how comes he to take no notice of this Difference of the *Clermont Copy?* For that he had a ſight of that part of it, which hath the Epiſtles of *S. Paul*, appears by his Notes in which he refers to it. For he mentions it three times in his Notes on *Rom.* 1. *v.* 13. 29. 32. and in one he calls it *a very ancient Manuſcript written in large Letters.* What ſhould make *Beza* paſs it over here? It ſeems by *Morinus* that in the *Clermont Copy*, there was a Correction made by another hand; which is put into the *various Lections* of the *Polyglott* in *Morinus* his Words. But how doth it appear, that *Beza's Clermont Copy* was the very ſame which *Morinus* had? *Morinus* ſaith, *he had it from the F. F. Puteani*; (and is the ſame I ſuppoſe with that in the King of *France's* Library; of which they were then the Keepers.) But *Morinus* intimates that it was *an old Copy*,

Verum repugnant perpetuo conſenſu omnes Græci Codices. Bez.

Morinus Exercit. Bibl. *l.* 1. *Ex.* 2. *c.* 4.

Simon. Differt. Sur le MS. du Nov, Teſt. *p.* 14.

Rigalt. vit. P. Puteani, p. 62.

Copy, which fell into their hands; and ſo might come into the French King's Library, when they gave their own *Manuſcripts* to it. This ſeems to have been the ſame which *P. Pithæus* ſpeaks of; for the Deſcription exactly agrees with it; but *Pithæus*, who was a Perſon of great Integrity and Learning, affirms, *That this Volume of the Epiſtles in great Letters came out of the Monaſtery* of *Corbey*; and ſo it could not be the *Clermont Copy* which *Beza* had. And I ſhall make it appear from the very places mention'd by *Morinus*, that *Beza*'s Copy did differ from that which *Morinus* peruſed, as *Rom.* 4. 9. *Morinus* his Copy had μόνον; *Beza* takes notice of it only in the vulgar Latin; which he would never have done, if it had been in the *Clermont Copy*, Rom 5. 6. For ἔτι *Morinus* reads in that Copy εἰς τί, and ſaith it is the true reading: but *Beza* condemns it, and never intimates that his Copy had it, *Rom.* 7. 25. *Morinus* ſaith, the reading of his Copy is the true, χάρις τῷ Θεῷ: *Beza* ſaith, *It is againſt all the Greek Copies but one*, and that hath χάρις ὁ τῷ Θεῷ; whether *Beza* were miſtaken as to other Copies is not our buſineſs to enquire; but if the reading had been in his Copy as *Morinus* found it, he could never have ſaid, that but one Copy had that

P. Pithæ. de Latino Interpret. p. 11.

different

different reading. *Rom.* 8. 13. *Morinus* his Copy had it τῆς σαρκὸς; *Beza* takes no notice of any difference. *Rom.* 10. 8, *Morinus* reads τί λέγει ἡ γραφή. *Beza* ſaith, *It is not in the Greek Copies*; and he had then the *Clermont* by him: but it is both in that of the French King's *Library*, and of S. *Germains*; which agree which each other, where *Beza*'s Copy differs; and *Beza* upon *Rom.* 7. 6. and 11. 6. obſerves, that his *Clermont Copy* differs from the reſt; by which we ſee how careful he was to obſerve the various Readings in it; and ſo upon *Rom.* 15. 24, 33. 16. 27.

Rom. 14. 6. *Beza.* obſerves, *That the vulgar Latin leaves out part of the Verſe, but that it is found in all the Greek Copies*; here *Morinus* charges *Beza* with *Negligence*, or *Diſ-ingenuity*; becauſe it was left out in the *Clermont Copy*; but how doth he prove he had the ſame Copy; He ſaith indeed, *That the ancient Copy, which he had was lent to* Beza; but he tells not by whom, nor in whoſe Poſſeſſion it was afterwards. But if *Beza* were a man of any ordinary Care or Honeſty, he would never have concealed thoſe things, which *Morinus* found in it. 1 *Cor.* 6. 20, *Beza* ſaith, That thoſe words ᾧ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι ὑμῶν, *are in all the Greek Copies*; *Morinus* ſaith, *That they were*

were wanting in that which he made uſe of. It's true, they are wanting in the *Alexandrian*, and ſome others; but in none that *Beza* had the ſight of, if he may be believed. Theſe are ſufficient to ſhew, that there is no good Proof, that the Copy which *Beza* had was the ſame which *Morinus* borrow'd; and therefore his Authority is not to be ſlighted in this matter, when he affirms, that all the Greek Copies agreed in reading *God manifeſt in the fleſh*; and I cannot imagine *Beza* ſo intolerably careleſs as he muſt have been, if *Morinus* his Copy and *Beza's* were the ſame. But whether it were in *Beza's* Copy or not, *it's certain*, they ſay, *That it is not in that ancient Manuſcript, which is called the Clermont Copy*; which is affirmed by *Morinus*, and taken for granted by others, therefore we muſt enquire a little farther into the Authority of this ancient Copy. It appears by thoſe who have view'd and conſider'd them, that there are two very ancient Copies of *S. Paul's* Epiſtles, ſo exactly agreeing, that one is ſuppoſed to be the Tranſcript of the other; one is in the King's Library, the other in the Monaſtery of *S. Germains*. Which *Mabillon* ſaith is a Thouſand years old. Theſe two Copies are in effect

Mabil. de Re Diplomat. *l.* 5. *p.* 346.

effect but one, agreeing ſo much where they differ from others; and having the old Latin Verſion oppoſite to the Greek. Monſieur *Arnauld* had ſo bad an Opinion of both parts of this *Clermont Copy*, (as it is called) that he charges it with manifeſt Forgery, and Impoſture; inſerting things into the Text without ground. *F. Simon* who defends them cannot deny ſeveral things to be inſerted, but he ſaith, it was through Careleſsneſs and not Deſign. But he Confeſſes, *That thoſe who tranſcribed both thoſe ancient Copies of* S. Paul's *Epiſtles did not underſtand Greek, and hardly Latin.* And now let us conſider, of what juſt Authority this different Reading of the *Clermont Copy* ought to be againſt the Conſent of all other ancient Copies. We find ſome good Rules laid down by the Roman Criticks, when they had a Deſign under *Urban* 8th. to compare the Greek Text of the New Teſtament, with their ancient Manuſcripts in the *Vatican*, and elſewhere, and to publiſh an exact Edition of it (which Collation was preſerved in the *Barberin Library*, and from thence publiſhed by *Pet. Poſſinus*,) and the main Rules as to the various Lections of Manuſcripts were theſe, 1. That the Text was not to be alter'd but by a Concur-

Differt. ſur les MS. du Nov. Teſt. p. 17.

rence of all, or the greateſt part of the Manuſcripts. 2. That if one Manuſcript agreed with the Vulgar Latin, the Text was not to be alter'd, but the Difference to be ſet down at the end of the Chapter. But it is obſervable in that *Collation of Twenty two Manuſcripts*, there is no one Copy produced, wherein there is any Variety as to this place. I know they had not twenty two Manuſcripts of *S. Paul*'s Epiſtles, (they mention but Eight ancient Manuſcripts)but they found no difference in thoſe they had. And now I leave any reaſonable man to judge, whether this *Clermont Copy* out to be relied upon in this matter. But I have ſomething more to ſay about the *Greek Copies.*

1. That *God* is in the *Complutenſian Polyglott*, which was the firſt of the Kind, and carried on by the wonderful Care and Expence of that truly great Man *Cardinal Ximenes*, who ſpared for no Coſt or Pains in procuring *the beſt ancient Copies both Hebrew and Greek*; *and the fitteſt men to judge of both Languages.* And in purſuit of this noble Deſign, he had the beſt *Vatican Manuſcripts* ſent to him (as is expreſſed in the Epiſtle before his *Greek Teſtament*,) and what others he could get out of other places,among which he had the

Alvarez Gomez de rebus Geſtis Fr. Ximenii, *l.* 2. & 3.

Codex

Codex Britannicus mention'd by *Eraſmus*, But after all theſe Copies made uſe of by the Editors there is no Intimation of any variety as to this Place; although the *vulgar Latin* be there as it was.

But Eraſmus *mentions the great Conſent of the old Copies as to the vulgar Latin, and whence ſhould that come, but from a Variety in the old Greek Copies.* To that I anſwer,

2 That the *Greek Copies*, where they were beſt underſtood had no Variety in them; *i. e.* among the *Greeks* themſelves. As appears by *Gregory Nyſſen*, *S. Chryſoſtom*, *Theodoret*, *Oecumenius* and *Theophylact.* But doth not *Monſieur Amelote ſay*, *That the Marquiſs of* Velez *had Sixteen old Manuſcripts, out of which he gathered various Readings, and he reads it* O^e. I cannot but obſerve, how he commends *Fabricius* and *Walton*, for *rendring the Syriac Verſion accordingto the vulgar Latin*, but that will appear to be falſe, to any one that looks into them; the former is mentioned already; and the latter tranſlates it, *Quod manifeſtatus ſit in carne.* But as to the *Marquiſs* of *Velez* his Copies, there is a Secret in it, which ought to be underſtood, and is diſcover'd by *Mariana.* He Confeſſes, *He had ſo many Manuſcripts, eight of them out*

Amelote in Loc.

Marian. Edit vulg. c. 17.

of the Escurial, *but that he never set down whence he had his Readings.*

And in another place, he ingenuously confesses, *That his Design was to justifie the vulgar Latin; and therefore collected Readings on purpose, and he suspects some, out of such Greek Copies, as after the Council of* Florence *were made conformable to the Latin.* Which Readings were published by *la Cerda*, whose Authority *Amelote* follows. And now what Reason can there be, that any such *late Copies* should be prefer'd before those which were used by the *Greek Fathers.*

Præf. ad Schol.

3. That the *Latin Fathers* did not concern themselves about changing their Version, because they understood it still to relate to the Person of Christ. So do S. *Jerom*, *Leo*, *Hilary*, *Fulgentius*, and others. As to the Objections about *Liberatus*, *Macedonius* and *Hincmarus*, I refer them to the Learned *Oxford Annotations.*

Hier. in Loc. Leo Epist. 34. ad Fl. Hilar. de Trinit. l. 11. Fulg. ad Thra. c. 4.

IX. Is it not *wisely* done of these *Interpreters*, to charge our Church so much for retaining a Verse in S. *John's first Epistle*, when they had so good authority to do it? The Verse is, *There are three that bear Record in Heaven, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, &c.* From hence they charge us with *corrupted Copies* and *false Translati-*

1 Joh. 5. 7.

Consider on the Explic. p. 29.

Tranſlations; as an inſtance of the former, they produce this Text, which they ſay, *was not originally in the Bible, but is added to it, and is not found in the moſt ancient Copies of the Greek, nor in the* Syriac, Arabic, Ethiopic, *or* Armenian *Bibles, nor in the moſt ancient Latin Bibles.* Notwithſtanding all which, I hope to be able to ſhew, that our Church had reaſon to retain it. For which end we are to conſider theſe things; *History of Unit. p. 43. Anſ to the Archbiſhop, p. 29.*

1. That *Eraſmus* firſt began to raiſe any ſcruple about it. For, however it might not be in ſome MSS. which were not look'd into, this Verſe was conſtantly and ſolemnly read as a part of Scripture both in the *Greek* and *Latin Churches*, as Mr. *Selden* confeſſes, and that it was in *Wickliff's Bible.* So that here was a general conſent of the Eaſtern and Weſtern Churches for the receiving it; and although there might be a variety in the Copies, yet there was none in the publick Service, and no Objections againſt it that we can find. But *Eraſmus* his authority ſway'd ſo much here, that in the Bibles in the time of *H.* 8. and *E.* 6. it was retained in a *different Letter.* As in *Tyndell's Bible* printed by the King's Printer, *A. D.* 1540. and in the Church Bi- *Selden de Syned. l. 2. c. 4.*

ble of King *E.* 6. in both which they are read, but not in the ſame Character. Yet *Eraſmus* his authority was not great enough to caſt it out, if he had a mind to have done it. Which doth not appear, for he ſaith himſelf, that finding it in the *codex Britannicus*, as he calls it, he reſtored it in his *Tranſlation* as well as the *Greek Teſtament*, out of which he had expunged it before in two Editions, and the *Complutenſian Bible* coming out with it, added greater authority to the keeping of it in, and ſo it was preſerved in the *Greek Teſtaments* of *Hervagius*, *Plautin* and *R. Stephens* and others, after the MSS. had been more diligently ſearched. *Morinus* ſaith, *it was in ſeven of Rob. Stephens* his MSS. but *F. Simon* will not allow that it was in any but the *Complutenſian*, which is a ſtrange piece of boldneſs in him. For *Beza* ſaith, *He had the uſe of them all from him*; and *H. Stephens* let him have his Father's Copy compared with 25 MSS. and he affirms, *That he found it in ſeveral of* R. Stephens *his old MSS.* beſides the *Codex Britannicus* and the *Complutenſian Copy*, and therefore he concludes, *that it ought to be retained.* (And ſo it was, after theſe Copies were come abroad in the Biſhop's Bible, under Queen *Elizabeth*,

Morin exercit. Bibl. *l.* 1, 2, Ex. 2. Simon diſſert. de MSS *p.* 14. Bez. Epiſt. ad nov. Teſtam.

zabeth, without any diſtinction of character, as likewiſe in our laſt Tranſlation.) And it is obſervable, that *Amelote* affirms that he found it in the *moſt ancient Greek Copy* in the *Vatican Library*; but the *Roman* Criticks confeſs, it was not in their 8 *MSS.* yet they thought it fit to be retained from the common Greek Copies, and the Teſtimonies of the Fathers agreeing with the Vulgar Latin.

2. This Verſe was in the Copies of the *African Churches* from S. *Cyprian's* time, as appears by the Teſtimonies of S. *Cyprian*, *Fulgentius*, *Facundus*, *Victor Vitenſis*, and *Vigilius Tapſenſis*, which are produced by others. *F. Simon* hath a bold conjecture, of which he is not ſparing, *that* Victor Vitenſis *is the firſt who produced it as S.* John's *ſaying*; and that it *was S.* Cyprian's *own aſſertion and not made uſe of by him as a Teſtimony of Scripture.* But they who can ſay ſuch things as theſe, are not much to be truſted. For S. *Cyprian's* words are, ſpeaking of S. *John* before, *Et iterum de Patre & Filio ſcriptum eſt, & hi tres unum ſunt.* And it was not *Victor Vitenſis*, but the *African Biſhops* and *Eugenius* in the head of them, who made that addreſs to *Huneric*, wherein they ſay, *That it is clearer than Light,* Critique in nov. Teſt. c. 18.

that Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt are one God, and prove it by the Teſtimony of S. John. *Tres ſunt qui Teſtimonium perhibent in cælo, Pater, Verbum & Spiritus Sanctus, & hi Tres unum ſunt.*

3. In the former Teſtimony, the authority of the *Vulgar Latin* was made uſe of: and why is it rejected here? When *Morinus* confeſſes there is no variety in the *Copies* of it. *Vulgata verſio hunc verſum conſtanter habet.* And he obſerves, that thoſe of the Fathers, who ſeem to omit it (as S. *Auguſtin* againſt *Maximinus*) did not follow the old Latin Verſion. *Lucas Brugenſis*, ſaith only, *That in 35 old Copies, they found it wanting but in five.* As to S. *Jerom*'s *Prologue*, I am not concerned to defend it; but *Eraſmus* thought *it had too much of S.* Jerom *in it*, and others think *it hath too little.* *F. Simon* confeſſes, that *P. Pithœus* and *Mabillon* think it was S. *Jerom*'s, and that it was in the MSS. But I conclude with ſaying, That whoever was the Author, at the time when it was written, *the Greek Copies had this Verſe*, or elſe he was a notorious impoſtor.

Morin exercit. Bibl. *l.* 1. Ex. 2. *c.* 1. *n.* 9.

Critique To. I. *c.* 9.

X. The next thing I ſhall ask theſe *wiſe Interpreters of Scripture*, is, Whether, when the Scripture ſo often affirms, *That the*

the World was made by the Son, and that all things were created by him in Heaven and in Earth, it be reaſonable to underſtand them of *Creating nothing*? For after all their *Shifts* and *Evaſions* it comes to nothing at laſt. But that we may ſee, how much they are confounded with theſe places, we may obſerve. Joh. 1. 3. Heb. 1. 2, 10. Col. 1. 16.

1. They ſometimes ſay, that where *the Creation of all things is ſpoken of, it is not meant of Chriſt but of God.* For in the anſwer they give to the place of the Epiſtle to the *Coloſſians*, they have theſe words: *For by him all things were created, are not ſpoken of Chriſt, but of God: the ſenſe of the whole context is this, The Lord Chriſt is the moſt perfect Image of the inviſible God, the Firſt born from the dead of every Creature; for,* O Coloſſians, *by him, even by the inviſible God were all things created; they were not from all eternity, nor roſe from the concourſe of Atoms, but all of them, whether things in Heaven, or things in Earth; whether Thrones, or Dominions, or Principalities, or Powers, are Creatures, and were by God created, who is before them all, and by him they all conſiſt.* This is a very fair Conceſſion, that of whomſoever theſe words are ſpoken he muſt be God. *Hiſt. of the Unit.* p. 38.

2. But

Defence of the Hiſtory of Unitar. *p.* 13, 14.

2. But in the defence of this very Book, they go about to prove, *That the Creation of the World is not meant by theſe words,* Is not this *interpreting like wiſe men* indeed? And they tell us, *They cannot but wonder, that Men ſhould attribute the old or firſt Creation to Chriſt. Wiſe Men* do not uſe to wonder at plain things. For what is the old or firſt Creation, but the *making the World and creating all things in Heaven and Earth*? And theſe things are attributed to the *Word, to the Son, to Chriſt.* But ſay they, *The Scripture does never ſay in expreſs words, that Chriſt hath created the Heaven and the Earth.* What would theſe *wiſe Interpreters* have? Doth not *by whom all things were created in Heaven and Earth* imply, that *Heaven and Earth were created by him*? but they have a notable obſervation from the Language of the New Teſtament, *viz. That Chriſt is never ſaid to have created the Heaven, the Earth, and the Sea, and all that therein is*; but we are apt to think, that *creating all things* takes in the Sea too, and that in the Scripture Language, *Heaven* and *Earth* are the ſame with the *World,* and I hope the *World* takes in the Sea; and the *World* is ſaid to be *made by him,* and do not *all things* take in all? *No,* ſay they,

all

all things are limited to all Thrones, Principalities and Powers, viſible and inviſible. Then, however the making of theſe is attributed to *Chriſt.* And *if he made all Powers, Viſible and inviſible,* he muſt be God. *Not ſo either.* What then is the meaning of the words, *By him were all things created that are in Heaven and in Earth, viſible and inviſible; whether they be Thrones, or Dominions, or Principalities, or Powers, all things were created by him and for him?* Surely then, theſe *Dominions* and *Powers* were created by him. P. 10. *No,* ſay they, *that which we render created, ought to be rendred, modelled, diſpoſed, or reformed into a new Order.* Were ever *wiſe Men* driven to ſuch miſerable Shifts? One while theſe words are very ſtrong and good proof of the Creation of the World againſt *Atheiſts* and *Epicureans,* and by and by they prove nothing of all this, but only a *new modelling of ſome things called Dominions and Powers.* Do they hope ever to convince Men at this rate of wiſe interpreting? Well, but what is this *creating* or *diſpoſing things* into a *new order?* And who are theſe *Dominions* and *Powers?* they anſwer, *Men and Angels.* How are the *Angels created by him and for him?* Did he die to *reform them,*

them, as well as Mankind? *No, but they are put under him.* And ſo *they were created by him*, that is, they were *not created by him*, but only *made ſubject to him.* But who made them *ſubject to him*? The *Man Chriſt Jeſus*? No, *God appointed him to be the Lord of every Creature.* Then they were not *created by Chriſt*, but *by God*; but the Apoſtle ſaith, they were *created by Chriſt, But God made him Head of the Church and as Head of the Body he Rules over all.* This we do not at all queſtion; but how this comes to be *creating Dominions and Powers, viſible and inviſible.* Did God *make the Earth* and all the living Creatures in it, when he made Man Lord over them? Or rather was Man ſaid to *create them*, becauſe he was made their Head? if this be their interpreting Scripture like *wiſe Men*, I ſhall be content with a leſs meaſure of Underſtanding, and thank God for it.

XI. Laſtly, is this to *interpret Scripture like Wiſe men*, to leave the *form of Baptiſm doubtfull, whether it were not inſerted into S.* Matthew's *Goſpel*; or to underſtand it in another Senſe than the Chriſtian Church hath done from the Apoſtles times? I ſay firſt, *Leave it doubtfull*, becauſe they ſay, *That Learned Criticks have given very*

Anſwer to Milb. p. 15.

ſtrong

ſtrong Reaſons why they believe theſe Words. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghoſt, were not ſpoke by our Saviour, but have been added to the Goſpel of S. Matthew, *from the common Form and Practice of the Church.* Why are theſe *ſtrong Reaſons of Learned Criticks* mentioned, but to raiſe Doubts in Peoples minds about them? *But they declare afterwards againſt them.* Not too much of that. For they ſay, only, *That they are not without their weight, but they have obſerved ſeveral things that make them think, that this Text is a genuine part of Scripture.* Very *Wiſely* and *Diſcreetly* ſpoken! The *Reaſons are ſtrong and weighty*; but they *think otherwiſe.* I wiſh they had told the World, who theſe *learned Criticks* were; leſt it ſhould be ſuſpected that they were their own *Inventions.* But I find a certain *Nameleſs Socinian* was the Author of them; and his Words are produced by *Sandius* (a Perſon highly commended by them for his Induſtry and Learning, but as much condemned by others, for want of Skill or Ingenuity.) The reaſon of writing theſe Reaſons *Sandius* freely confeſſes was, *becauſe this place clearly proved a Trinity of Perſons againſt the* Socinians. But what are theſe *very ſtrong*

P. 16.

Sand. Interp. Et. Paradox. p. 115.

ſtrong and weighty Reaſons? For it is great Pity but they ſhould be known.

In the firſt place he obſerves, *That S.* Matthew's *Goſpel was written in Hebrew, and the Original* he ſaith is loſt; and he *ſuſpects that either S.* Jerom *was himſelf the Tranſlator into Greek and Latin* (*who was a Corrupter of Scripture, and* Origen) *or ſome unknown Perſon: from whence it follows, that our Goſpel of S.* Matthew *is not of ſuch Authority, that an Article of ſuch moment ſhould depend upon it.* Is not thisa *very ſtrong and weighty Reaſon*? Muſt not this be a very *learned Critick* who could mention S. *Jerom*, as *Tranſlator of S.* Matthews *Goſpel* into *Greek*? But then one would think this interpreter might have been wiſe enough to have added this of himſelf. No; he dares not ſay that, *but that it was added by Tranſcribers.* But whence or how? To that he ſaith, *That they ſeem to be taken out of the Goſpel according to the* Egyptians. This is great News indeed. But comes it from a good hand? Yes, *from* Epiphanius. And what ſaith he to this purpoſe? * He ſaith, *That the* Sabellians *made uſe of the* counterfeit Egyptian *Goſpel, and there it was declared that Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt were the ſame.* And what then? Doth he ſay *they borrowed*

Epiph. hær. 62. n. 2.

borrowed the Form of Baptiſm from thence? Nothing like it. But on the contrary, *Epiphanius* urges this very Form in that place againſt the *Sabellians*: and quotes S. *Matthew's* Authority for it. But this worthy Author produces other Reaſons, which *Sandius* himſelf laughs at, and deſpiſes, and therefore I paſs them over. The moſt material ſeems to be if it hold, *That the moſt ancient Writers on S.* Matthew *take no notice of them*, and he mentions *Origen*, *Hilary*, and S. *Chryſoſtom*, but theſe Negative arguments *Sandius* thinks of no force. *Origen* and S. *Chryſoſtom*, he ſaith, *reach not that Chapter*; the *Opus Imperfectum*, which was none of his, doth not; but his own commentaries do, and there he not only mentions the *Form*, but takes notice of the *Compendious Doctrine* delivered by it, which can be nothing elſe but that of *the Trinity*. In the Greek *Catena* on S. *Matthew* there is more mentioned, *viz. That Chriſt had not then firſt his Power given him; for he was with God before, and was himſelf by Nature God.* And there *Gregory Nazianzen* ſaith, *The Form of Baptiſm was in the Name of the Holy Trinity*; and he there ſpeaks more fully. *Remember*, ſaith he, *the Faith into which thou wert baptized. Into the Father?* N. 4.

Father? That is well, but that is no farther than the Jews *go* (for they own *one God*, and *one Perſon.*) *Into the Son? That is beyond them, but not yet perfect. Into the Holy Ghoſt? Yes,* ſaith he, *this is perfect Baptiſm. But what is the common Name of theſe three,* δηλαδὴ τὸ τῦ Θεῦ *Plainly, that of God.* But this *learned Critick* obſerves, *that* Hilary *in ſome Copies takes no notice of this Form.* That is truly obſerved, for the very Concluſion is not *Hilary*'s, but taken out of S. *Jerom*; but if he had look'd into *Hilary*'s Works, he would have found the Form of Baptiſm owned, and aſſerted by him. For he not only ſets it down as *the Form of Faith,* as well as *our Baptiſm appointed by Chriſt*; but argues from it, againſt the *Sabellians* and *Ebionites*, as well as others. Thus we ſee how very ſtrong and weighty the Arguments of this *learned Critick* were.

Hilar. l. 2. de Trinit.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

The General Senſe of the Chriſtian Church, proved from the Form of Baptiſm, as it was underſtood in the firſt Ages.

BUt our *Unitarians* pretend, *that they are ſatisfied, that the Form of Baptiſm is found in all Copies, and all the ancient Tranſlations; and that it was uſed before the Council of* Nice, *as appears by ſeveral places of* Tertullian. But how then? There are two things ſtick with them. P. 17.

(1.) *That the* Ante-Nicene *Fathers do not alledge it to prove the Divinity of the Son, or Holy Ghoſt.*

(2.) *That the Form of Words here uſed, doth not prove the Doctrine of the Trinity.* Both which muſt be ſtrictly Examined.

1. As to the former. It cannot but ſeem ſtrange to any one converſant in the Writings of thoſe Fathers; when S. *Cyprian* ſaith expreſly, *That the Form of Baptiſm is preſcribed by Chriſt, that it ſhould be* in plenâ & adunatâ trinitate: i. e. *in the full Confeſſion of the Holy Trinity*; and Cyprian. ad Jul. Ep. 73.

therefore, *he denied the Baptiſm of the* Marcionites, *becauſe the Faith of the Trinity was not ſincere among them,* as appears at large in that Epiſtle. And this, as far as I can find, was the general Senſe of the *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, as well as others. And it is no improbable Opinion of *Eraſmus*, and *Voſſius*, two *learned Criticks* indeed, *That the moſt ancient Creed went no further than the Form of Baptiſm*, viz. to Believe *in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt*; and the other Articles were added as Hereſies gave occaſion. S. *Jerom* ſaith, *That in the Traditional Creed, which they received from the Apoſtles*, the main Article was, *the Confeſſion of the Trinity*; to which he joyns *the Unity of the Church, and Reſurrection of the Fleſh*; and then adds, *that herein is contained, Omne Chriſtiani Dogmatis Sacramentum, the whole Faith into which Chriſtians were baptized.* And he ſaith, *It was the Cuſtom among them, to inſtruct thoſe who were to be Baptized for forty days in the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity.* So that there was then no Queſtion but the Form of Baptiſm had a particular Reſpect to it; and therefore, ſo much weight is laid upon the uſe of it, as well by the *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, as others. For, *Tertullian* ſaith, *That the Form of Baptiſm was preſcribed*

Eraſm. ad Cenſ. Pariſ. Tit. II. Voſſi. de Symb. diſſ. I. n. 38.

Hierom. Ep. 61.

Tertul. de Baptiſm. c. 13.

preſcribed by our Saviour himſelf as a Law to his Church. S. *Cyprian* to the ſame purpoſe, *That he commanded it to be uſed.* S. *Auguſtin* calls them, *the Words of the Goſpel, without which there is no Baptiſm.* The reaſon given by S. *Ambroſe* is, *becauſe the Faith of the Trinity is in this Form.* But how if any one Perſon were left out? He thinks, that if the reſt be not denied, the Baptiſm is good; but otherwiſe, *vacuum eſt omne Myſterium, the whole Baptiſm is void.*

De Præſcript. hæret. c. 20. Cyprian. Ep. 27. 73. Ed. Ox. Aug. de Baptiſm. c. Donat. *l.* 6. *c.* 25. Ambroſ. de Sp. Sanct. *l.* 1. *c.* 3.

So that the *Faith of the Trinity* was that which was required in order to true Baptiſm, more than the bare *Form of Words.* If there were no reaſon to queſtion the former, S. *Ambroſe* ſeems of Opinion that the Baptiſm was good, although every Perſon were not named, and therein he was followed by *Beda, Hugo de Sancto Victore, Peter Lombard* and others. And S. *Baſil* in the *Greek Church,* aſſerted that *Baptiſm in the name of the Holy Ghoſt was ſufficient, becauſe he is hereby owned to be of equal Dignity with the Father and Son*; but it is ſtill ſuppoſing that the whole and undivided Trinity be not denied. And he elſewhere ſaith, *That Baptizing in the Name of the Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt is a moſt ſolemn Profeſſion of the Tri-*

Bed. *in* Act. 19. Hugo de S. Vict. de Sacr. *l.* 1. *c.* 13. Lomb. 4. Sent. Diſt. 3. c. ſed qd. Baſil c. Eunom. *l.* 5. *c.* 3. *c.* 10.

nity in Unity, becauſe they are all joyned together in this publick Act of Devotion. But others thought that the Baptiſm was not good, unleſs every Perſon were named; which Opinion generally obtained both in the *Greek* and *Latin Church.* And the late Editors of S. *Ambroſe* obſerve, that in other places he makes the whole *Form of Words* neceſſary as well as the Faith in the Holy Trinity. The Baptiſm of the *Eunomians* was rejected, becauſe they alter'd the Form and the Faith too, ſaying, *That the Father was untreate, the Son created by the Father, and the Holy Ghoſt created by the Son.*

Epiph. Her. 75. ad fin.

Council. Nican. c. 19. Aug. de Hareſ. c. 44. Concil. Arel. I. c. 8.

The Baptiſm of the *Samoſatenians* was rejected by the Council of *Nice.* S. *Auguſtin* thinks it was *becauſe they had not the right Form*; but the true Reaſon was, they rejected *the Doctrine of the Trinity.* And ſo the Council of *Arles* I. doth in expreſs Words refuſe their *Baptiſm who refuſed to own that Doctrine.* That Council was held A. D. 314. and therefore *Bellarmin*, and others after him, are very much miſtaken, when they interpret this Canon of the *Arians*, concerning whoſe Baptiſm there could be no Diſpute till many years after. But this Canon is *de Afris*; among whom the Cuſtom of Baptizing prevailed; but this

Bellarm. de Bap. l. 1. c. 3.

this Council propounds an expedient as moſt agreeable to the general Senſe of the Chriſtian Church, *viz. That if any relinquiſhed their Hereſie and came back to the Church, they ſhould ask them the Creed, and if they found that they were baptized in the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, they ſhould have only impoſition of hands, but if they did not confeſs the Trinity, their Baptiſm was declared void.* Now this I look on as an impregnable Teſtimony of the Senſe of the *Ante-Nicene* Fathers, *viz.* That they did not allow that Baptiſm which was not in *the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt*; or (which they underſtood to be the ſame) *in the Confeſſion of the Faith of the Trinity.* How then can our *Unitarians* pretend, *That the Ante-Nicene Fathers did not alledge the Form of Baptiſm to prove the Trinity?* For the words are, *If they do not anſwer to this Trinity let them not be baptized*, ſaith this *plenary Council*, as *S. Auguſtin* often calls it. What *Trinity* do they mean? *Of mere Names or Cyphers*, or of *one God and two Creatures* joyned in the ſame Form of words, as our *Unitarians* underſtand it? But they affirm, *That the Ancients of* 400 *years do not inſiſt on this Text of S.* Matthew *to prove the Divinity*

Anſwer to Milb p. 18.

nity or Perſonality of the Son or Spirit.

Therefore to give a clear account of this matter, I ſhall prove, that the *Ante-Nicene Fathers* did underſtand theſe words, ſo as not to be taken, either for *meer Names*, or for *Creatures joyned with God*; but that they did maintain *the Divinity of the Son and Holy Ghoſt*, from the general Senſe, in which theſe words were taken among them.

And this I ſhall do from theſe Arguments;

1. That thoſe who took them in another Senſe, were oppoſed and condemned by the Chriſtian Church.

2. That the Chriſtian Church did own this Senſe in publick Acts of divine Worſhip as well as private.

3. That it was owned and defended by thoſe who appeared for the Chriſtian Faith againſt Infidels. And I do not know any better means than theſe, to prove ſuch a matter of Fact as this.

1. The Senſe of the Chriſtian Church may be known by its behaviour towards thoſe, who took theſe words only for different *Names* or *Appearances* of One Perſon.

And of this we have full Evidence, as to *Praxeas*, *Noëtus* and *Sabellius*, all long before the *Council of Nice*.

Praxeas

Praxeas was the firſt, at leaſt in the Weſtern Church, who made *Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, to be only ſeveral Names of the ſame Perſon,* and he was with great Warmth and Vigor oppoſed by *Tertullian,* who charges him with *introducing a new opinion into the Church,* as will preſently appear. And his teſtimony is the more conſiderable, becauſe our *Unitarians* confeſs, *that he lived* 120 *years before the Nicene Council,* and that he particularly inſiſts *upon the Form of Baptiſm againſt* Praxeas. But to what purpoſe? Was not his whole deſign in that Book to prove *three diſtinct Perſons of Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, and yet but One God?* Doth he not ſay expreſly, *That Chriſt commanded that his Diſciples ſhould baptize into the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, not into One of them*; ad ſingula nomina in Perſonas ſingulas tingimur. *In Baptiſm we are dipped once at every Name, to ſhew that we are baptized into three Perſons.* It is certain then, that *Tertullian* could not miſtake the Senſe of the Church ſo groſly, as to take *three Perſons* to be only *three ſeveral Names.*

P. 17.

Adverſ. Prax. c. 26.

He grants to *Praxeas, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt are one,* but how? *Per unitatem ſubſtantiæ,* becauſe *there is but*

C. 2.

one divine Eſſence: but yet he ſaith, *there are three,* not with reſpect to eſſential Attributes, for ſo they are *unius Subſtantiæ, & unius Status, & unius Poteſtatis, quia unus Deus.* And therefore the difference can be only as to perſonal Properties and diſtinct Capacies, which he calls *Gradus, Forma, Species,* not merely as to internal Relations, but as to external Diſpenſations, which he calls their *Oeconomy.* For his great buſineſs is to prove againſt *Praxeas,* that *the Son and Holy Ghoſt* had thoſe things attributed to them in Scripture, which could not be attributed to the Father. For *Praxeas* aſſerted, *That the Father ſuffer'd*; and thence his followers were called *Patripaſſians* and *Monarchici.* i.e. *Unitarians.* The main ground which *Praxeas* went upon, was *the Unity of the Godhead,* ſo often mention'd in *Scripture,* from hence *Tertullian* ſaith, *That he took advantage of the weakneſs of the common ſort of Chriſtians, and repreſented to them, that whereas the Doctrine of Chriſt made but one God, thoſe who held the Trinity according to the Form of Baptiſm, muſt make more Gods than one. Tertullian* anſwers, that they held a *Monarchy,* i.e. *unicum imperium, one ſupreme Godhead, and a ſupreme power may be lodged*

Tertul. de præſcr. hæret. c. ult.

Con. Prax. c. 3.

lodged in diſtinct Perſons and adminiſtred in ſeveral manners; that nothing overthrew the *divine Monarchy*, but a *different Power and Authority*, which they did by no means aſſert. They held a *Son*, but of *the Subſtance of the Father*, and *a Holy Ghoſt from the Father by the Son*: he ſtill keeps to the *diſtinction of* Perſons, and the *Unity of Subſtance*. And he utterly denies *any Diviſion of Eſſences* or *ſeparate Subſtances*; *for therein*, he ſaith, *lay the Hereſie of* Valentinus, *in making a Prolation of a ſeparate Being*. But although he ſaith, *the Goſpel hath declared to us, that the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghoſt God, yet we are taught that there is ſtill but one God*: redactum eſt jam nomen Dei & Domini in unione, *c.* 13. whereby *the Chriſtians are diſtinguiſhed from the Heathens who had many Gods*. This is the force of what *Tertullian* ſaith upon this matter. C. 4.

Alium autem quomodo accipere debes jam profeſſus ſum, Perſonæ non Subſtantiæ nomine, ad Diſtinctionem, non ad Diviſionem, cæterum ubique teneo unam ſubſtantiam in tribus cohærentibus. *Adverſ. Prax. c.* 12.

Et ſermo erat apud Deum & nunquam ſeparatus à Patre aut alius à Patre quia ego & Pater unum ſumus. Hæc erat probola veritatis, cuſtos unitatis qua prolatum dicimus Filium à Patre, ſed non ſeparatum. C. 8.

And what ſay our *Unitarians* to it? They cannot deny that he was an *Ante-Nicene Father*; and it is plain that he did underſtand *the Form of Baptiſm* ſo as to imply

imply a *Trinity of Perſons in an Unity of Eſſence:* To which they give no Anſwer.

But I find three things objected againſt *Tertullian* by their Friends;

1. That *Tertullian brought this Doctrine into the Church from* Montanus, whoſe Diſciple he then was. So *Schlichtingius* in his Preface againſt *Meiſner*, grants, *That he was very near the Apoſtolical Times, and by his Wit and Learning promoted this new Doctrine about the Trinity, eſpecially in his Book againſt* Praxeas. But how doth it appear, that he brought in any *new Doctrine?* Yes, ſaith *Schlichtingius*, he confeſſes, *That he was more inſtructed by the Paraclete.* But if he had dealt ingenuouſly, he would have owned that in that very place, he confeſſes, *He was always of that opinion, although more fully inſtructed by the Paraclete?* This only ſhews that *Montanus* himſelf innovated nothing in this matter, but endeavoured to improve it. And it is poſſible, that *Tertullian* might borrow his *Similitudes* and *Illuſtrations* from him, which have added no ſtrength to it. But as to the main of the Doctrine, he ſaith, *It came from the rule of Faith delivered by the Apoſtles, before* Praxeas, *or any Hereticks his Predeceſſors.* Which ſhews, that thoſe who rejected this Doctrine

Schlicht. ad Meiſn. de Trinit. p. 13, 14. 17.

Adverſ. Prax. 2.

Nos vero ut ſemper nunc magis ut inſtructiores per Paracletum, &c.

Hanc regulam ab initio Evangelii decucurriſſe etiam ante priores hæreticos, nedum Praxean heſternum.

Doctrine were always esteemed *Hereticks* in the Christian Church. And this is a very early Testimony of the *Antiquity* and general Reception of it, because as one was received the other was rejected, so that the Assertors of it were accounted *Hereticks*. And the Sense of the Church is much better known by such *publick Acts*, than by mere particular Testimonies of the learned Men of those times. For when they deliver the Sense of the Church in such *publick Acts*, all persons are Judges of the truth and falshood of them at the time when they are deliver'd; and the nearer they came to the *Apostolical Times*, the greater is the strength of their evidence; this I ground on *Tertullian's* appealing to the *ancient rule of Faith*, which was universally known and received in the Christian Church, and that such Persons were look'd on as *Hereticks* who differ'd from it. Which being so very near the Apostles Times, it's hardly possible to suppose, that the whole Christian Church should be mistaken as to what they received *as the rule of Faith*, which was deliver'd and explained at Baptism, and therefore the general Sense of the Form of Baptism must be understood by all who were admitted to it. So that the

the Members of the Chriſtian Church cannot be ſuppoſed better acquainted with any thing than the Doctrine they were baptized into. Here then we have a concurrence of ſeveral *publick Acts of the Church.* 1. The *Form of Baptiſm.* 2. The *Rule of Faith* relating to that Form, and explained at Baptiſm. 3. The *Churches* rejecting thoſe as *Hereticks* who differ'd from it: which *Tertullian* applies to thoſe who rejected the Trinity. And *Praxeas* his Doctrine was then condemned, not by a particular Sentence, but by the general Senſe of the Church at that time. For *Optatus Milevitanus* reckons him among the *condemned Hereticks*, and joyns him with *Marcion* and *Valentinus*, as well as *Sabellius*, who follow'd him in the ſame Hereſie. How was this poſſible, if *Praxeas* deliver'd the true Doctrine, and *Tertullian* brought in a *new Opinion* as *Schlichtingius* fanſies? *Tertullian* was at that time a declared *Montaniſt*; and if he had introduc'd a *new Doctrine* about the Trinity, can we imagine thoſe would have been ſilent about it, who were ſharp enough upon *Tertullian* for the ſake of his *Paraclete?* Some of the followers of *Montanus* afterwards fell into the ſame opinions with *Praxeas*, as *Theodoret*

Optat. Mil. l. 1.

odoret tells us, and *Tertullian* ſaith as much of thoſe *Cataphrygians* who follow'd *Æſchines:* But theſe *Montaniſts* are diſtinguiſhed from the reſt. And *Rigaltius* obſerves, that *Tertullian* follow'd *Montanus* chiefly in what related to Diſcipline, and that himſelf was not ſo corrupted in point of Doctrine as ſome of his Followers were. Theodor. hær. l. 3. c. 2. Tertull. de præſcr. c. 5. Rigalt. in Tertul. ad Praxean.

2. It's objected, *That* Tertullian's *Doctrine is inconſiſtent with the Doctrine of the Trinity; for he denies the eternal Generation of the Son; and only aſſerts an Emiſſion of him before the Creation.* Ante-Nicen. p. 27.

But my buſineſs is not to juſtifie all *Tertullian*'s Expreſſions or Similitudes; for Men of Wit and Fancy love to go out of the Road, and ſometimes involve things more by Attempts to explain them; but I keep only to that which he ſaith was *the Faith of the Church from the beginning*; and I ſee no reaſon to call in Queſtion his Fidelity in reporting, however he might be unhappy in his Explications.

3. *Tertullian himſelf*, ſaith *Schlichtingius*, in other *Places, where he ſpeaks of the rule of Faith, doth not mention the Holy Ghoſt; and therefore this ſeems added by him for the ſake of the Paraclete.* But this can be of no force to any one that conſiders, P. 12.

ſiders, that *Tertullian* grounds his Doctrine not on any *New Revelation* by the *Paraclete*, but on *the Rule of Faith* received in the Church long before; and upon the *Form of Baptiſm* preſcribed by our Saviour. Will they ſay, *the Holy Ghoſt* was there added for the ſake of *Montanus* his *Paraclete?* And in another of his Books, he owns the *Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt to make up the Trinity in Unity*. Wherein *Petavius* himſelf confeſſes, *That he aſſerted the Doctrine of the Church in a Catholick manner*; although he otherwiſe ſpeaks hardly enough of him.

In quo eſt Trinitas unius Divinitatis, Pater, Filius & Spiritus Sanctus. De Pudicit. c. 21. Petav. T. 2. l. 1. c. 5. Sect. 4.

The next I ſhall mention, is *Novatian*, whom *Schlichtingius* allows, *to have been before the* Nicene-Council; and our modern *Unitarians* call him a *great Man, whoever he was, and very ancient*. And there are two things I obſerve in him. 1. That he oppoſes *Sabellianiſm*: for, before his time *Praxeas* and *Noetus* were little talked of, eſpecially in the Weſtern Church; but *Sabellius* his Name and Doctrine were very well known by the oppoſition to him, by the Biſhops of *Alexandria* and *Rome*. He ſticks not, at the calling it *Hereſie* ſeveral times; and Diſputes againſt it,

Schlichting. Præf. p. 30. Ante-Nicen. p. 27.

Novatian. de Trinit. c. 12. 21, 31.

it, and anſwers the Objection *about the Unity of the Godhead*. 2. That he owns, *that the Rule of Faith requires our believing in Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt*; and aſſerts *the Divine Eternity* of it, and therefore muſt hold the *Doctrine of the Trinity* to be the Faith of the Church contained in the *Form of Baptiſm*. For he ſaith, *The Authority of Faith, and the Holy Scriptures admoniſh us to believe not only in the Father and Son. but in the Holy Ghoſt.* Therefore the *Holy Ghoſt* muſt be conſidered, as an object of Faith joyned in the Scripture with the other two, which is no where more expreſs, than in *the Form of Baptiſm*, which as *S. Cyprian* ſaith, was to be *adminiſtred in the full Confeſſion of the Trinity*, in the place already mention'd. And it is obſervable that *S. Cyprian* rejects the *Baptiſm* of thoſe who denied the *Trinity* at that time, among whom he inſtances in the *Patripaſſians*, who it ſeems were then ſpread into *Africa*.

C. 29.

Et cum Spiritus Sancti divina æternitate ſociari.

Cypr. *Ep.* 37.

The Diſpute about the *Marcionites Baptiſm* was upon another ground, for they held a *real Trinity*, as appears by *Dionyſius Romanus* in *Athanaſius*, and *Epiphanius*, &c. but the Queſtion was, whether they held the *ſame Trinity* or not. *S. Cyprian* ſaith, *That our Saviour appointed his Apoſtles*

ſtles to baptize in the Name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, and in the Sacrament of this Trinity they were to baptize. Doth *Marcion* hold this Trinity? So that S. *Cyprian* ſuppoſed the validity of *Baptiſm* to depend on the Faith of the *Trinity.* And if he had gone no farther, I do not ſee how he had tranſgreſſed the Rules of the Church; but his Error was, that he made void Baptiſm upon difference of Communion, and therein he was juſtly oppoſed. But the *Marcionites* Baptiſm was rejected in the Eaſtern Church, becauſe of their Doctrine about the Trinity.

Baſil Epiſt. Canon, 47.

In the Parts of *Aſia* about *Epheſus*, *Noetus* had broached the ſame Doctrine, which *Praxeas* had done elſewhere. For which he was called to an account, and *himſelf with his followers were caſt out of the Churches Communion*, as *Epiphanius* reports, which is another conſiderable Teſtimony of the Senſe of the Church at that time. *Epiphanius* ſaith, *he was the firſt who broached that blaſphemy*; but *Theodoret* mentions *Epigonus* and *Cleomenes* before him; it ſeems, that he was the firſt who was publickly taken notice of for it; and therefore underwent the Cenſure of the Church with his Diſciples. When he was firſt ſummon'd to anſwer, he denied *that he aſſerted any ſuch Doctrine*

Epiph hæreſ. 57. n. 1.

trine; *because no man before him* ſaith Epiphanius, *had vented ſuch Poiſon.* And in the beginning he ſaith, that *Noetus* out of a Spirit of Contradiction had utter'd ſuch things, *as neither the Prophets, nor the Apoſtles, nor the Church of God ever thought or declared.* Now what was this unheard of Doctrine of *Noetus*? That appears beſt by *Noetus* his anſwer upon his ſecond appearance which was, *That he worſhipped One God, and knew of no other, who was born and ſuffer'd, and died for us*; and for this he produced the ſeveral places which aſſert the *Unity of the Godhead*, and among the reſt one very obſervable, *Rom.* 9. 5. *Of whom as concerning the fleſh Chriſt came, who is over all God bleſſed for ever.* From whence he inferr'd *that the Son and the Father were the ſame, and the ſame be affirmed of the Holy Ghoſt.* But from hence we have an evident Proof that the moſt ancient *Greek Copies* in *Noetus* his time, which was long before the Council of *Nice*, had *God* in the Text. *Epiphanius* brings many places of Scripture to prove the Diſtinction of Perſons in the Unity of the Godhead; but that is not my preſent buſineſs, but to ſhew the general Senſe of the Church at that time. I do not ſay that *Noetus* was condemned by a N. 2.

general Council; but it is ſufficient, to ſhew that he was caſt out of the Church, where he broached his Doctrine, and no other Church received him, or condemned that Church which caſt him out, which ſhews an after Conſent to it. Now what was this Doctrine of *Noetus*? The very ſame with that of *Praxeas* at *Rome*. *Theodoret* ſaith, this his Opinion was, *That there was but one God the Father, who was himſelf impaſſible, but as he took our Nature, ſo he was paſſible and called the Son. Epiphanius* more fully, *that the ſame Perſon was Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt*; *wherein* he ſaith, *he plainly contradicts the Scriptures, which attribute diſtinct Perſonalities to them*; *and yet aſſert but one Godhead. The Father hath an Hypoſtaſis of his own, and ſo have the Son and Holy Ghoſt*; *but yet there is but one Divinity, one Power, and one Dominion*; for theſe diſtinct Perſons are, τῆς αὐτῆς ταυτότητος, τῆς αὐτῆς κυριότητος; *of the ſame individual Eſſence and Power.* But *Epiphanius* was no *Ante-Nicene Father*: however in matters of Antiquity, where there is no incongruity in the thing, we may make uſe of his Authority; and I think no one will queſtion, that *Noetus* was condemned; which was the thing I produced him to prove.

Theod. hær. l. 3. c. 3.

Epiph. 57. n. 2.

But

But although *Noetus* was condemned, yet this Doctrine did ſpread in the Eaſtern parts; for *Origen* mentions thoſe *who confounded the Notion of Father and Son, and made them but one Hypoſtaſis, and diſtinguiſhed only by thought, and Denomination.* This Doctrine was oppoſed not only by *Origen*, but he had *the Senſe of the Church* concurring with him, as appears in the Caſe of *Beryllus* Biſhop of *Boſtra*, who fell into this Opinion, and was reclaimed by *Origen*; and *Euſebius* gives this account of it, *That there was a Concurrence of others with him in it*, and that this Doctrine was look'd on as an Innovation in the Faith. For his Opinion was *that our Saviour had no proper Subſiſtence of his own before the Incarnation*; *and that the Deity of the Father alone was in him.* He did not mean that the Son had no ſeparate Divinity from the Father, but that the Deity of the Father only appeared in the Son; ſo that he was not really God, but only one in whom the Deity of the Father was made manifeſt. Which was one of the oldeſt Hereſies in the Church, and the moſt early condemned and oppoſed by it.

Comment. *in* Matth. p. 470.

Euſeb. *l.* 6. *c.* 33.

But thoſe Hereſies, which before had differenced Perſons from the Church, were

now ſpread by ſome at firſt within the Communion of it; as it was not only in the Caſe of *Noetus* and *Beryllus*, but of *Sabellius* himſelf, who made the greateſt noiſe about this Doctrine; and *his Diſciples*, *Epiphanius* tells us, *ſpread very much both in the Eaſtern and Weſtern parts*; *in* Meſopotamia *and at* Rome. *Their Doctrine*, he ſaith, *was*, *that Father*, *Son and Holy Ghoſt were but one Hypoſtaſis*, *with three different Denominations.* They compared God to *the Sun*, *the Father to the Subſtance*, *the Son to the Light and the Holy Ghoſt to the Heat which comes from it*; and theſe two latter were only *diſtinct Operations of the ſame Subſtance.*

Epiph. Hær. 62.

Epiphanius thinks that *Sabellius* therein diff r'd from *Noetus*, *becauſe he denied that the Father ſuffer'd*; but S. *Auguſtin* can find no difference between them All that can be conceived is, that a different Denomination did ariſe from the different apperance and Operation; which our *Vnitarians* call *three Relative Perſons*, *and one Subſiſting Perſon.*

Aug. *in* Joh. tract. 36.

Sabellius did ſpread his Hereſie moſt in his own Country; which was in *Pentapolis* of the *Cyrenaick Province*, being born in *Ptolemais* one of the five Cities there. Of this *Dionyſius* Biſhop of *Alexandria* gives

Diſcourſe of Nominal, and real Unit. p. 16.

gives an account in his Epiſtle to *Xyſtus* then Biſhop of *Rome*, wherein he takes notice of *the wicked and blaſphemous Hereſie, lately broached there againſt the Perſons of the Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt.* Letters on both ſides were brought to him, on which occaſion he wrote ſeveral Epiſtles, among which there was one to *Ammonius* Biſhop of *Bernice*, another of the Cities of *Pentapolis.* In this, he diſputed with great warmth againſt this Doctrine of *Sabellius*, inſomuch, that he was afterwards accuſed to *Dionyſius* of *Rome*, that he had gone too far the other way; and leſſen'd the Divinity of the Son by his Similitudes; of which he clear'd himſelf, as appears by what remains of his Defence in *Athanaſius.* But as to his Zeal againſt *Sabellianiſm* it was never queſtion'd. *Dionyſius* of *Rome* declares his Senſe at large in this matter againſt both Extremes, *viz.* of thoſe who aſſerted *three ſeparate and independent Principles*, and of thoſe who *confounded the Divine Perſons*; and he charges the Doctrine of *Sabellius* too with *Blaſphemy*, as well as thoſe who ſet up *three different Principles*, and *ſo made three Gods.* But he declares the Chriſtian Doctrine to be, that *there were Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt*; *but that there*

Euſeb. *l.* 7. *c.* 6. 26.

Athan. de Decret. Synodi Nicænæ, p. 273.

is an indiviſible Union in one and the ſame Godhead. It ſeems *Dionyſius* of *Alexandria* was accuſed for *dividing and ſeparating the Perſons*, to which he anſwers, that it was impoſſible he ſhould do it, because *they are indiviſible from each other; and the Name of each Perſon did imply the inſeparable Relation to the other, as the Father to the Son, and the Son to the Father, and the Holy Ghoſt to both.* And this Judgment of theſe two great Men in the Church concerning *Sabellianiſm*, was univerſally receiv'd in the *Chriſtian Church.* And this happen'd long before the *Nicene Council.*

Athanaſ. de Sentent. Dionyſii, p. 561.

2. Another argument of the general *Senſe of the Chriſtian Church* is from the *Hymns* and *Doxologies* publickly received; which were in the moſt ſolemn Acts of religious Worſhip made to *Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt.* The force of this argument appears hereby, that divine Worſhip cannot be given to *mere Names*, and an Equality of Worſhip doth imply an Equality of Dignity in the object of Worſhip, and therefore, if the ſame Acts of Adoration be performed to *Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt*, it is plain, that the Chriſtian Church did eſteem them to have the ſame divine Nature, although they were

diſtinct

distinct Persons. And if they were not so, there could not be distinct Acts of divine Worship performed to them. S. *Basil* mentions this *Doxology* of *Africanus*, (that ancient Writer of the Christian Church) in the fifth Book of his *Chronicon*, *We render thanks to him who gave our Lord Jesus Christ to be a Saviour, to whom with the Holy Ghost be Glory and Majesty for ever.* And another of *Dionysius Alexandrinus* in his 2d Epistle to *Dionysius* of *Rome*. *To God the Father and his Son our Lord Jesus Christ with the Holy Ghost, be Glory and Power for ever and ever, Amen.* And this is the more considerable, because he saith he *did herein follow the ancient Custom and Rule of the Church; and he joyned with it,* ὁμοφώνως αὐτοῖς προσευχαριστῶντες, *Praising God in the same voice with those who have gone before us*, which shews how early these *Doxologies* to *Father, Son* and *Holy Ghost*, had been used in the Christian Church. But to let us the better understand the true Sense of them, S. *Basil* hath preserved some passages of *Dionysius Alexandrinus* which do explain *it, viz. That either the* Sabellians *must allow three distinct Hypostases, or they must wholly take away the Trinity.* By which it is evident, that by *Father, Son and Holy Ghost* he did

Basil de Sp. Sancto c. 29.

underſtand *three diſtinct Hypoſtaſes, but not divided*; for that appears to have been the *Sabellians* Argument, *That if there were three, they muſt be divided*: No ſaith *Dionyſius*, *they are three whether the* Sabellians *will or not*; *or elſe there is no Trinity*: which he look'd on as a great abſurdity to take away, τὴν θείαν τριάδα the *Divine Trinity*. Of what? Of mere *Names or Energies*? That is no *Trinity*; for there is but *one ſubſiſting Perſon of ſeparate and divided Subſtances*: That the *Sabellians* thought muſt follow but both the *Dionyſius's* denied it. And in another Paſſage there mention'd *Dionyſius* of *Alexandria* aſſerts the *Trinity in Unity*. But before *Dionyſius*, he quotes a paſſage of *Clemens Romanus* concerning *Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt*, which attributes *Life* diſtinctly to them. Now *Life* cannot belong to a *Name* or *Energy*, and therefore muſt imply *a Perſon*.

Θειοτάτην δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, μετὰ τὴν μονάδα καὶ ἡ τριάς.
Ζῇ φησιν ὁ Θεὸς καὶ ὁ Κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς, καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον.

But that which is moſt material to our purpoſe, is the *Publick Doxology* in the Church of *Neo-Cæſarea*, brought in by *Gregory Thaumaturgus*. *S. Baſil* gives a very high Character of him, as of a Perſon of extraordinary Piety and Exactneſs of Life

Life, and a great promoter of Chriſtianity in thoſe Parts, and by him the *Form of Doxology was introduced into that Church*, being chiefly formed by him (there being but Seventeen *Chriſtians* when he was firſt made Biſhop there) which was, *Glory to God the Father, and Son with the Holy Ghoſt*, which ought to be underſtood according to the ſenſe of the Maker of it. And *Gregory* hath deliver'd his ſenſe plainly enough in this matter: for in that *Confeſſion of Faith*, which was preſerved in the Church of *Neo-Cæſarea*, he owns *a perfect Trinity in Glory, Eternity and Power, without Separation or Diverſity of Nature.* On which Doctrine his Form of *Doxology* was grounded. Which S. *Baſil* following, Exceptions were taken againſt it, by ſome as varying from the Form uſed in ſome other places. For the Followers of *Aetius* took advantage from the Expreſſion uſed in thoſe *Doxologies*, *Glory be to the Father, by the Son, and in the Holy Ghoſt*, to infer *a Diſſimilitude in the Son and Holy Ghoſt to the Father, and to make the Son the Inſtrument of the Father, and the Holy Ghoſt only to relate to time and place.* But S. *Baſil* takes a great deal of Pains to ſhew the impertinency of theſe Exceptions. They would

Greg. Thaumat. p. 1.

would fain have charged this *Doxology* as an Innovation on *S. Basil*, because it attributed *equal Honour to Father, Son and Holy Ghost*, which the *Aetians* would not endure; but they said, *That the Son was to be honoured only in Subordination to the Father, and the Holy Ghost as inferiour to both.* But S. *Basil* proves from Scripture an *Equality of Honour* to be due to them: and particularly from *the Form of Baptism*, c. 10. wherein *the Son and Holy Ghost are joyned with the Father, without any note of Distinction. And what more proper token of a Conjunction in the same Dignity, than being put together in such a manner.*

Especially considering these two things. 1. The extream Jealousie of the Jewish Nation, as to joyning the Creatures with God in any thing that related to Divine Honour. But as *S. Basil* argues, *If the Son were a Creature, then we must believe in the Creator, and the Creature together; and by the same reason that one Creature is joyned, the whole Creation may be joyned with him; but,* saith he, *we are not to imagine the least Disunion or Separation between Father, Son and Holy Ghost; nor that they are three distinct parts of one inseparable Being, but that there is an indivisible Conjunction*

of

of three in the ſame Eſſence; ſo that where one is, there is the other alſo. For where the Holy Ghoſt is, there is the Son, and where the Son is, there is the Father. And ſo *Athanaſius* urges the Argument from theſe Words, *That a Creature could not be joyned with the Creator in ſuch a manner as in the Form of Baptiſm*; and it might have been as well ſaid, *Baptize in the Name of the Father, and any other Creature.* And for all that I ſee, our *Unitarians* would have liked ſuch a Form very well; for they parallel it with thoſe in *Scripture*; *and they worſhipped the Lord, and the King*; and *they feared the Lord and Samuel.* But the *Jews* underſtood the different occaſion of ſuch Expreſſions too well, to have born ſuch a Conjunction of Creatures with the Creator in the moſt ſolemn Act of Initiation into a Profeſſion of Religion.

Athanaſ. c Scrap. p. 10.

Anſwer to Milb. p. 18.

2. The *Jews* had a Notion among them of *three diſtinct Subſiſtences in the Deity* ſutable to theſe of *Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt.* This hath been ſhew'd by many as to the Son, or the *Divine Word*; and *Rittangel* makes out the ſame as to *the Holy Ghoſt.* Among the *three Subſiſtences* in the *Mercavah* (which *Rittangel* had proved from their moſt ancient Writings) thoſe which are added to the firſt are *Wiſdom* and *Intelligence,*

Rittang. p. 81

gence, and this laſt is by the old *Chaldee*
P. 113. *Paraphraſt* rendred שכינתא, and he proves it to be applied to God in many places of the *Pentateuch*, where ſuch things are attributed to him, as belong to the Holy
P. 117. Ghoſt. And he particularly ſhews by many places, that the *Schecinah* is not taken for *the Divine Glory*, but that is rendred by other Words (however the Interpreters of the *Chaldee Paraphraſt* have rendred it ſo) but he produces ten places where the *Chaldee Paraphraſt* uſes it in another Senſe; and he leaves, he ſaith, many more to the Readers obſervation. If the *Jews* did of old own *three Subſiſtences* in the ſame Divine Eſſence, there was then great Reaſon to joyn *Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt* in the ſolemn Act of Initiation: But if it be denied, *that they did own any ſuch thing*; they muſt deny their moſt *ancient* Books, and the *Chaldee Paraphraſt*, which they eſteem next to the Text, and *Rittangel* ſaith, *They believe it written by Inſpiration.* That which I chiefly urge, is this, that if theſe things be not very ancient, they muſt be put in by the later *Jews*, to gratifie the *Chriſtians* in the *Doctrine of the Trinity*; which I do not believe any *Jew* will aſſent to. And no one elſe can imagine this, when our

Unitarians

Unitarians ſay, *that the Doctrine of the Trinity is the chief Offence which the Jews take at the Chriſtian Religion.* How then can we ſuppoſe the *Jews* ſhould forge theſe Books on purpoſe to put in ſuch Notions, as were moſt grateful to their Enemies, and hateful to themſelves? *Morinus* hath endeavoured to run down the Credit of the moſt ancient Books of the *Jews*; and among the reſt the Book *Jezirah*, the moſt ancient *Cabbaliſtical* Book among the *Jews*, which he learnedly proves was not written by *Abraham*, (as the *Jews* think.) I will not ſtand with *Morinus* about this; however the Book *Coſri* ſaith, *it was made by* Abraham *before God ſpake to him*, and magnifies it to the King of *Coſar*, as containing an admirable Account of the firſt *Principles* above the *Philoſophers*. *Buxtorf* ſaith, that the Book *Coſri* hath been extant *Nine hundred years*, and in the beginning of it, it is ſaid, *that the Conference was Four hundred years before*, and therein the Book *Jezirah* is alledged as a Book of Antiquity: and there the *three Subſiſtences* of the Deity are repreſented by *Mind, Word, and Hand.* So that this can be no late Invention of *Cabbaliſtical Jews.* But our *Unitarians* utterly deny *that the* Jews *had any* Cabbala *corncerning the*

Anſwer to Dr. Bull, p. 59.

Morin. Exercit. l. 2. l. 10. c. 8.

Coſri Part. 4. p. 316.

P. 302.

the Trinity. And they prove it, *becauſe the* Jews *in* Origen, *and* Juſtin Martyr *deny the Meſſias to be God.* They might as well have brought their Teſtimony to prove Jeſus not to be the *Meſſias*; for the *Jews* of thoſe times, being hard preſſed by the *Chriſtians*, found they could not otherwiſe avoid ſeveral places of the Old Teſtament. But this doth not hinder, but that they might have Notions of *three Subſiſtences* in their ancient Books: which contained neither *late Invention*, nor *Divine Revelations*; but a Traditional notion about the Divine Being, and the *Subſiſtences* in it: and I can find no Arguments againſt it, that deſerve mentioning. For when they ſay *the Jewiſh* Cabbala *was a Pharaſaical Figment*, &c. it needs no anſwer. But what do they ſay to the *Old Paraphraſes*, whereon the main Weight as to this matter lies? All that I can find
P. 61. is, *That they do not ſpeak of diſtinct Perſons*; *but they confeſs that* Philo *ſpeaks home, and therefore they make him a* Chriſtian. But *Philo* had the ſame Notion with the *Paraphraſts*; and their beſt way will be to declare, that they look upon them all as *Chriſtians*; and they might as well affirm it of *Onkelos*, as they do of *Philo*; but I doubt the World will not take their Word for either. But

But to proceed with the *Christian Doxologies*. *Nothing*, saith *S.* Basil, *shall make me forsake the Doctrine I received in my Baptism, when I was first entred into the Christian Church; and I advise all others to keep firm to that Profession of the Holy Trinity, which they made in their Baptism*; that is, *of the indivisible Union of Father, Son and Holy Ghost*. And, as he saith afterwards, *by the Order of the Words in Baptism it appears that as the Son is to the Father, so the Holy Ghost is to the Son. For they are all put without any Distinction or Number, which he observes agrees only to a multitude. For by their Properties they are one and one; yet by the Community of Essence the two are but one:* and he makes it his business to prove *the Holy Ghost to be a proper Object of Adoration as well as the Father and Son, and therefore there was no reason to find fault with the Doxology used in that Church*: and that, Firmilian, Meletius *and the Eastern* Christians *agreed with them in the use of it, and so did all the Western Churches from* Illyricum *to the Worlds end: and this,* he saith, *was by an immemorial Custom of all Churches, and of the greatest men in them.* Nay, more he saith, *It had been continued in the Churches, from the time the Gospel had been*

De Sp. Sancto, c. 10.

c. 17.

c. 18.

c. 29.

been receiv'd among them. And nothing can be fuller than the Authority of his Teſtimony, if S. *Baſil* may be believed.

Euſeb. l. 4. c. 15. To theſe I ſhall add the *Doxology* of *Polycarp* at his Martyrdom, mentioned by *Euſebius*, which is very full to our Purpoſe; *I Glorifie thee by our Eternal High-Prieſt Jeſus Chriſt thy beloved Son, by whom be Glory to thee, with him in the Holy Ghoſt.* What can we imagine *Polycarp* meant by this, but to render the *ſame Glory* to *Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt*; but with ſuch a difference as to the Particles, which S. *Baſil* at large proves come to the ſame thing? And to the ſame purpoſe, not only the Church of *Smyrna*, but *Pionius* the *Martyr*, who tranſcribed the Acts, ſpeaking of *Jeſus Chriſt, with whom be Glory to God the Father, and the Holy Ghoſt*, Theſe ſuffer'd Martyrdom for Chriſtianity, and owned the ſame Divine Honour to the *Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt.*

Valeſ. ad Euſeb. p. 73.

Coteler. VII. p. 1027. What could they mean, if they did not believe them to have the ſame Divine Nature? Can we ſuppoſe them Guilty of ſuch ſtupidity to loſe their Lives, for not giving Divine Honour to Creatures, and at the ſame time to do it themſelves? So that, if the *Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt* were

were not then believed to be three *Perſons and one God*, the Chriſtian Church was mightily deceived; and the Martyrs acted inconſiſtently with their own Principles. Which no good Chriſtian will dare to affirm. But ſome have adventured to ſay, that Polycarp *did not mean the ſame Divine Honour to Father Son, and Holy Ghoſt.* But if he had ſo meant it, how could he have expreſſed it otherwiſe? It was certainly a Worſhip diſtinct from what he gave to *Creatures*; as appears by the Church of *Smyrna*'s diſowning *any Worſhip* but of *Love and Reſpect to their fellow Creatures*, and owning the giving *Adoration to the Son of God*; with whom they joyn both *Father and Holy Ghoſt.* Which it is impoſſible to conceive, that in their Circumſtances, they ſhould have done, unleſs they had believed the ſame Divine Honour to belong to them.

S. Baſil's Teſtimony makes it out of Diſpute, that the *Doxology* to *Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt*, was univerſally receiv'd in the publick Offices of the Church, and that from the time of greateſt Antiquity: So that we have no need of the Teſtimonies from the *Apoſtolical Conſtitutions* (as they are called) to prove it. But I avoid all diſputable Authorities. And I ſhall

C. 29. only add that it appears from S. *Baſil*, that this *Doxology* had been long uſed not only in publick Offices, but in *Occaſional Ejaculations*, as at the bringing in of *Light in the Evening*, *the People*, he ſaith, *were wont to ſay*, *Glory be to the Father*, *and to the Son*, *and to the Holy Ghoſt*, &c. *This*, he ſaith, *had been an ancient Cuſtom among the People*, *and none can tell who brought it in.* But *Prudentius*, ſhews, that it was continued to his Time; as appears by his *Hymn* on that occaſion, which concludes with this *Doxology*, and S. *Hilary* ends his *Hymn* written to his Daughter, in the ſame manner.

Prudent. Cath. Hymn. 5.

Hilar. Op. N. E. p. 1214.

3. I come therefore to the laſt Proof, which I ſhall produce of *the Senſe of the Chriſtian Church*, which is, from the *Teſtimony* of thoſe who wrote in *Defence of our Religion againſt Infidels*. In which I ſhall be the ſhorter, ſince the particular Teſtimonies of the Fathers, have been ſo fully produced, and defended by others, eſpecially by Dr. *Bull*.

Apol. 2. p. 94. *Juſtin Martyr* in his *Apology* for the *Chriſtians*, gives an account of the *Form of Baptiſm*, as it was adminiſtred among *Chriſtians*, which he ſaith, was *in the Name of God the Father of all*, *and of our Saviour Jeſus Chriſt*, *and of the Holy Ghoſt*.

Ghoſt. And he ſpake of them as of *diſtinct Perſons*, as appears by his words afterwards. *They who take the Son to be the Father, neither know the Father nor the Son, who being the Word and firſt begotten is God.* And when he ſpeaks of the *Euchariſt*, he ſaith, *That it is offer'd to the Father of all, by the Name of the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt:* and of other ſolemn Acts of Devotion, he ſaith, *That in all of them they praiſe God the Father of all, by his Son Jeſus Chriſt, and the Holy Ghoſt.* And in other places, he mentions the Worſhip they give to *Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt.* Indeed he mentions a *difference of Order* between them; but makes no *Difference* as to the *Worſhip* given to them. And all this in no long *Apology* for the *Chriſtian Faith.* What can be the meaning of this, if he did not take it for granted, that the Chriſtian Church embraced the Doctrine of the *Trinity in Baptiſm? Juſtin Martyr* was no ſuch weak Man to go about to expoſe the Chriſtian Religion inſtead of defending it; and he muſt have done ſo, if he did not believe this not only to be a true, but a neceſſary part of the Chriſtian Faith. For, why did he at all mention ſuch a Myſterious and dark Point? Why did he not conceal it,

P. 26. P. 97. P. 98. P. 56. P. 60.

(as ſome would have done) and only repreſent to the Emperours, the fair and plauſible part of Chriſtianity? No, he was a Man of great Sincerity, and a through Chriſtian himſelf; and therefore thought he could not honeſtly conceal ſo fundamental a Point of the Chriſtian Faith, and which related to their being entred into the Chriſtian Church For if the Profeſſion of this Faith had not been look'd on as a neceſſary condition of being a Member of the Church of Chriſt; it is hard to imagine, that *Juſtin Martyr* ſhould ſo much inſiſt upon it, not only here, but in his other Treatiſes: Of which an Account hath been given by others.

Athenagoras had been a *Philoſopher*, as well as *Juſtin Martyr*, before he profeſſed himſelf a Chriſtian; and therefore, muſt be ſuppoſed to underſtand his Religion before he embraced it. And in his Defence he aſſerts, *That the Chriſtians do believe in Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt; in God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghoſt.* And he mentions both *the Unity and Order which is among them.* Which can ſignifie nothing unleſs they be owned to be diſtinct Perſons in the ſame Divine Nature. And in the next Page, he looks on

Athenag. p. 11.

on it, as a thing which all Christians aspire after in another Life, *That they shall then know the Union of the Father, and the Communication of the Father to the Son, what the Holy Ghost is, and what Union and Distinction there is between the Holy Ghost, the Son and the Father.* No man who had ever had the name of a *Philosopher* would have said such things, unless he had believed the Doctrine of the *Trinity* as we do, *i.e.* that there are three distinct Persons in the same Divine Nature, but that the manner of the Union, and distinction between them, is above our reach and comprehension.

But our *Unitarians* have an Answer ready for these men, *viz. That they came out of* Plato's *School, with the Tincture of his three Principles; and they sadly complain, that* Platonism *had very early corrupted the Christian Faith as to these matters.* *Defence of the Hist. of the Unit. p. 5.*

In answer to which Exception, I have only one *Postulatum* to make; which is, that these were honest Men, and knew their own Minds best, and I shall make it appear, that none can more positively declare, than they do, that they did not take up these Notions from *Plato*, but from the *Holy Scriptures*; *Justin Martyr* saith he *Resp. ad Judic. Eccl. p. 174, 178.*

Just. Apol. 2. Paræ. ad Græc. p. 18, 22, 24. *took the Foundation of his Faith from thence*, and *that he could find no certainty as to God and Religion any where elſe*: that *he thinks*, Plato *took his three Principles from* Moſes; and in his Dialogue with *Trypho*, he at large proves the *Eternity of the Son of God from the Scriptures*; and ſaid, *He would uſe no other Arguments, for he pretended to no Skill but in the Scriptures, which God had enabled him to underſtand.*

Dial. cum Trypho, p. 274, &c.

Athenag. p. 8, 9. *Athenagoras* declares, *That where the Philoſophers agreed with them, their Faith did not depend on them, but on the Teſtimony of the Prophets, who were inſpired by the Holy Ghoſt.*

Theophil. ad Autolyc. p. 100. To the ſame purpoſe ſpeaks *Theophilus* Biſhop of *Antioch*, who aſſerts the *Coeternity of the Son with the Father, from the beginning of S* John's *Goſpel*; and ſaith, *their Faith is built on the Scriptures.*

Clemens Pæd. l. 3. c. 7. *Clemens Alexandrinus* owns not only, the *Eſſential Attributes of God to belong to the Son*; but *that there is one Father of all, and one Word over all, and one Holy Ghoſt who is every where.*

Str. l. 4. p. 517. Prof. p. 68. And he thinks, Plato *borrowed his three Principles from* Moſes; *that his ſecond was the Son, and his third the Holy Spirit.*

Even

Even *Origen* himſelf highly commends *Moſes above* Plato, in his moſt undoubted Writings, and ſaith, *That* Numenius *went beyond* Plato, and *that he borrowed out of the Scriptures*; and ſo he ſaith, Plato *did* in other places; but he adds, *That the Doctrines were better deliver'd in Scripture, than in his Artificial Dialogues.* Can any one that hath the leaſt reverence for Writers of ſuch Authority and Zeal for the Chriſtian Doctrine, imagine that they wilfully corrupted it in one of the chief Articles of it; and brought in new Speculations againſt the Senſe of thoſe Books, which at the ſame time, they profeſſed to be the only Rule of their Faith? Even where they ſpeak moſt favourably of the *Platonick* Trinity, they ſuppoſe it to be borrowed from *Moſes*.

Præd. *l.* 1. *c.* 6. Str. *l.* 5. *p.* 598. Orig. c. Celſ. *l.* 1. *p.* 16. *l.* 4. *p.* 198. *l.* 6. *p.* 275, 279, *&c.* 38. *l.* 7. *p.* 351, 371.

And therefore *Numenius* ſaid, *That* Moſes *and* Plato *did not differ about the firſt Principles*; and *Theodoret* mentions *Numenius* as one of thoſe, who ſaid, Plato *underſtood the Hebrew Doctrine in* Egypt; and during his Thirteen years ſtay there, it is hardly poſſible to ſuppoſe, he ſhould be ignorant of the *Hebrew Doctrine*, about the *firſt Principles*, which he was ſo inquiſitive after, eſpecially among Nations, who pretended to Antiquity.

Clem. Alex. Str. 1. Euſeb. Præp. *l.* 8. Theod. Serm. 1.

And the *Platonick Notion* of the *Divine Eſſence inlarging it ſelf to three Hypoſtaſes*, is conſiderable on theſe Accounts:

1. That it is deliver'd with ſo much aſſurance by the Oppoſers of Chriſtianity; ſuch as *Plotinus*, *Porphyrius*, *Proclus* and others were known to be, and they ſpeak with no manner of doubt concerning it; as may be ſeen in the paſſages of *Porphyrie* preſerved by *S. Cyril* and others.

Cyril. c. Jul. l. 1. & l. 8.

2. That they took it up from no Revelation; but as a Notion in it ſelf agreeable enough; as appears by the paſſages in *Plato* and others concerning it. They never ſuſpected it to be liable to the Charge of *Non Senſe*, and *Contradictions*, as our modern *Unitarians* charge the Trinity with; although their Notion as repreſented by *Porphyrie* be as liable to it. How came theſe Men of Wit and Senſe, to hit upon, and be ſo fond of ſuch abſurd Principles which lead to the Belief of Myſteries *Non Senſe*, and *Impoſſibilities*; if theſe Men may be truſted?

3. That the Nations moſt renowned for Antiquity and deep Speculations, did light upon the ſame Doctrine, about a Trinity of *Hypoſtaſes* in the Divine Eſſence. To prove this I ſhall not refer to the *Triſmegiſtick Books*, or the *Chaldee Oracles*,

Oracles, or any doubtful Authorities; but *Plutarch* aſſerts the *three Hypoſtaſes to have been receiv'd among the* Perſians, and *Porphyry*, and *Jamblicus*, ſay the ſame of the *Egyptians*.

Plutarch de Iſid. & Oſirid. p. 369. ed. Fr. Euſebius Præp. E. l. 3. c. 11. Jamb. de Myſt. Sect. 8. c. 2. Macrob. in Som. Scipion. l. 1. c. 14.

4. That this *Hypoſtaſis* did maintain its Reputation ſo long in the World For we find it continued to the time of *Macrobius*; who mentions it as a reaſonable Notion, *viz.* of *one ſupreme Being, Father of all, and a Mind proceeding from it, and Soul from Mind.* Some have thought *that the* Platoniſts *made two created Beings, to be two of the Divine Hypoſtaſes*; but this is contrary to what *Plotinus* and *Porphyry* affirm concerning it, and it is hard to give an Account, how they ſhould then be Eſſentially different from Creatures, and be *Hypotheſes in the Divine Eſſence.* But this is no part of my buſineſs, being concerned no farther, than to clear the Senſe of the Chriſtian Church, as to the *Form of Baptiſm in the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt*; which according to the Senſe of *the Ante Nicene Fathers*, I have proved, doth manifeſt the Doctrine of the Trinity, to have been generally receiv'd in the Chriſtian Church.

2. Let

2. Let us now ſee what our *Unitarians* object againſt the Proof of the Trinity from theſe words.

Anſwer to Milb. p. 17.

1. They ſay, *That there is a Note of diſtinction and Superiority. For Chriſt owns, that his Power was given to him by the Father.*

There is no queſtion, but that the Perſon who ſuffer'd on the Croſs, had Power given to him, after his Reſurrection; but the true Queſtion is, whether his *Sonſhip* were then given to him. He was then *declared to be the Son of God with Power, and had a Name* or Authority *given him above every Name; being exalted to be a Prince and a Saviour, to give Repentance, and Remiſſion of Sins:* in order to which *he* now appointed his Apoſtles *to teach all Nations; baptizing them in the Name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt.* He doth not ſay in the name of *Jeſus*, who ſuffer'd on the Croſs; nor in the name of *Jeſus the Chriſt* now exalted; but in the name of *Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt:* and although there were a double Gift with reſpect *to the Son and Holy Ghoſt*; the one, as to his Royal Authority over the Church; the other, as to his extraordinary Effuſion on the Apoſtles, yet neither of theſe are ſo much as intimated; but the

Office

Office of Baptiſm is required to be performed in the Name of theſe three as diſtinct and yet equal; without any Relation to any Gift, either as to the *Son or Holy Ghoſt*. But if the ancient *Jews* were in the Right, as we think they were, then we have a plain account, how theſe came to be thus mention'd in the Form of Baptiſm, *viz.* that theſe three diſtinct Subſiſtences in the Divine Eſſence, were not now to be kept up as a ſecret Myſtery from the World; but that the Chriſtian Church was to be formed upon the Belief of it.

2. They bring *ſeveral places of Scripture, where God and his Creatures are joyned, without any Note of diſtinction or Superiority*; *as, The people feared the Lord, and* Samuel, 1 Sam. 12. 18. *They worſhipped the Lord, and the King*, 1 Chron. 29. 20. *I charge thee before God and the Lord Jeſus Chriſt, and his elect Angels*, 1 Tim. 5. 21. *The Spirit and the Bride ſay come*, Revel. 22. 17.

But can any Man of Senſe imagine, theſe places contain a Parallel with a Form of Words, wherein men are entred into the Profeſſion of a new Religion, and by which they were to be diſtinguiſhed from all other Religions? In the former places, the Circumſtances were ſo notorious

rious as to *God*, and the *Civil Magiſtrate*, *that* it ſhews no more than that the ſame external Acts may be uſed to both, but with ſuch a different Intention as all men underſtood it. What if S. *Paul* name *the elect Angels* in a ſolemn Obteſtation to *Timothy*, together with *God, and the Lord Jeſus Chriſt?* What can this prove, but that we may call God and his Creatures to be Witneſſes together of the ſame thing? And ſo *Heaven and Earth* are called to bear Witneſs againſt obſtinate Sinners: May men therefore be baptized in the name of *God and his Creatures? The Spirit and Bride* may ſay *come* without any Incongruity; but it would have been ſtrange indeed, if they had ſaid, *Come be baptized in the name of the Spirit and the Bride.* So that theſe Inſtances are very remote from the purpoſe.

But they ſay farther, *That the ancients of the firſt Four hundred years do not inſiſt on this place, to prove the Divinity or Perſonality of the Son or Spirit.* As to the firſt *Three hundred years*, I have given an account already; and as to the *Fourth Century*, I could not have thought, that they would have mention'd it: ſince there is ſcarce a Father of the Church in that time, who had occaſion to do it, but makes

makes use of the Argument from this place to prove *the Divinity* and *Personality of the Son and Spirit.*

Athanasius saith, *That Christ founded his Church on the Doctrine of the Trinity contained in these Words; and if the Holy Ghost had been of a different Nature, from the Father and Son, he would never have been joyned with them in a Form of Baptism, no more than an Angel, or any other Creature. For the Trinity must be Eternal and Indivisible, which it could not be, if any created Being were in it,* and therefore he disputes against the *Arian Baptism,* although performed with the same Words, because *they joyned God and a Creature together in Baptism.* To the same purpose argue *Didymus, Gregory Nazianzen, S. Basil* and others, within the Compass of four hundred years, whose Testimonies are produced by *Petavius*; to whom I refer the Reader, if he hath a mind to be satisfied in so clear a Point, that I cannot but think our *Unitarians* never intended to take in the *Fathers* after the Council of *Nice,* who are so expressly against them; and therefore I pass it over as a slip.

Athan. Ep. ad Serapion p. 14. Tom. 2. Ad Sec. p. Tom. 1. p. 185, 179.

Or. 3. c. Arian p. 413.

Petavius T. II. l. 2. c. 12. sect. 8.

4. They object, *That the Form of Baptism implies no more, than being admitted into*

Hist. of the Unitar. p. 25.

into that Religion which proceeds from God the Father, and deliver'd by his Son, and confirmed by the Teſtimony of the Holy Ghoſt. So much we grant is implied, but the Queſtion ſtill remains, whether the *Son* and *Holy Ghoſt* are here to be conſider'd only in order to their *Operations*, or whether the Perſons of the *Son and Holy Ghoſt*, from whom thoſe Effects came, are not here chiefly intended? For if no more had been meant, but theſe Effects, then the right Form of admiſſion had not been, *into the Name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt*; but *in the Name of the Father alone*, as *Revealing* himſelf by his *Son*, and *Confirming* it by the miraculous Works of the *Holy Ghoſt*. For theſe are only ſubſervient Acts to the deſign of God the *Father, as the only ſubſiſting Perſon.*

4. They tell us, *That it is in vain, not to ſay ridiculouſly pretended, that a Perſon or thing is God, becauſe we are baptized into it; for ſome were baptized into* Moſes, *and others into* John's *Baptiſm, and ſo* Moſes *and* John Baptiſt *would be Gods; and to be baptized into a Perſon or Perſons, and in the name of ſuch a Perſon is the ſame thing.* Grant this; yet there is a great difference between being baptized in the name of *a Miniſter of Baptiſm*, and of *the*

Author

Author of a Religion, into which they are baptized. The Iſraelites *were baptized unto* Moſes; but how? The *Syriac* and *Arabic Verſions* render it *per Moſen*; and ſo S. *Auguſtin* reads it. And this ſeems to be the moſt natural ſenſe of the Word, εἰς, being put for διὰ, as it is *Act.* 7. 53. compared with *Gal.* 3. 19. And the force of the Apoſtle's Argument, doth not lie in the Parallel between being *baptized into* Moſes, *and into Chriſt*; but in the Privileges they had under the *Miniſtery of* Moſes with thoſe which Chriſtians enjoyed. The other place implies no more, than being enter'd into that Profeſſion, which John *baptized his Diſciples into.* But doth any one imagine, that becauſe *John Baptiſt* did enter his *Diſciples* by Baptiſm, therefore they muſt believe him to be God? I know none that lay the force of the Argument upon any thing parallel to thoſe Places. But it depends upon laying the Circumſtances together. Here was a new Religion to be taught mankind, and they were to be entred into it, not by a bare verbal Profeſſion, but by a ſolemn Rite of Baptiſm; and this *Baptiſm* is declar'd to be *in the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt:* which cannot be underſtood of their *Miniſtery*, and

Aug. *in Pſal.* 77.

and therefore muſt relate to that Faith, which they were baptized into, which was concerning *the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt.* And ſo the Chriſtian Church underſtood it, from the beginning, as I have proved in the foregoing Diſcourſe.

And from hence came the Inſtruction of *Catechumens.* who were to be baptized about the *Trinity*; and the firſt *Creeds* which related only to them, as I have already obſerved. And ſo much our *Unitarians* grant in one of their lateſt Pamphlets, that a *Creed was an Inſtitution, or Inſtruction what we are to believe in the main, and fundamental Articles, eſpecially concerning the Perſons of Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt.* But they contend, *That the Creed which bears the Name of the Apoſtles, was the Original Creed framed by the Apoſtles themſelves, becauſe they ſuppoſe this Creed doth not aſſert the Son and Holy Ghoſt, to be eternal and Divine Perſons, and therefore they conclude, that the Makers of this Creed, either did not know, that any other Perſon but the Father is God, or Almighty, or Maker of Heaven and Earth, or they have negligently, or wickedly concealed it.*

Anſwer to Dr. Bull, p. 17.

This is a matter ſo neceſſary to be clear'd, that I ſhall examine theſe two things

things before I put an end to this Diſcourſe.

1. What Proofs they bring that this *Creed* was framed by the Apoſtles.

2. What Evidence they produce, that this *Creed* excludes the *Divinity of the Son and Holy Ghoſt.*

1. As to the Proofs they bring, that this *Creed* was framed by the Apoſtles. We believe the *Creed* to be *Apoſtolical* in the *true Senſe* of it; but that it was ſo in that *Frame of Words*, and Enumeration of Articles, as it is now receiv'd, hath been called in queſtion by ſome *Criticks* of great Judgment and Learning, whom I have already mentioned. *Eraſmus* ſaith, *He doth not queſtion the Articles being Apoſtolical; but whether the Apoſtles put it thus into Writing.* And his chief Argument is from the *Variety* of the *Ancient Creeds*; of which no Account can be given ſo probable, as that they were added *Occaſionally* in oppoſition to a growing Hereſie. As for Inſtance, the Word *impaſſible* was inſerted with Reſpect to the Father in the ancient *Eaſtern Creed*, againſt the Doctrine of *Sabellius*; but it was not in the old *Weſtern Creed.* And he argues, That the *Apoſtolical Creed* ended with the Holy Ghoſt; becauſe the

Eraſ. ad Conſ. Pariſ. Tit. II.

Voſſ. de tribus Symb. Diſſert. 1. Sect. 47.

Nicene Creed did ſo. And *Voſſius* thinks the other Articles which are in *Cyril*, were added after the *Nicene Council*; which would not have omitted them, if they had been in the former Creed. And when there were ſo many *Creeds* made afterwards, it is obſervable, that they do all end with the Article of the *Holy Ghoſt*; which they would never have done, in ſo jealous a time about *Creeds*, if they had left out any Articles of what was then receiv'd for the *Apoſtolical Creed*.

Hilar. de Synod. p. 1169.

The firſt *Creed* after the *Nicene*, which made great noiſe in the World, was that framed at *Antioch*; and that *Creed* not only ends with the Article of the Holy Ghoſt; but mentions the *Form* of *Baptiſm*; *and our Saviours commanding his Apoſtles to baptize in the Name of the Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt*; as the Foundation of the Creed. *For it hereby appears, that the Father is true Father, and the Son true Son, and the Holy Ghoſt true Holy Ghoſt*; *not bare Names, but ſuch as import three diſtinct Subſiſtences.*

Epiphanius hær. 73. n. 17.

For *Hilary* obſerves, That this Council chiefly intended to overthrow *Sabellianiſm*, and therefore aſſerted *tres Subſiſtentium Perſonas*, as *Hilary* interprets their meaning, and ſo doth *Epiphanius*; which was to remove

remove the Suſpition, that they aſſerted only *triplicis vocabuli Unionem*; as *Hilary* ſpeaks. The next *Creed* is of the Eaſtern Biſhops at *Sardica*, and that ends with *the Holy Ghoſt*, and ſo do both the Creeds at *Sirmium*; and the latter calls the *Article of the Trinity*, *the cloſe of our Faith*; which is always to be kept according to our Saviour's command, *Go teach all Nations, baptizing them in the Name of the Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt.* So that in all theſe *Creeds*, about which there was ſo much heat in the Chriſtian Church, there was not the leaſt Objection, that any Articles of the *Apoſtolical Creed* were omitted. It is no Argument, That there was then no conteſt about theſe Articles; for they were bound to give in an entire Creed; and ſo the Council of *Antioch* declares, that they would publiſh the *Confeſſion of the Faith of the Church*; and how could this be, if they left out ſuch Articles which had been always receiv'd from the Apoſtles times? But certainly our *Unitarians* would not attack ſuch Men, as *Eraſmus*, and *Voſſius* in a matter relating to Antiquity, if they had not ſome good Arguments on their ſide. Their firſt buſineſs, is to ſhew, that ſome of *Voſſius* his Arguments are not concluſive;

Clauſula Fidei in Edit. nuperâ Pariſ. ex MSS.

ſuch as they are, I leave them to any one that will compare them with the Anſwers. But there are two things they lay weight upon.

P. 27. 1. *That the whole Chriſtian Church Eaſt and Weſt, could not have agreed in the ſame Creed, as to Number and Order of Articles, and manner of Expreſſion, if this Creed had not come from the ſame Perſons, from whom they receiv'd the Goſpel and the Scriptures; Namely, from the Apoſtles and Preachers of Chriſtianity.*

P. 28. 2. *That it was receiv'd by a conſtant Tradition to have been the Apoſtles*; not a bare *Oral Tradition*, but *the Tradition of the ancient Commentators upon it.*

Now theſe I confeſs to be as good Arguments, as the Matter will bear; and I will no longer conteſt this Point with them, provided, that we be allowed to make uſe of the ſame Arguments; as to the ſecond Point; wherein they undertake to prove, *That the Apoſtles Creed doth exclude the Divinity of the Son and Holy Ghoſt.* What is now become of the *general Conſent of the Chriſtian Church, Eaſt and Weſt? and of the Commentators upon this Creed?* If the Argument hold good in one Caſe, I hope it will be allowed to do ſo in the other alſo. And what

what greater Teſtimony can be given of ſuch a *Conſent of the Chriſtian Church*, than that thoſe who oppoſed it, have been condemned by it, and that the Church hath expreſſed her Senſe of it in *Publick*, and *Private Acts* of *Devotion*, and *Divine Worſhip*, and have defended it as a neceſſary part of the *Chriſtian Faith*, againſt the Aſſaults of *Infidels* and *Hereticks*? So that although the *Apoſtles Creed* do not in expreſs words declare, *The Divinity of the three Perſons in the Unity of the Divine Eſſence*; yet taking the *Senſe* of thoſe Articles, as the *Chriſtian Church* underſtood them from the Apoſtles times, then we have as full, and clear Evidence of this Doctrine, as we have *that we receiv'd the Scriptures from them.*

CHAP. X.

The Objections againſt the Trinity in Point of Reaſon anſwer'd.

HAving in the foregoing Chapters indeavour'd to clear the Doctrine of the *Trinity* from the charge of *Contradictions*, and to prove it agreeable to the *Senſe* of *Scripture*, and the *Primitive Church*;

I now come in the next place to Examine the remaining Objections, in point of Reaſon; and thoſe are,

1. That this Doctrine is ſaid to be a *Myſtery*, and therefore *above Reaſon*, and we cannot in reaſon be obliged to believe any ſuch thing.

2. That if we allow any ſuch *Myſteries of Faith* as are *above Reaſon*, there can be no ſtop put to any abſurd Doctrines, but they may be receiv'd on the ſame Grounds.

1. As to this Doctrine being ſaid to be *above Reaſon*, and therefore not to be believ'd; we muſt conſider two things;

1. What we underſtand by *Reaſon*;

2. What ground in Reaſon there is, to reject any Doctrine *above it*, when it is propoſed as a Matter of Faith.

1, What

1. What we underſtand by *Reaſon.* I do not find that our *Unitarians* have explained the *Nature* and *Bounds* of *Reaſon* in ſuch manner, as thoſe ought to have done, who make it the Rule and Standard of what they are to believe. But ſometimes they ſpeak of *clear and diſtinct Perceptions,* ſometimes of *natural Ideas,* ſometimes of *congenit Notions,* &c. But a late Author hath endeavour'd to make amends for this, and takes upon him to make this matter clear; and to be ſure to do ſo, he begins with telling us, *That Reaſon is not the Soul abſtractedly conſider'd;* (no doubt of it) *but the Soul acting in a peculiar manner is Reaſon.* (And this is a very *peculiar way* of explaining it.) But farther we are told, *It is not the Order or Report* (reſpect I ſuppoſe) *which is naturally between all things.* (But that implies a Reaſon in things.) *But the thoughts which the Soul forms of things according to it, may properly claim that Title,* i. e. ſuch thoughts which are agreeable to the Reaſon of things are reaſonable thoughts. This is clear and diſtinct. And I perfectly agree with him, *That our own Inclinations, or the bare Authority of others is not Reaſon.* But what is it? *Every one experiences in himſelf a Power, or Faculty of forming vari-*

Anſwer to my Sermon p. 4. *Letter of Reſolution,* p. 3. *Chriſtianity not myſterious,* p. 8, 9.

ous Ideas, or Perceptions of things; of affirming, or denying according as he ſees them to agree or diſagree, and this is Reaſon in General. It is not the bare receiving Ideas into the Mind, that is ſtrictly Reaſon, (who ever thought it was?) *but the Perception of the Agreement, or Diſagreement of our Ideas in a greater or leſſer Number; wherein ſoever this Agreement or Diſagreement may conſiſt. If the Perception be immediate without the Aſſiſtance of any other Idea, this is not call'd Reaſon, but Self-Evidence: but when the mind makes uſe of intermediate Idea's to diſcover that Agreement or Diſagreement, this method of Knowledge is properly call'd Reaſon or Demonſtration. And ſo Reaſon is defined to be that Faculty of the Soul, which diſcovers the certainty of any thing dubious or obſcure, by comparing it with ſomething evidently known.*

This is offer'd to the World, as an Account of Reaſon; but to ſhew how very looſe, and unſatisfactory it is, I deſire it may be conſider'd that this Doctrine ſuppoſes, that we muſt have *clear and diſtinct Ideas* of whatever we pretend to any certainty of in our Minds, and that the only Way to attain this certainty, is by comparing theſe *Ideas* together. Which excludes

excludes all certainty of Faith or Reaſon, where we cannot have ſuch *clear and diſtinct Ideas*. But if there are many things of which we may be certain, and yet can have no *clear and diſtinct Ideas* of them; if thoſe *Ideas* we have, are too imperfect and obſcure to form our Judgments by; if we cannot find out ſufficient *intermediate Ideas*; then this cannot be the *Means* of *Certainty*, or the *Foundation* of *Reaſon*.

But I ſhall keep to our preſent Subject; and our certainty of it in Point of Reaſon, depends upon our Knowledge of the Nature of *Subſtance*, and *Perſon* and the *Diſtinction* between them: but if we can have no ſuch *clear Ideas* in our Minds concerning theſe things, as are required from *Senſation*, or *Reflection*; then, either we have no uſe of *Reaſon* about them, or it is inſufficient to paſs any Judgment concerning them.

1. I begin with the Notion of *Subſtance*. And I have great Reaſon to begin with it; for, according to this Man's Principles their can be no certainty of Reaſon at all about it. And ſo our new Way of Reaſon is advanced to very good Purpoſe: For we may talk and diſpute about *Subſtance*, as long as we pleaſe, but, if his Principles of Reaſon be true, we can come

to no certainty; ſince we can have no *clear Idea* in our Minds concerning it, as will appear from his own Words; and the method he proceeds in.

Chap. I. (1.) He ſaith, *That the Mind receives in Ideas two ways.* 1. *By Intromiſſion of the Senſes, as Colours, Figures, Sounds, Smells,* &c. 2. *By the Souls conſidering its own Operations about what it thus gets from without, as knowing, doubting, affirming, denying,* &c.

(2.) *That theſe ſimple and diſtinct Ideas, thus laid up in the great Repoſitory of the Underſtanding are the ſole matter and Foundation of all our Reaſoning.*

Then it folllows, That we can have *no Foudation of Reaſoning*, where there can be no ſuch *Ideas* from *Senſation, or Reflection.*

Now this is the Caſe of *Subſtance*; it is not *intromitted by the Senſes*, nor depends upon *the Operations of the Mind*; and ſo it cannot be within the compaſs of our Reaſon. And therefore I do not wonder, that the Gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning, have almoſt diſcarded *Subſtance* out of the reaſonable part of the World. For they not only tells us, *That we can have no Idea of it by Senſation or Reflection*; but that *nothing is ſignified by it,*

Human under ſtanding, l. 1. chap. 4. ſect. 18.

it, only an uncertain Suppoſition of we know not what. And therefore it is parallel'd, more than once, with the *Indian Philoſophers, He knew not what; which ſupported the* Tortoiſe, *that ſupported the* Elephant, *that ſupported the Earth*; ſo *Subſtance was found out only to ſupport Accidents.* And, *that when we talk of Subſtances we talk like Children, who being ask'd a Queſtion, about ſomewhat which they know not, readily give this ſatisfactory Anſwer, that it is Something.* *L. 2. c. 13. ſect. 19.* *Chap. 23. ſect. 2.*

If this be the truth of the Caſe, we muſt ſtill *talk like Children,* and I know not how it can be remedied. For, if we cannot come at a rational Idea of *Subſtance,* we can have no Principle of certainty to go upon in this Debate.

I do not ſay, that we can have a *clear Idea of Subſtance,* either by *Senſation* or *Reflexion*; but from hence I argue, that this is a very inſufficient Diſtribution of the *Ideas* neceſſary to Reaſon. For beſides theſe, there muſt be ſome *general Ideas,* which the mind doth form, not by *meer comparing thoſe Ideas it has got from Senſe or Reflection*; but by forming diſtinct general Notions of things from particular *Ideas.* And among theſe geral Notions, or rational *Ideas*, *Subſtance*

ſtance is one of the firſt; becauſe we find that we can have no true Conceptions of any *Modes* or *Accidents* (no matter which) but we muſt conceive a *Subſtratum*, or Subject wherein they are. Since it is a Repugnancy to our firſt Conceptions of things, that *Modes* or *Accidents* ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves, and therefore the *Rational Idea* of *Subſtance* is one of the firſt, and moſt natural *Ideas* in our minds.

But we are ſtill told, *That our Underſtanding can have no other Ideas, but either from Senſation or Reflection.* And *that, herein chiefly lies the Excellency of mankind, above Brutes, that theſe cannot abſtract, and inlarge their Ideas, as men do.*

L. 2. ch. 1. ſect. 5.

But how comes the *general Idea* of *Subſtance*, to be framed in our Minds? Is this by *Abſtracting* and *inlarging ſimple Ideas*? No, *but it is by a Complication of many ſimple Ideas together: becauſe not imagining how theſe ſimple Ideas can ſubſiſt by themſelves, we accuſtom our ſelves to ſuppoſe ſome* Subſtratum *wherein they do ſubſiſt, and from which they do reſult, which therefore we call Subſtance.* And is this all indeed, that is to be ſaid for the being of *Subſtance*, *that we accuſtom our ſelves to ſuppoſe a* Subſtratum? Is that *Cuſtom* grounded upon true Reaſon or not? If not, then

L. 2. ch. 23. ſect. 1.

then *Accidents* or *Modes*, muſt ſubſiſt of themſelves, and theſe *ſimple Ideas* need no *Tortoiſe* to ſupport them: For *Figures* and *Colours*, &c. would do well enough of themſelves, but for ſome Fancies *men have accuſtomed themſelves to.* If it be grounded on plain and evident Reaſon, then we muſt allow an *Idea* of *Subſtance*, which comes not in by *Senſation* or *Reflection*; and ſo we may be certain of ſome things which we have not by thoſe *Ideas.*

The Idea of Subſtance, we are told again, *is nothing but the ſuppoſed, but unknown ſupport of thoſe Qualities we find exiſting, which we imagine cannot ſubſiſt* ſine re ſubſtante *which according to the true import of the word, is in plain Engliſh, ſtanding under, or upholding.* But very little weight is to be laid upon a bare *Grammatical Etymology*, when the word is uſed in another Senſe by the beſt Authors, ſuch as *Cicero* and *Quintilian*, who take *Subſtance* for the ſame with *Eſſence*; as *Valla* hath proved; and ſo the Greek word imports; but *Boethius* in tranſlating *Ariſtotle's Predicaments*, rather choſe the word *Subſtance* as more proper, to expreſs a *Compound Being*, and reſerved *Eſſence*, for what was more ſimple and immaterial. And in this

Valla Diſput. Dial. l. 1. c. 6.

this Senſe, *Subſtance* was not applied to God but only *Eſſence*, as S. *Auguſtin* obſerves, but afterwards, the names of *Subſtance*, and *Eſſence* were promiſcuouſly uſed, with reſpect to God and his Creatures. And do imply, that which makes the *Real Being*, as diſtinguiſhed from *Modes* and *Properties*. And ſo the *Subſtance*, and *Eſſence* of a Man are the ſame; not being taken for the *individual Subſtance*, which cannot be underſtood without particular *Modes* and *Properties*; but the general Subſtance, or Nature of Man abſtractly for all the Circumſtances of Perſons.

And I deſire to know, whether according to true Reaſon, that be not a *clear Idea* of a Man; not of *Peter*, *James* or *John*, but of a Man as ſuch. This is not a meer *univerſal Name*, or *Mark*, or *Sign*; but there is as clear and diſtinct a Conception of this in our Minds, as we can have from any ſuch *ſimple Ideas*, as are convey'd by our Senſes. I do not deny that the Diſtinction of particular Subſtances, is by the ſeveral Modes and Properties of them, (which they may call *a Complication of ſimple Ideas*, if they pleaſe) but I do aſſert, that the *general Idea*, which relates to the *Eſſence* without theſe

is

is ſo juſt, and true an *Idea*, that without it *the Complication of Simple Ideas*, will never give us a right Notion of it.

I muſt do that right to the ingenious Author of *the Eſſay of humane Underſtanding* (from whence theſe Notions are borrowed to ſerve other Purpoſes than he intended them) that he makes the Caſe of *Spiritual*, and *Corporeal Subſtances* to be alike, as to their *Idea's*, and *that we have as clear a Notion of a Spirit, as we have of a Body, the one being ſuppoſed to be the* Subſtratum *to thoſe ſimple Ideas we have from without, and the other of thoſe Operations we find within our ſelves. And that it is as rational to affirm, there is no Body, becauſe we cannot know its Eſſence, as 'tis called, or have no Idea of the Subſtance of Matter; as to ſay, there is no Spirit, becauſe we know not its Eſſence, or have no Idea of a Spiritual Subſtance.* Chap. 23. ſect. 5.

From hence it follows, That we may be certain, that there are both *Spiritual and Bodily Subſtances*, although we can have *no clear and diſtinct Ideas of them*. But, if our Reaſon depend upon our *clear and diſtinct Idea's*; how is this poſſible? We cannot reaſon without *clear Idea's*, and yet we may be certain without them: Can we be certain without Reaſon? Or doth our Reaſon

Reaſon gives us true Notions of things, without theſe *Idea's*? If it be ſo, this new *Hypotheſis* about Reaſon muſt appear to be very unreaſonable.

Let us ſuppoſe this Principle to be true, *That the ſimple Ideas* by Senſation or Reflection, *are the ſole Matter and Foundation of all our Reaſoning*: I ask then, how we come to be certain that there are *Spiritual Subſtances* in the World, ſince we can have no *clear and diſtinct Ideas* concerning them? Can we be certain without *any Foundation of Reaſon*? This is a new ſort of Certainty, for which we do not envy theſe Pretenders to *Reaſon*. But methinks they ſhould not at the ſame time aſſert the abſolute neceſſity of theſe *Ideas* to our knowledge, and declare that we may have certain Knowledge without them. If there be any other method, they overthrow their own Principle; if there be none, how come they to any Certainty, that there are both *Bodily* and *Spiritual Subſtances*?

As to theſe latter (which is my buſineſs) I muſt enquire farther, how they come to know that there are ſuch. The Anſwer *is by Self-Reflection on thoſe Powers we find in our ſelves, which cannot come from a mere Bodily Subſtance.* I allow the

the Reaſon to be very good, but the Queſtion I ask is, whether this Argument be from the *clear and diſtinct Idea* or not? *We have Ideas in our ſelves of the ſeveral Operations of our Minds of Knowing, Willing, Conſidering,* &c. *which cannot come from a Bodily Subſtance.* Very true; but is all this contained in the *ſimple Idea* of theſe *Operations*? How can that be, when the ſame Perſons ſay, that notwithſtanding their *Ideas* it is poſſible *for Matter to Think.* For it is ſaid, *That we have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking, but poſſibly ſhall never be able to know, whether any mere material Being thinks or not; it being impoſſible for us by the Contemplation of our own Ideas, without Revelation to diſcover whether Omnipotency hath not given to ſome Syſtems of Matter, fitly diſpoſed, a Power to perceive or think.* If this be true, then for all that we can know by our Ideas of *Matter* and *Thinking*, Matter may have a Power of Thinking: and if this hold, then it is impoſſible to prove a Spiritual Subſtance in us, from *the Idea of Thinking*: For how can we be aſſured by our *Ideas*, That God hath not given ſuch a Power of Thinking, to Matter ſo diſpoſed as our Bodies are? Eſpecially ſince it is ſaid, *That in reſpect of our Notions, it is not*

Humane Underſt. l. 4. ch. 3. Sect. 6. 2d. Ed. p. 310.

much more remote from our Comprehenſion to conceive that God can, if he pleaſes, ſuper-add to our Idea of Matter a Faculty of Thinking, than that he ſhould ſuper-add to it another Subſtance, with a Faculty of Thinking. Whoever aſſerts this, can never prove *a Spiritual Subſtance* in us, from a *Faculty of Thinking*; becauſe he cannot know from *the Idea of Matter and Thinking*, that Matter ſo diſpoſed cannot Think. And he cannot be certain that God hath not framed the Matter of our Bodies, ſo as to be capable of it.

Book IV. *Chap.* 10. *§.* 5. It is ſaid indeed elſewhere, *That it is repugnant to the Idea of Senſleſs Matter, that it ſhould put into it ſelf Senſe, Perception and Knowledge:* But this doth not reach the preſent Caſe; which is not *what Matter can do of it ſelf*, but what Matter prepared by an Omnipotent hand can do. And what certainty can we have that he hath not done it? We can have none *from the Ideas*; for thoſe are given up in this Caſe; and conſequently, we can have no certainty upon theſe Principles, whether we have any *Spiritual Subſtance* within us or not.

Book II. *Chap.* 23. *§.* 15. But we are told, *That from the Operations of our Minds, we are able to frame the Complex Idea of a Spirit.* How can that

that be, when we cannot from thoſe *Ideas* be aſſured, but that thoſe Operations may come from a *material Subſtance*. If we frame an *Idea* on ſuch Grounds, it is at moſt but a *poſſible Idea*; for it may be otherwiſe; and we can have no aſſurance *from our Ideas*, that it is not: So that the moſt men may come to in this way of *Idea's* is, That it is poſſible it may be ſo, and it is poſſible it may not; but that it is impoſſible for us *from our Ideas*, to determine either way. And is not this an admirable Way to bring us to a certainty of Reaſon?

I am very glad to find the Idea of a *Spiritual Subſtance* made as conſiſtent, and intelligible, as that of a *Corporeal*; *for as the one conſiſts of a* Coheſion *of ſolid Parts, and the Power of communicating Motion by impulſe, ſo the other conſiſts in a Power of Thinking, and Willing, and moving the Body; and that the* Coheſion *of ſolid Parts, is as hard to be conceived as Thinking; and we are as much in the dark about the Power of communicating Motion by impulſe, as in the Power of exciting Motion by thought. We have by daily experience clear Evidence of Motion produced, both by Impulſe and by Thought; but the manner how, hardly comes within our Comprehenſion; we are equally at a loſs in both.* Sect. 27. Sect. 28.

From whence it follows, That we may be certain of the Being of a *Spiritual Subſtance*, although we have *no clear and diſtinct Idea* of it, nor are *able to comprehend the manner of its Operations:* And therefore it is a vain thing in any to pretend, that all our Reaſon and Certainty is founded on clear and diſtinct *Ideas*; and that they have Reaſon to reject any Doctrine which relates to *Spiritual Subſtances*, becauſe they cannot comprehend the manner of it. For the ſame thing is confeſſed by the moſt inquiſitive Men, about the manner of Operation, both in *material*, and *immaterial Subſtances*. It is affirmed, That *the very Notion of Body*, implies, *ſomething very hard, if not impoſſible to be explained, or underſtood by us*; *and that the natural Conſequence of it*, viz. *Diviſibility*; *involves us in Difficulties impoſſible to be explicated, or made conſiſtent. That we have but ſome few Superficial Ideas of things*; *that we are deſtitute of Faculties, to attain to the true Nature of them*? *and that when we do that, we fall preſently into Darkneſs, and Obſcurity*; *and can diſcover nothing farther, but our own Blindneſs and Ignorance.*

Sect. 31.

Sect. 32.

Theſe are very fair and ingenuous Confeſſions of the ſhortneſs of humane Under-

Underſtanding, with reſpect to the Nature and Manner of ſuch things, which we are moſt certain of the Being of, by conſtant and undoubted Experience. I appeal now to the Reaſon of mankind, whether it can be any reaſonable Foundation for rejecting a Doctrine propoſed to us, as of Divine Revelation, becauſe we cannot comprehend the manner of it; eſpecially, when it relates to the Divine Eſſence. For as the ſame Author obſerves, *Sect.* 33, 34, 35. *Our Idea of God is framed from the Complex Ideas of thoſe Perfections we find in our ſelves, but enlarging them ſo, as to make them ſuitable to an infinite Being, as Knowledge, Power, Duration,* &c. And *the Degrees or Extent of theſe which we aſcribe to the Soveraign Being, are all boundleſs and infinite. For it is infinity, which joyned to our Ideas of Exiſtence, Power, Knowledge,* &c. *makes that Complex Idea, whereby we repreſent to our ſelves the beſt we can, the Supreme Being.* *Sect.* 36.

Now, when our Knowledge of groſs material Subſtances is ſo dark; when the Notion of Spiritual Subſtances is above all Ideas of Senſation; when the higher any Subſtance is, the more remote from our Knowledge; but eſpecially when the

very *Idea* of a Supreme Being implies its being Infinite, and Incomprehenſible, I know not whether it argues more Stupidity, or Arrogance to expoſe a Doctrine relating to the Divine Eſſence, becauſe they cannot comprehend the manner of it. But of this more afterwards. I am yet upon the Certainty of our *Reaſon*, from clear and diſtinct *Ideas*: and if we can attain to Certainty without them, and where it is confeſſed we cannot have them; as about *Subſtances*: then theſe cannot be *the ſole Matter and Foundation of our Reaſoning*, which is ſo peremptorily aſſerted by this late Author.

But I go yet farther: and as I have already ſhew'd, we can have no certainty of an *Immaterial Subſtance* within us, from theſe *ſimple Ideas*; ſo I ſhall now ſhew, that there can be no ſufficient Evidence, brought from them by their own Confeſſion, concerning the *Exiſtence of the moſt Spiritual and infinite Subſtance, even God himſelf.*

Book IV. *Chap.* 10. *ſect.* 1. We are told, *That the Evidence of it is equal to Mathematical Certainty*; and very good Arguments are brought to prove it, in a Chapter on purpoſe: but that which I take notice of is, that the Argument from the *clear and diſtinct Idea of*

of God is paſſed over. How can this be conſiſtent with deducing our *Certainty of Knowledge* from *clear and ſimple Ideas?* I do not go about to juſtifie thoſe, *who lay the whole ſtreſs upon that Foundation*; which I grant to be too weak to ſupport ſo important a Truth; and that thoſe are very much to blame, who *go about to invalidate other Arguments for the ſake of that*; but I doubt all this talk about *clear and diſtinct Ideas, being made the Foundation of Certainty*, came Originally from thoſe Diſcourſes, or *Meditations*, which are aimed at. The Author of them was an ingenious, Thinking man, and he endeavour'd to lay the Foundations of Certainty, as well as he could. The firſt thing he found any certainty in, was his own Exiſtence; which he founded upon the Perception of the Acts of his Mind, which ſome call *an Internal, infallible Perception that we are.* From hence he proceeded, to enquire, how he came by this Certainty, and he reſolved it into this, that he had a clear and diſtinct Perception of it; and from hence he formed his general Rule, *That what he had a clear and diſtinct Perception of was true.* Which in Reaſon ought to go no farther, than where there is the like Degree of Evidence: for

the *Certainty* here, was not grounded on the clearneſs of the *Perception*, but on the Plainneſs of the Evidence which is of that Nature, that the very *Doubting* of it proves it; ſince it is impoſſible, that any thing ſhould doubt or queſtion its own Being, that had it not. So that here it is not *the Clearneſs of the Idea*, but an immediate Act of Perception, which is the true ground of Certainty. And this cannot extend to things without our ſelves; of which we can have no other Perception, than what is cauſed by the Impreſſions of outward objects. But whether we are to judge according to thoſe Impreſſions, doth not depend on the *Ideas* themſelves, but upon the Exerciſe of our Judgment and Reaſon about them, which put the Difference between true and falſe, and adequate, and inadequate Ideas. So that our Certainty is not from the *Ideas* themſelves, but from the Evidence of Reaſon, that thoſe *Ideas* are true, and juſt, and conſequently that we may build our Certainty upon them.

But the *Idea* of an infinite being hath this peculiar to it, that neceſſary Exiſtence is implied in it. This is a *clear and diſtinct Idea*, and yet it is denied, that this doth prove the Exiſtence of God.

How

How then can the Grounds of our Certainty ariſe from *clear and diſtinct Ideas*; when in one of the cleareſt Ideas of our Minds we can come to no Certainty by it? I do not ſay, That it is *denied* to prove it; but this is ſaid, That it is a doubtful thing *from the different make of Mens Tempers and Application of their thoughts.* Sect. 7. What can this mean, unleſs it be to let us know, that even *clear and diſtinct Ideas*, may loſe their Effect by the *difference of mens Tempers and Studies*; ſo that, beſides *Ideas*, in order to a right Judgment, a due Temper and Application of the mind is required.

And wherein is this different from what all men of Underſtanding have ſaid? Why then ſhould theſe clear and *ſimple Ideas be made the ſole Foundation of Reaſon?* One would think by this, that theſe *Ideas* would preſently ſatisfie mens Minds, if they attend to them. But even this will not do, as to the *Idea* of an infinite Being. It is not enough to ſay, *They will not examine how far it will hold:* for they ought either to ſay, that it doth hold, or give up this Ground of Certainty from *clear and diſtinct Ideas.*

But inſtead of the proper Argument Sect. 6. from *Ideas*, we are told, *That from the Conſide-*

Conſideration of our ſelves, and what we find in our own Conſtitutions, our Reaſon leads us to the Knowledge of this certain and evident Truth; that there is an eternal, moſt powerful, and moſt knowing Being. All which I readily yield; but we ſee plainly the Certainty is not placed in the *Idea*, but in good and ſound Reaſon *from the Conſideration of our ſelves and our Conſtitutions.* What! in the *Idea of our Selves?* No certainly; for let our *Idea* be taken which way we pleaſe, by *Senſation* or *Reflection*, yet it is not the *Idea* that makes us certain, but the Argument from that which we perceive in, and about our Selves.

Sect. 5. *But we find in our ſelves Perception and Knowledge.* It's very true; but how doth this prove that there is *a God?* Is it from the *clear and diſtinct Idea* of it. No, but from this Argument: *That either there muſt have been a knowing Being from Eternity, or an unknowing; for ſomething muſt have been from Eternity: but if an unknowing, then it was impoſſible there ever ſhould have been any knowledge; it being as impoſſible, that a thing without knowledge ſhould produce it, as that a Triangle ſhould make it ſelf three Angles bigger than two right ones.* Allowing the Argument to be good,

good, yet it is not taken from *the Idea*, but from Principles of true Reaſon; as That no man can doubt his own Perception; that every thing muſt have a Cauſe, that this Cauſe muſt either have Knowledge or not: if it have, the Point is gained; if it hath not, nothing can produce nothing; and conſequently, a not knowing Being cannot produce a knowing.

Again, *If we ſuppoſe nothing to be firſt,* Sect. 10. *Matter can never begin to be; if bare Matter without Motion eternal, Motion can never begin to be; if Matter and Motion be ſuppoſed Eternal, Thought can never begin to be. For, if Matter could produce thought, then Thought muſt be in the power of Matter; and if it be in Matter as ſuch, it muſt be the inſeparable Property of all Matter; which is contrary to the Senſe and Experience of Mankind. If only ſome parts of Matter have a power of Thinking, how comes ſo great a difference in the Properties of the ſame Matter? What diſpoſition of Matter is required to thinking? And from whence comes it? of which no account can be given in Reaſon.*

This is the Subſtance of the Argument uſed, to prove an infinite ſpiritual Being, which I am far from weakning the force of; but that which I deſign, is to ſhew,

That

That the *Certainty* of it is not placed upon any *clear and distinct Ideas*, but upon the force of Reason distinct from it, which was the thing I intended to prove.

2. The next thing necessary to be clear'd in this Dispute is, the *Distinction* between *Nature* and *Person*, and of this we can have no *clear and distinct Idea* from *Sensation* or *Reflection*. And yet all our Notions of the Doctrine of the Trinity, depend upon the right understanding of it. For we must talk unintelligibly about this Point, unless we have clear and distinct Apprehensions concerning *Nature* and *Person*, and the grounds of *Indentity* and *Distinction*. But that these come not into our Minds by these *simple Ideas* of *Sensation* and *Reflection*, I shall now make it appear;

1. As to *Nature*, That is sometimes taken for the *Essential Property* of a thing, as when we say, that such a thing is of a *different Nature* from another, we mean no more than that it is differenced by such Properties as come to our Knowledge. Sometimes *Nature* is taken for the *Thing it self in which those Properties are*; and so *Aristotle* took *Nature* for a *Corporeal Substance, which had the Principles of Motion in it self:* but *Nature* and *Substance* are

are of an equal extent; and ſo that which is the *Subject* of *Powers*, and *Properties* is the *Nature*, whether it be meant of *Bodily* or *Spiritual Subſtances*. I grant, that by *Senſation* and *Reflection* we come to know the *Powers* and *Properties* of Things; but our Reaſon is ſatisfied, that there muſt be ſomething beyond theſe; becauſe it is impoſſible that they ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves. So that the *Nature* of things properly belongs to our *Reaſon*, and not to meer *Ideas*.

But we muſt yet proceed farther. For, *Nature* may be conſider'd two ways.

1. As it is in diſtinct Individuals, as the *Nature* of a *Man* is equally in *Peter*, *James*, and *John*; and this is the *common Nature* with a particular Subſiſtence proper to each of them. For the Nature of man, as in *Peter*, is diſtinct from that ſame Nature, as it is in *James* and *John*; otherwiſe, they would be but *one Perſon*, as well as have the *ſame Nature*. And this Diſtinctions of *Perſons* in them is diſcerned both by our *Senſes*, as to their different Accidents; and by our Reaſon, becauſe they have a ſeparate Exiſtence; not coming into it at once and in the ſame manner.

2. *Nature* may be conſider'd *Abſtractedly*, without reſpect to individual Perſons, and

and then it makes an entire Notion of it ſelf. For however, the ſame Nature may be in different Individuals, yet the Nature in it ſelf remains one and the ſame: which appears from this evident Reaſon; that otherwiſe every Individual muſt make a different kind.

Let us now ſee, how far theſe things can come from our *ſimple Ideas, by reflection* and *Senſation.* And I ſhall lay down the *Hypotheſis* of thoſe, who reſolve our *Certainty* into *Ideas*, as plainly, and intelligibly, as I can.

Humane Underſt. I. 2. ch. 30. 31.

1. We are told, *That all ſimple Ideas are true and adequate. Not, that they are the true Repreſentations of things without us; but that they are the true Effects of ſuch Powers in them, as produce ſuch Senſations within us.* So that really we can underſtand nothing certainly by them, but the *Effects* they have upon us.

2. *All our Ideas of Subſtances are imperfect and inadequate; becauſe they refer to the real Eſſences of things, of which we are Ignorant, and no man knows what Subſtance is in it ſelf:* And *they are all falſe, when look'd on as the Repreſentations of the unknown Eſſences of things.*

Chap. 32. ſect. 18.

Book 3. Chap. 3. ſect. 6.

3 *Abſtract Ideas are only general Names, made by ſeparating Circumſtances of time and*

and place, &c. from them, which are only the Inventions, and Creatures of the Underſtanding.

4 *Eſſence may be taken two ways.* 1. *For the real, internal, unknown Conſtitutions as things, and in this Senſe it is underſtood of to particular things.* 2. *For the abſtract Idea, and one is ſaid to be the Nominal, the other the Real Eſſence. And the Nominal Eſſences only are immutable; and are helps to enable Men to conſider things, and to diſcourſe of them.* Ib. ſect. 15. Sect. 19. 20.

But two things are granted, which tend to clear this Matter.

1. That there is *a Real Eſſence*, which is the Foundation of *Powers* and *Properties*.

2. That we may *know* theſe *Powers* and *Properties*, although we are ignorant of the *Real Eſſence*.

From whence I inferr.

1. That from thoſe true and *adequate Ideas*, which we have of the *Modes* and *Properties* of Things, we have ſufficient certainty of the *Real Eſſence* of them: For theſe *Ideas* are allow'd to be true; and either by them we may judge of the truth of things; or we can make no Judgment at all of any thing without our ſelves.

If

If our *Ideas* be only the Effects we feel of the Powers of things without us; yet our Reaſon muſt be ſatisfied, that there could be no ſuch Powers, unleſs there were ſome real Beings which had them. So that either we may be certain by thoſe Effects of the real Being of Things; or it is not poſſible, as we are framed, to have any certainty at all of any thing without our ſelves.

2. That from the *Powers* and *Properties* of things which are knowable by us, we may know as much of the internal *Eſſence* of Things, as thoſe *Powers* and *Properties* diſcover. I do not ſay, That we can know all Eſſences of things alike; nor that we can attain to a perfect underſtanding of all that belong to them: but if we can know ſo much, as that there are *certain Beings* in the World, endued with ſuch *diſtinct Powers* and *Properties*, what is it we complain of the want of, in order to our Certainty of Things? *But we do not ſee the bare Eſſence of things.* What is that *bare Eſſence* without the *Powers* and *Properties* belonging to it? It is *that internal Conſtitution of things from whence thoſe Powers and Properties flow.* Suppoſe we be ignorant of this (as we are like to be, for any Diſcoveries that

that have been yet made, that is a good Argument to prove the uncertainty of Philoſophical Speculations about the *Real Eſſences* of things; but it is no prejudice to us, who enquire after the *Certainty* of ſuch *Eſſences*. For although we cannot comprehend the *internal Frame*, or *Conſtitution* of things, nor in what manner they do flow from the Subſtance; yet by them we certainly know that there are ſuch *Eſſences*, and that they are diſtinguiſhed from each other by their *Powers* and *Properties*.

3. The *Eſſences* of things as they are *knowable* by us, have a *Reality* in them: For they are founded on the *natural Conſtitution* of things. And however the *abſtract Ideas* are the work of the Mind; yet they are not meer Creatures of the Mind; as appears by an inſtance produced of the *Eſſence of the Sun, being in one ſingle Individual*; in which Caſe it is granted, *That the Idea may be ſo abſtracted, that more Suns might agree in it, and it is as much a Sort as if there were as many Suns as there are Stars.* So that here we have a *Real Eſſence* ſubſiſting in one *Individual*, but capable of being multiplied into more, and the ſame Eſſence remaining. But in this *one Sun* there is a Book 3. *Chap.* 6. *Sect.* 1.

Real Eſſence, and not a meer *Nominal* or *abſtracted Eſſence:* but ſuppoſe there were more Suns; would not each of them have the *Real Eſſence* of the Sun? For what is it makes the ſecond Sun to be a true Sun, but having the ſame *Real Eſſence* with the firſt? If it were but a *Nominal Eſſence*, then the ſecond would have nothing but the *Name.*

Therefore there muſt be a *Real Eſſence* in every individual of the ſame kind; for that alone is it, which makes it to be what it is. *Peter*, and *James*, and *John*, are all true and real Men; but what is it which makes them ſo? Is it the attributing a *general Name* to them? No certainly, but that the true and *Real Eſſence* of a Man is in every one of them. And we muſt be as certain of this, as we are that they are Men; they take their Denomination of being Men from that common Nature, or Eſſence which is in them.

4. That the *general Idea* is not made from the ſimple *Ideas* by the meer act of the Mind abſtracting from Circumſtances, but from *Reaſon* and Conſideration of the true Nature of things. For, when we ſee ſo many *Individuals*, that have the ſame *Powers* and *Properties*, we thence infer, that there muſt be ſomething common

mon to all, which makes them of *one kind*: and if the difference of Kinds be real, that which makes them of one kind and not of another, muſt not be a *Nominal*, but *Real Eſſence*. And this difference doth not depend upon the *complex Ideas of Subſtance*, whereby Men arbitrarily joyn Modes together in their Minds; for let them miſtake in the *Complication of their Ideas*, either in leaving out, or putting in what doth not belong to them, and let their Ideas be what they pleaſe; the *Real Eſſence* of a Man, and a Horſe, and a Tree, are juſt what they were: and let their *Nominal Eſſences* differ never ſo much, the *Real common Eſſence*, or *Nature* of the ſeveral Kinds are not at all alter'd by them.

And theſe *Real Eſſences* are *unchangeable*: For, however there may happen ſome variety in Individuals, by particular Accidents, yet the Eſſences of Men, and Horſes, and Trees remain always the ſame; becauſe they do not depend on the *Ideas* of Men, but on the Will of the Creator, who hath made ſeveral ſorts of Beings.

2. Let us now come to the *Idea* of a *Perſon*. For, although the *common Nature* in mankind be the ſame, yet we ſee a difference in the ſeveral Individuals from

one another: So that *Peter* and *James*, and *John* are all of the ſame kind; yet *Peter* is not *James*, and *James* is not *John*. But what is this diſtinction founded upon? They may be diſtinguiſhed from each other by our Senſes, as to difference of Features, diſtance of Place, &c. but that is not all; for ſuppoſing there were no ſuch external difference; yet there is a difference between them, as ſeveral Individuals in the ſame common Nature. And here lies the true *Idea* of a *Perſon*, which ariſes from that *manner of Subſiſtence* which is in one Individual, and is not Communicable to another. An *Individual, intelligent Subſtance*, is rather ſuppoſed to the making of a *Perſon*, than the proper *Definition* of it; for a *Perſon* relates to ſomething which doth diſtinguiſh it from another *Intelligent Subſtance* in the *ſame Nature*; and therefore the Foundation of it lies in the peculiar manner of Subſiſtence, which agrees to one, and to none elſe of the Kind; and this is it which is called *Perſonality*.

But how do our *ſimple Ideas* help us out in this Matter? Can we learn from them, the difference of *Nature* and *Perſon*? We may underſtand the difference between *abſtracted Ideas*, and particular Beings,

ings, by the Impreſſions of outward Objects; and we may find an *Intelligent Subſtance* in our ſelves by inward Perception; but whether that make a *Perſon* or not, muſt be underſtood ſome other Way; for, if the meer Intelligent Subſtance makes a Perſon, then there cannot be the Union of two Natures, but there muſt be two Perſons.

Therefore a *Perſon* is a compleat Intelligent Subſtance, with a peculiar manner of Subſiſtence; ſo that if it be a part of another Subſtance, it is no Perſon; and on this account the Soul is no Perſon, becauſe it makes up an entire Being by its Union with the Body.

But when we ſpeak of Finite *Subſtances* and *Perſons*, we are certain that diſtinct Perſons do imply diſtinct Subſtances, becauſe they have a diſtinct and ſeparate Exiſtence; but this will not hold in an infinite Subſtance, where neceſſary Exiſtence doth belong to the *Idea* of it. And although the Argument from the *Idea of God*, may not be ſufficient of it ſelf to prove his Being; yet it will hold as to the excluding any thing from him, which is inconſiſtent with *neceſſary Exiſtence*; therefore, if we ſuppoſe a Diſtinction of *Perſons* in the ſame *Divine Na-*

ture, it must be in a way agreeable to the infinite Perfections of it. And no objection can be taken from the *Idea of God*, to overthrow a *Trinity* of *Co-existing Persons* in the *same Divine Essence*. For *necessary Existence* doth imply a *Co-existence* of the Divine Persons; and the Unity of the Divine Essence, that there cannot be such a difference of *individual Substances*, as there is among mankind. But these things are said to be *above our Reason*, if not contrary to it, and even such are said to be repugnant to our Religion.

2. That therefore is the next thing to be carefully Examin'd, whether *Mysteries of Faith*, or Matters of Revelation *above our Reason*, are to be rejected by us. And a Thing is said to be *above our Reason*, when we can have *no clear and distinct Idea* of it in our Minds: And, *that if we have no Ideas of a thing, it is certainly but lost labour for us to trouble our selves about it*; and that, *if such Doctrines be proposed which we cannot understand, we must have new Powers, and Organs for the Perception of them.*

Christianity not Myst. p. 28.

We are far from defending *Contradictions* to our *natural Notions* (of which I have spoken already) but that which we are now upon is, whether any Doctrine may

may be rejected, when it is offer'd as a Matter of Faith upon this account, that it is above our Comprehenſion, or that we can have no *clear Idea of it in our Minds.* And this late Author hath undertaken to prove, *That there is nothing ſo Myſterious, or above Reaſon in the Goſpel.*

To be above Reaſon, he ſaith, *may be underſtood two ways.* 1. *For a thing Intelligible in it ſelf, but cover'd with figurative and myſtical Words.* 2. *For a thing in its own Nature unconceivable, and not to be judged of by our Faculties, tho' it be never ſo clearly revealed. This in either Senſe is the ſame with Myſtery.* And from thence he takes occaſion to ſhew his Learning about the *Gentile Myſteries,* and *Eccleſiaſtical Myſteries,* which might have been ſpared in this Debate, but only for the Parallel aimed at between them, as to *Prieſtcraft* and *Myſteries*; without which a Work of this nature would want its due reliſh with his good *Chriſtian Readers.* Others we ſee have their *Myſteries* too; but the Comfort is, that they are ſo eaſily underſtood, and ſeen through; as when the *Heathen Myſteries,* are ſaid, *to have been inſtituted at firſt in Commemoration of ſome remarkable Accidents, or to the Honour of ſome great Perſons that obliged the* P. 67. P. 71.

World by their Vertues and uſeful Inventions to pay them ſuch Acknowledgments. He muſt be very dull that doth not underſtand the meaning of this; and yet this Man pretends to vindicate *Chriſtianity* from being *Myſterious.*

P. 73. *But there are ſome,* he ſaith, *that being ſtrongly inclined out of Ignorance, or Paſſion to maintain what was firſt introduced by the Craft or Superſtition of their Forefathers, will have ſome Chriſtian Doctrines to be ſtill Myſteries in the ſecond Senſe of the Word; that is, unconceiveable in themſelves, however clearly revealed.* I hope there are ſtill *ſome,* who are ſo throughly perſwaded of the Chriſtian Doctrine, that they dare own and defend it, notwithſtanding all the Flouts and Taunts of a ſort of Men, whoſe Learning and Reaſon lies moſt in expoſing *Prieſt-craft,* and *Myſteries.* Suppoſe there are ſuch ſtill in the World, who own their Aſſent to ſome Doctrines of Faith, which they confeſs to be above their Comprehenſion, what mighty Reaſon, and invincible Demonſtration is brought againſt them? He pretends *to Demonſtrate*; but what I pray? The Point in hand? No. But he will *Demonſtrate* ſomething inſtead of it? What is that? Why truly, *That in the*

New

New Teſtament Myſtery is always uſed in the firſt Senſe of the Word. And what then? Doth it therefore follow, that there are no Doctrines in the Goſpel above the reach and comprehenſion of our Reaſon? But how doth it appear, that the Word *Myſtery* is always uſed in that Senſe? When S. *Paul* ſaith in his firſt *Epiſtle* to *Timothy*, Chap. 3. v. 9. *That the Deacons muſt hold the Myſtery of Faith in a pure Conſcience*; doth he not mean thereby the ſame *with the form of ſound Words*, which *Timothy* had heard of him, 2 *Tim.* 1. 13. And are not all the main Articles of the Chriſtian Faith comprehended under it? Eſpecially that whereinto they were Baptized, *in the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt:* and if the Doctrine of the Trinity were underſtood by this *Form*, as I have already proved, then this muſt be a part of the *Myſtery of Faith.* And in the ſame Chapter, v. 16. He makes *God manifeſt in the Fleſh*, the firſt part of the *Myſtery of Godlineſs.* If it extends to all the other things, doth it exclude this, which is the firſt mention'd? (And that our Copies are true, is already made to appear.) There is no Reaſon therefore to quarrel with our Uſe of the Word *Myſtery* in this Senſe;

Senſe; but the Debate doth not depend upon the Word, but upon the Senſe of it.

And therefore I paſs over all that relates to the bare uſe of the Word, as not coming up to the main Point; which is, Whether any Point of Doctrine, which contains in it ſomething above our Comprehenſion can be made a Matter of Faith?

P. 145. For our Author concludes from his Obſervations, *That Faith is ſo far from being an implicit Aſſent to any thing above Reaſon, that this Notion directly contradicts the end of Religion, the Nature of Man, and the Goodneſs and Wiſdom of God.*

But we muſt not be frighted with this bold *Concluſion*, till we have Examin'd his *Premiſes*; and then we ſhall find, that ſome *who are* not *great Readers, are no deep Reaſoners.* The firſt thing he premiſes is,

P. 75. *That nothing can be ſaid to be a Myſtery, becauſe we have not an adequate Idea of it, or a diſtinct View of all its Properties at once, for then every thing would be a Myſtery.* What is the meaning of this, but that we cannot have an *adequate Idea* of any thing? And yet all our Reaſon depends upon our *Ideas* according to him, and our *clear and diſtinct Ideas are by him made the ſole Foundation of Reaſon.* All our

our *ſimple Ideas* are ſaid to be *adequate*, becauſe they are ſaid to be only *the Effects of Powers in things which produce Senſations in us.* But this doth not prove them *adequate* as to *the things*, but only as to our *Perceptions.* But as to *Subſtances* we are told, *That all our Ideas of them are inadequate.* So that the ſhort of this is, that we have no true Knowledge or Comprehenſion of any thing; but we may underſtand Matters of Faith, as well as we underſtand any thing elſe, for in Truth we underſtand nothing. Is not this a method of *true Reaſoning* to make us reject Doctrines of Faith, becauſe we do not comprehend them, and at the ſame time to ſay we *comprehend nothing?* For I appeal to the common Senſe of mankind, whether we can be ſaid to *Comprehend* that, which we can have no *adequate Idea* of? But he appeals to the Learned; for he ſaith, *That to Comprehend in all correct Authors is nothing elſe but to know.* But what is *to know?* Is it not to have *adequate Ideas* of the things we know? How then can we know, that of which we can have no *adequate Idea?* For if our Knowledge be limited to our *Ideas*, our Knowledge muſt be imperfect and inadequate where our *Ideas* are ſo.

But

But let us lay theſe things together. Whatever we can have no *adequate Idea* of is *above our Knowledge*, and conſequently *above our Reaſon*; and ſo all *Subſtances* are *above our Reaſon*; and yet he ſaith, with great Confidence, *That to Aſſent to any thing, above Reaſon, deſtroys Religion, and the Nature of man, and the Wiſdom and goodneſs of God.* How is it poſſible for the ſame man to ſay this, and to ſay withal, that it is very conſiſtent with that *Nature of man, and the goodneſs and Wiſdom of God*, to leave us without *adequate Ideas* of any *Subſtance*? How come the *Myſteries of Faith* to require more *Knowledge* than the *Nature of Man* is capable of? In natural things we can have no *adequate Ideas*; but the things are confeſſed to be *above our Reaſon*; but in Divine and Spiritual things, to *Aſſent to things above our Reaſon is againſt the Nature of Man.*

How can theſe things conſiſt?

But theſe are not Myſteries. Yes, whatever is of that Nature that we can have no *Idea* of it, is certainly a *Myſtery* to us. For what is more unknown than it is known is a *Myſtery*. The true Notion of a *Myſtery* being ſomething that is hidden from our Knowledge. Of which there may be ſeveral Kinds. For a *Myſtery* may be taken for, 1. Some-

1. Something kept ſecret, but fully underſtood as ſoon as it is diſcover'd; thus *Tully* in his *Epiſtles* ſpeaks of *Myſteries* which he had to tell his Friend, but he would not let his *Amanuenſis* know; no doubt ſuch things might be very well underſtood as ſoon as diſcover'd. Ad. Attic. 4. 87. ed. R. S.

2. Something kept from common Knowledge, although there might be great Difficulties about them when diſcover'd. Thus *Tully* ſpeaks of *Myſteries* among the Philoſophers, particularly among the *Academicks*, who kept up their Doctrine of the *Criterion* as a Secret, which, when it was known had many Difficulties about it. Acad. 4. 18.

3. Something that Perſons were not admitted to know, but with great Preparation for it. Such were the *Athenian Myſteries* which *Tully* mentions with Reſpect, although they deſerved it not: but becauſe they were not Communicated to any but with Difficulty, they were called *Myſteries*. And this is ſo obvious a piece of Learning, that no *great Reading*, or *deep Reaſoning* is required about it. Only it may be obſerved, that the Word μύειν is oppoſed to ἐφορᾶν, and ſo the *Myſteries* related to thoſe who were *initiated* and not made *Epoptæ*; *i. e.* to thoſe who did De Leg. l. 2. c. 14.

did not throughly underſtand them, although they had more knowledge of them than ſuch as were not *initiated*. *Olympiodorus*, in reckoning up the *Degrees* of Admiſſions, mentions the μυήσεις before ἐποπτείαι. So that they were properly *Myſteries* to ſuch, who knew ſomething; though there were other things farther to be diſcover'd, but they did not yet know what they were, as the *Epoptæ* did.

From hence the ancient Chriſtian Writers did not only call the *Sacraments*, but more abſtruſe Points of Faith by the name of *Myſteries*; ſo S. *Chryſoſtom* calls *the Reſurrection, a great and ineffable Myſtery.* And *Iſidore Peluſiota* in his Epiſtle to *Lampetius* ſaith, *That S.* Paul, *when he ſpeaks of the great Myſtery of Godlineſs, doth not mean that it is wholly unknown to us, but that it is impoſſible to Comprehend it. Theophylact* ſaith, it is therefore called *the great Myſtery of Godlineſs; becauſe although it be now revealed to all, yet the manner of it is hidden from us,* διὰ τοῦτο Μυστήριον ἐστι, *for this Reaſon it is called a Myſtery.*

Chryſ. Hom. de Reſurrect.

Iſidor. Peluſ. l. 2. Ep. 192.

But this is in the way of *Reading*; let us now come to *deep Reaſoning*; and ſee how ſtrongly he argues againſt this Senſe of the Word *Myſteries*: his Words are theſe; *They trifle then exceedingly, and*

diſcover

diſcover a mighty ſcarcity of better Arguments, who defend their Myſteries, by this pitiful ſhift of drawing Inferences from what is unknown to what is known, or of inſiſting upon adequate Ideas; except they will agree as ſome do, to call every Spire of Graſs, ſitting and ſtanding, fiſh and fleſh to be Myſteries. And if out of a pertinacious or worſe humour, they will be ſtill fooling, and call theſe things Myſteries, I'm willing to admit as many as they pleaſe in Religion, if they will allow me likewiſe to make mine as intelligible to others, as theſe are to me. Chriſtianity not Myſt. p. 80, 81.

It is eaſie to gueſs whom theſe kind Words were intended for: And are not theſe very modeſt and civil Expreſſions? *Trifling, Fooling; out of a pertinacious, or worſe Humour*; but why, *Fooling about Myſteries*, to call ſuch things by that Name, which are in ſome meaſure known, but in a greater meaſure unknown to us? and if theſe are real Myſteries in Nature, why may not the ſame term be uſed for Matters of Faith?

And I think in ſo plain a Caſe, no great ſtore of Arguments need to be uſed. But *in theſe natural things*, he ſaith, *we have diſtinct Ideas of the Properties which make the Nominal Eſſence, but we are abſolutely ignorant of the Real Eſſence, or intrinſick Conſtitu-* p. 84.

Conſtitution of a thing, which is the ground or ſupport of all its Properties. Are not then (without *Trifling and Fooling*) theſe Real Eſſences *Myſteries* to them? They know there are ſuch by the *Ideas* of their Properties, but know nothing of their *Real Eſſence*; and yet they will not allow them to be *Myſteries*? If they do underſtand them, why do they ſay, *They do not, nor cannot*? And if this be true, let them call them what they pleaſe, they muſt be inexplicable *Myſteries* to them. So that all this is mere quarrelling about a Word, which they would fain be rid of, if they knew how; but they involve and perplex themſelves more by their own *deep Reaſonings* againſt the *Trifling* and *Fooling* of others.

But he ſaith, *That ſome would have the moſt palpable abſurdities and groſs Contradictions to go down, or words that ſignifie nothing, becauſe men cannot comprehend the Eſſence of their own Souls, nor the Eſſence of God, and other Spiritual Subſtances.* We utterly deny, that any Article of our Faith contains in it any *palpable Abſurdities*, or *groſs Contradictions* (as I hope hath been proved already as to the Doctrine of the Trinity which is chiefly ſtruck at) but ſurely your *deep Reaſoners* may find a dif-

a difference between *groſs Contradictions to our Reaſon*, and barely *being above it*, or not having any *diſtinct Conception* of the Nature of it. And that is all that we aſſert, and which they grant as to all *Subſtances*.

If this be their way of arguing, they may even return to *Tranſubſtantiation* again, without any great leſſening of their Underſtandings. But none are ſo bold in attacking the *Myſteries of the Chriſtian Faith*; as the Smatterers in *Ideas*, and new Terms of Philoſophy, without any true Underſtanding of them. For theſe *Ideas* are become but another ſort of Canting with ſuch men; and they would reaſon as well upon *Genus* and *Species*, or upon *Occult Qualities*, and *Subſtantial Forms*, but only that they are *Terms* out of *Faſhion*.

But we find that the change of Terms doth neither improve nor alter mens Underſtandings; but only their Ways of ſpeaking; and ill Gameſters will not manage their Game one jot the better, for having *new Cards* in their hands. However we muſt ſee what Work they make of it.

P. 86. *Although we do not know the Nature of the Soul, yet we know as much of it, as we do of any thing else, if not more,* i. e. we really know nothing by any *adequate Idea* of it, but we must believe nothing, but what we have a *clear distinct Idea* of. Is not this a rare way of fixing the *Boundaries of Faith and Reason*; *As to God and his Attributes*, it is said, *That they are not Mysteries to us for want of an adequate Idea;* P. 81. *no not Eternity.* And in another place, P. 88. *As to God, we comprehend nothing better than his Attributes.*

Let us try this, by the *Attribute* pitched on by himself; *viz. Eternity.* We see he pretends to comprehend nothing better than the *Divine Attributes*; and *Eternity* as well as any; (which I am very apt to believe) but how doth he *Comprehend Eternity?* Even by finding, *That it* P. 82. *cannot be Comprehended.* Is not this Subtle and *deep Reasoning?* But *Reason* he saith, *performs its part in finding out the true Nature of Things*; and if such be the *Nature of the thing*, that it *cannot be Comprehended*, then Reason can do no more, and so it is not *above Reason.* Was there ever such *Trifling* that pretended to Reason; and that about the highest Matters, and with Scorn and Contempt of others

others whom he calls *Myſterious Wits*? The Queſtion is, whether any thing ought to be rejected as an Article of Faith, becauſe we cannot comprehend it, or have a clear and diſtinct Perception of it: He concludes it muſt be ſo, or elſe *we overthrow Religion, and the Nature of Man, and the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God.* Here is an Eſſential Attribute of God, *viz.* his Eternity. Am I bound to believe it or not? Yes, doubtleſs. But how can I comprehend this Attribute of Eternity? *Very eaſily.* How ſo? *Do not you comprehend that it is incomprehenſible?* What then? Doth this reach the Nature of the thing, or only the manner of our Conception? *If the Nature of the thing be, that it cannot be comprehended, then you rightly underſtand the Nature of the thing, and ſo it is not above your Reaſon.* Let the Caſe be now put as to the *Trinity*; do you believe the Doctrine of it, as of Divine Revelation? No, *God hath given me the Nature, and Faculties of a Man; and I can believe nothing, which I cannot have a diſtinct and clear Idea of; otherwiſe I muſt have new Faculties.* Will you hold to this Principle? Then you muſt believe nothing, which you cannot have a clear and diſtinct *Idea* of. Very true.

But can you have a clear and distinct Idea of what you cannot comprehend? *A clear Idea, is that whereof the mind hath a full and evident Perception. A distinct Idea, is that whereby the mind perceives the difference of it from all others.* Is this right? Yes. But can you have a full and evident Perception of a thing, so as to difference it from all others, when you grant it to be *Incomprehensible?* If you have a *full Perception* of it, you comprehend its Nature, and especially if you can *difference* it from all other things; but when you say, *its Nature is Incomprehensible*, and yet *believe it*, you must deny it to be necessary to Faith, to have *a clear and distinct Idea* of the thing proposed. And if it be repugnant to your Faculties to reject the *Trinity*, because you cannot have *a clear and distinct Idea* of it, for the same Reason, you must unavoidably reject his *Eternity*, and all other Attributes which have *infinity* joyned with them.

But we must stop here, because this admirable Undertaker hath said, *That he despairs not of rendring Eternity, and Infinity as little Mysterious, as that three and two make five.* And till then I take my leave of him.

P. 83.

And

And ſo I return to our profeſſed *Unitarians*, who in anſwer to my Sermon fell upon the ſame Subject, and it is neceſſary that I conſider ſo much, as tends to the clearing of it. In my Sermon I had urged this Argument to prove, that we may be bound to believe ſome things that are Incomprehenſible to us, becauſe the Divine Nature, and Attributes are acknowledged to be ſo; and I had ſaid,

(1.) That there is no greater Difficulty in the Conception of the Trinity, and Incarnation, than there is of *Eternity*. Not but that there is great Reaſon to believe it, but from hence it appears, that our Reaſon may oblige us to believe ſome things, which it is not poſſible for us to comprehend.

And what ſay our *Unitarians* to this? They Charge my *Notion of Eternity* (as they call it) with a *Contradiction*.

The beſt way of proceeding will be to ſet down my own Words; which are theſe. *Anſwer to Serm.* p. 5.

"We know that either God muſt have "been for ever, or it is impoſſible he "ever ſhould be, for if he ſhould come "into being when he was not, he muſt "have ſome Cauſe of his Being, and that "which was the firſt Cauſe would be

" God. But if he was for ever, he must " be from himself, and what Notion, or " Conception can we have in our Minds " concerning it ?

To this say they, *To say a Person, or Thing is from it self is a Contradiction; it implies this Contradiction, it was before it was. And they are sorry an Eternal God must be a Contradiction.* What a false and spiteful Inference is this ?

But it had look'd like very *deep Reasoning*, if I had said, *That God was the cause of himself.* For, that would have implied the Contradiction he had charged it with : but I had expresly excluded his being *from any Cause* : and the thing I urged was only the Impossibility, of our having a clear and distinct Conception of *Eternity.* For, if he could have *no Cause*, what could we thing of his being Eternal? *If to be from himself as a Cause*, be unconceivable, (as I grant it is) then it proves what I designed that we cannot have any destinct Idea of *Eternity.* But *to be from himself* in the Sense generally understood, is a meer *Negative Expression* ; for no Men were such Fools to imagine any thing could be before it self, and in this Sense only, Learned Men have told us, that it is to be understood by those *ancient and Modern Writers*,

Writers, who have uſed that Expreſſion. As when S. *Jerom* ſaith, That *God is ſelf Originated*; and S *Auguſtin*, *that God is the Cauſe of his own Wiſdom*; and *Lactantius*, *that God made himſelf*; all theſe and ſuch like expreſſions are only to be Negatively underſtood. Poſſevin. *Appar. in* Genebrard.

But I confeſs I aimed at ſhewing, that it was impoſſible for us to have any *clear and diſtinct Idea* of *Eternity*, and therefore I took in all poſſible ways of conceiving it, either by Gods being from himſelf, or his Co-exiſting with all differences of Time, without any ſucceſſion in his own Being; or his having a ſucceſſive Duration. From all which I argued the Impoſſibility of a clear Notion of Eternity. And now what do theſe Men do? They diſpute againſt one of theſe Notions, and very triumphantly expoſe, as they think, the *Abſurdities* of it. And what then? *Why then this Notion will not do.* But I ſay none will do.

I prove there can be no ſucceſſive Duration in a Being of neceſſary Exiſtence; and that it is not to be conceived, how without Succeſſion God ſhould be preſent with the Being, and not Being, the Promiſe and Performance of the ſame thing; and yet one of theſe ways we muſt make

uſe of. From whence I concluded, That all we can attain to is, a full Satisfaction of our Reaſon concerning God's Eternity, although we can form no diſtinct Conception of it in our Minds. But when theſe Men inſtead of anſwering the Argument from all the Notions of Eternity, onely diſpute againſt one Notion of it, they apparently ſhew the weakneſs of their Cauſe, if it will bear no other Defences, but ſuch as this. For I take it, that the main Debate in point of Reaſon depends upon this, whether we can be certain of the Being of a Thing, of which we can have *no clear and diſtinct Idea*? If we may, then it can be no Objection in point of Revelation, that we can have no *clear and diſtinct Idea* of the Matter revealed; ſince there can be no Reaſon to tie us up ſtricter in Point of Revelation, than we are without it. If we can be certain in Reaſon of many things, we can have no ſuch *Ideas* of, what imaginable Reaſon can there be, that a point of Faith ſhould be rejected on that account?

2. I urged another Attribute of God, *viz.* his *Spirituality*, for the ſame Reaſon; *viz.* that we are ſatisfied in point of Reaſon that God muſt be a Spirit; and yet we cannot have a clear diſtinct poſitive Notion of a Spirit. And

And what answer do they give to this? As wise as the former. Why truly, *I had no cause to object this against them, because they own the Spirituality of God's Nature, and none since* Biddle *have denied it.* P. 6.

Very well! but doth my argument proceed upon that, or upon the not having *a distinct and clear Idea* of a *Spirit?* It was hardly possible for men so to mistake my meaning, unless they did it, because they had no other answer to give.

3. I argued from *God's Prescience*, which I do expressly assert, and prove that they cannot have a distinct Notion of it, nay that *Socinus* denied it, because he could not understand it.

But here they tell me, *I cannot defend our Doctrine against theirs without finding Contradictions in God's Eternity and Foreknowledge.* If this be the Ingenuity and Justice and Charity of the *Unitarians*; commend me to the *honest-hearted Deists*, if there be any such, as they assure us there are. One had better be charged with *Trifling and Fooling with Mysteries*, than with undermining the main foundations of Religion, by charging them with *Contradictions.* P. 7.

But nothing could be farther from my Thoughts, than any thing tending that way.

way. And such a base Calumny is too much honoured with a Confutation. But do they offer to clear the difficulty and give us a *clear and distinct Idea of God's fore-knowing* future Events without a *certain Cause* to make them future. Nothing like it. For the question is not, *Whether a thing be necessary because God foresees it as certain,* (as they suppose.) But how of a thing merely possible it comes to be certain without a *certain Cause*; and how a thing which hath no *certain Cause* can be certainly foreknown, and what clear and distinct Notion we can have of this in our Minds. If they had answer'd this, they had said something to the purpose. To resolve *all into God's infinite Wisdom* is a good answer from us, but not from them. For we think it our Duty to satisfie our selves with what God hath revealed, without prying into the manner of things above our Comprehension; but these Men who will receive nothing but what they have *clear and distinct Ideas* of, ought to shew the manner of this, or else we must be excused on the same reason, if we allow the manner of the *divine Subsistences* in the *same Essence* to be above our Comprehension.

4. I ſhew'd how unreaſonable their demands were, when the Nature of God is owned to be *incomprehenſible*, and his *Perfections infinite.*

And now of a ſudden they are quite turned about; for before they were only for fencing and warding off Blows but at laſt they come to the point, and own *the being of God to be comprehenſible by them; and that they have clear and diſtinct Ideas of God's infinite Attributes.* This is indeed to the purpoſe, if they can make theſe things out. But Fencers have many tricks, and I wiſh we find none here. I had ſaid, " That in conſequence to the " Aſſertion, that nothing is to be believ'd, " but what may be comprehended, the " very Being of God muſt be rejected " too, becauſe his Being is incomprehen- " ſible, and ſo they muſt reject one God " well as three Perſons.

To this they reply, *That to comprehend the Being or Exiſtence of God, is only this, to comprehend that God is, and if we cannot comprehend that, all Religion ceaſes.* P. 7. Is not this a fine turn? What I ſaid of God as to the Perfections of his Nature, they will have it underſtood of his bare Exiſtence, which I do not mention. When God is ſaid to be *an incomprehenſible Being*, who

who before them did underſtand the meanning to be, *That we cannot comprehend that there is a God:* This is not mere *trifling*, for it looks like ſomething worſe; and yet they preſently after ſay, *That to comprehend a thing is to have a clear adequate Conception of it.* And will they pretend to have ſuch a one of the divine Eſſence, when they confeſs but a little before,

P. 5. *That we converſe every day with very many things, none of which we comprehend, and that I might have ſpared my pains in proving it?* But what can be the meaning of theſe ſayings, *They cannot comprehend the common Natures of things*, nor have a *clear* and *diſtinct Idea* of them, but they can *comprehend* an *infinite Being*, whom all Mankind own to be *incomprehenſible.* But as to divine *Attributes*, they ſay, *They have clear, diſtinct and adequate Conceptions of them*; and inſtance in *Eternity, Power, Wiſdom and Juſtice.* We do not deny that in ſuch Attributes which we apply to God, becauſe we find them to be *Perfections in us*, we have a diſtinct and clear Perception of them, as they are conſider'd in themſelves, for that is the reaſon why we attribute them to God. But for ſuch as peculiarly belong to God as *Eternity* doth; and for the degrees

grees of other Attributes as they belong to him, as they are *infinite*, ſo they are above our *Comprehenſion*. (1.) As to Eternity, ſay they, it is a *clear and diſtinct Notion of Eternity, to ſay, it is a duration without beginning and without end.*

But we can have no *clear and diſtinct Notion of Duration*, when applied to a Being that hath *neceſſary Exiſtence*. For *Duration*, they ſay, *conſiſts in a Succeſſion*. And what *Succeſſion* can there be in a Being which *always* is the ſame, if there were no difference of times, *i.e.* God was the ſame Being before time was, and is the very ſame Being under all the differences of times; he hath not any other Duration now than he had before, and what Succeſſion could there be where there was no time? But we make uſe of *Duration* with reſpect to things done in time, and for the help of our underſtandings apply the meaſure of time to divine Acts. But in a *neceſſary Exiſtence*, there can be *no paſt, preſent, or to come*; and in a ſucceſſive Duration, there muſt be conceived a longer continuance from time to time; which is repugnant to the Notion of a Being, which always is. So that, if we cannot conceive *Eternity* without *Duration*, nor *Duration* without *Succeſſion*;

ceſſion; nor can apply *Succeſſion* to a *Being* which hath *neceſſary Exiſtence*, then we can have no *clear and diſtinct Notion of God's Eternity.* (2) As to the *Infiniteneſs* of God's Perfections, they ſay, *That although the Mind be in it ſelf finite, yet it hath an infinite Comprehenſion, for what is finite with reſpect to its Extenſion of parts may be infinite in other reſpects, and with reſpect to ſome of its Powers.* But how doth it appear that we have any *Power* to *comprehend* what is *infinite?* All the *Power* we have extends only to *adding and enlarging our Ideas* without bounds, *i. e.* we can put no ſtop to our apprehenſions, but ſtill they may go farther than we can poſſibly think, but is this an *infinite Comprehenſion?* So far from it, that this ſhews our Capacities to be finite, becauſe our *Ideas* cannot go ſo far as our Reaſon. For our Reaſon tells us, we can never go ſo far, but we may ſtill go farther: but it is impoſſible for our underſtanding to have *diſtinct Ideas* of the infinite moments in an eternal Succeſſion of the utmoſt Bounds of Immenſity, or of the extent of infinite Power and Knowledge, ſince the very Notion of *Infinite* implies, that we can ſet no bounds to our thoughts; and therefore although the

P. 8.

the *Infinity* of the divine Attributes be evident to our Reaſon, yet it is likewiſe evident to our Reaſon, that what is *infinite* muſt be above our *Comprehenſion.*

II. I come now to the laſt enquiry which is that if we allow things above our Reaſon, what ſtop can be put to any abſurd Doctrine, which we may be required to believe?

And this is that which our *Unitarians* object in all their late Pamphlets. In anſwer to my Sermon they ſay, That on our principles, *our Reaſon would be in vain, and all Science and Certainty would be deſtroy'd,* which they repeat ſeveral times. And from hence they do ſo frequently inſiſt on the *Parallel* between the Doctrine of the *Trinity* and *Tranſubſtantiation:* They ſay, *That all the defence we have made for one will ſerve for the other, or any other abſurd and impoſſible Doctrine. That what we ſay, will equally ſerve all the Nonſenſe, and impoſſible Doctrines that are to be found among Men; and they particularly inſtance in Tranſubſtantiation.* I need mention no more. But I did not expect to have found this *Parallel* ſo often inſiſted upon, without an anſwer to *two Dialogues* purpoſely written on that Subject, at a time when the Doctrine

Anſwer to the Archbiſhop, &c. P. 4.

P. 17.

P. 67.

Letter of Reſolut. p. 3.

Conſiderat. on the Explication, &c. by Dr. W. p. 30.

Doctrine of the *Trinity* was uſed as an argument to bring in *Tranſubſtantiation*, as that is now alledged for caſting off the other.

But I muſt do them that right to tell the World, that at that time a *Socinian* Anſwer was written to thoſe *Dialogues*, which I ſaw, and wiſh'd it might be Printed, that the World might be ſatisfied about it and them. But they thought fit to forbear; and in all their late Pamphlets where this *Parallel* is ſo often repeated, there is but once, that I can find, any notice taken of thoſe *Dialogues*, and that in a very ſuperficial manner. For the main Deſign and Scope of them is paſt over, and only one particular mention'd, which ſhall be anſwer'd in its due order.

But in anſwer to the general Enquiry, I ſhall endeavour to ſtate the due Bounds between *Faith and Reaſon*, and thereby, to ſhew, that by thoſe grounds on which we receive the Doctrine of the *Trinity*, we do not give way to the Entertainment of any abſurd Opinion, nor overthrow the *Certainty* of *Reaſon*

1. We have no difference with them about the *Uſe* of our *Reaſon* as to the *Certainty* of a *Revelation*. For in this caſe, we are as much as they for ſearching into

into the grounds of our Faith; for we look on it as a *reaſonable Act* of our Minds, and if we did not allow this, we muſt declare our ſelves to believe without grounds. And if we have grounds for our Faith, we can expreſs them in Words that are intelligible; and if we can give an account of our Faith in an intelligible manner, and with a deſign to give others ſatisfaction about it, I think this is making *uſe of our Reaſon in matters of Faith.*

2. We have no difference with them about the *uſe of our Reaſon*, as to the *true Senſe of Revelation.* We never ſay, that Men are bound to believe upon the bare *ſound of Words* without examining the *Senſe* of them. We allow all the beſt and moſt reaſonable ways of attaining to it, by Copies, Languages, Verſions, comparing of Places, and eſpecially the *Senſe of the Chriſtian Church* in the beſt and pureſt Ages, neareſt the Apoſtolical Times and expreſs'd in ſolemn and publick Acts. By theſe *Rules* of *Reaſon* we are willing to proceed, and not by any late and uncertain methods of interpreting Scripture.

3. We differ not with them about the *right uſe* of the *Faculties* which God hath given us, of *right Underſtanding* ſuch matters as are offer'd to our Aſſent. For

it is to no purpoſe to require them to believe, who cannot uſe the Faculties which are neceſſary in order to it. Which would be like giving the *Benefit of the Clergy* to a Man with a *Cataract* in both his Eyes. And it would be very unreaſonable to put his Life upon that Iſſue, whether he could read or not, becauſe he had the *ſame Organs of Seeing* that other Men had; for in this caſe the whole matter depended not on the *Organ* but the *Uſe* of it: This needs no Application.

4. We differ not with them about *rejecting* ſome Matters propoſed to our Belief, which are *contradictory to the Principles of Senſe and Reaſon.* It is no great argument of ſome Mens Reaſon, whatever they pretend to talk againſt *admitting ſeeming Contradictions in Religion*; for who can hinder *ſeeming Contradictions*? Which ariſe from the ſhallowneſs of Mens Capacities, and not from the repugnancy of Things: and who can help Mens Underſtandings? But where there is evident proof of a *Contradiction* to the *Principles of Senſe and Reaſon*; we are very far from owning any ſuch thing to be an Article of Faith, as in the caſe of *Tranſubſtantiation.* Which we reject, not only, as having no foundation in Scripture,

but

but as repugnant to the common Principles of Senſe and Reaſon; as is made to appear in the two *Dialogues* before-mention'd.

But our *Unitarians* find fault with the Author of them, for laying the force of his argument upon this, *That there are a great many more Texts for the Trinity, than are pretended for Tranſubſtantiation*; whereas many other arguments are inſiſted on, and particularly the great *Abſurdity of it in point of Reaſon*, *Dial.* 2. from *p.* 33. to the end. And it is not the bare *number of Texts*, which he relies upon, but upon the *greater Evidence and Clearneſs* of the *Texts* on one ſide than on the other, which depends upon figurative Words, not capable of a *literal Senſe* without overthrowing the Doctrine deſigned to be proved by it. See with what Ingenuity theſe Men treat the Defenders of the *Trinity*, and the Enemies to *Tranſubſtantiation*, which they call only a *Philoſophical Error or Folly*; but the Doctrine of the *Trinity* is charged with *Nonſenſe*, *Contradiction*, and *Impoſſibilities*.

Conſiderat. on the Explication by Dr. W. *p.* 30.

Anſwer to Archbiſh. p. 21.

But wherein then lies the difference in *point of Reaſon*? For thus far I have ſhew'd, that we are far from overthrowing *Reaſon*, or giving way to any *abſurd Doctrines*.

It

It comes at last to the point already treated of in this Chapter, how far we may be obliged to believe a Doctrine which carries in it something *above our Reason*; or of which we cannot have any *clear and distinct Ideas*. And of this I hope I have given a sufficient Account in the foregoing Discourse.

FINIS.